




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BBS Ltr.#735-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
October 9, 1974

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137



SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION HIGH FLOW INSTRUMENT ANOMALY.

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A

2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 1320 hours on October 4, 1974
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1415 hours on October 4, 1974

3) Drawing Number: GEK 1399B Tab 3

Report Number: 50-249/1974-32

Report Date: October 9, 1974

Occurrence Date: October 3, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Dresden Unit 3 high pressure coolant injection high flow switch DPIS 3-2352 was found with a setpoint of 155 inches H₂O increasing which is above the Technical Specification limit of 145 inches H₂O increasing.

CONDITION PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, Dresden Unit 3 was in the run mode with a steady load of 600 MWe. Routine instrument surveillance was in progress.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

During routine instrument surveillance on Barton switch DPIS 3-2352 the setpoint was found to be 155 inches H₂O increasing, which is above the

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Technical Specification limit of 150 inches H₂O increasing. The switch was immediately inspected and several anomalies were noted. The actuator arm and pivots were loose, and the actuator plunger screw was not adjusted properly. The switch was repaired and reset to 145" H₂O increasing.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Procedure)

Dresden Station has had a history of setpoint drift on Barton sensors. A program has been underway for some time to determine the cause of this drift. A portion of this program was devoted to consulting the manufacturer and following his recommendations. The loose and mis-adjusted parts in DPIS 3-2352 were found as a consequence of following the recommendations made by the IIT Barton Co. It is theorized that these anomalies were the result of an unawareness of the instrument mechanics involved as to what constituted a properly adjusted Barton switch. This deficiency was corrected during the period of September 30, 1974 to October, 1974. During this time, a representative of IIT Barton Co. instructed the Dresden instrument mechanics as to the proper technique in adjusting and inspecting Barton model 288 switches.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

DPIS 3-2352 is one of two high flow sensors which function to isolate the HPCI steam line in the event of a pipe break. The remaining sensor was found to operate within the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the safety of plant personnel or the general public was not jeopardized as a result of this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The switch was immediately repaired and reset to 145" H₂O increasing. In addition, all Barton switches on the reactor safety system will be inspected, and all needed repairs made as soon as practicable.

FAILURE DATA

DPIS 3-2352 is a Barton Model 288 with a range of -200-0-200 inches H₂O DR. The switch has been found above the Technical Specifications six times previous to this occurrence in a span of approximately four years.

Sincerely,

B. B. Stephenson
for B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

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