




Commonwealth Edison  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

EBS Ltr.#723-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
October 4, 1974

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

50-249



SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  
FAILURE OF PRESSURE SWITCH INSTRUMENT TAPS ON 2/3 RADWASTE FILTER.

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A

- 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 1320 hours on September 27, 1974  
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1320 hours on September 27, 1974

Report Number: 40-249/1974-47

Report Date: October 4, 1974

Occurrence Date: September 27, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

#### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

At approximately 2000 hours on September 27, 1974, the pressure taps on "B" waste collector filter dome vent and dome drain lines were broken off resulting in spillage of contaminated water to the radwaste floor during the subsequent filter backwash.

#### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, Unit 2 was at 0 megawatts thermal with the mode switch in the shutdown position. The "A" filter was out of service due to maintenance.

#### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

The "B" waste collector filter pressure switch taps failed during the backwash cycle. The failure was discovered and reported by personnel in the area at the time.

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incident

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October 4, 1974

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Design Deficiency)

An investigation into the problem revealed that during maintenance on the "A" unit, the "B" lines had been bumped and jarred to the point that failure occurred during initial operations of the backwash cycle.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The safety of the plant and public was not in jeopardy during the failure of 2/3 "B" radwaste filter pressure switch taps. All water from the spillage was contained in the radwaste floor drain system. All systems functioned normally during the occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION


The immediate corrective action was to locate and isolate the failed lines. The pressure switches will also be moved from the pipe to an instrument rack in order to reduce congestion in the area and prevent possible recurrence of the event. This installation will also have an isolation valve in the line.

FAILURE DATA

The failure occurred on the 3/8" diameter lines of pressure switches PS1B and PS2B.

There has been no previous failure record of these lines.

Sincerely,



B. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent

BBS:ERP:do