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BBS Ltr. #56-75

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
January 30, 1975

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF UNUSUAL EVENT PER SECTION 6.6.C OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
FAILURE OF U3 CLEANUP SYSTEM INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE MO3-1201-1  
TO OPEN

- References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A  
2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: P. Johnson, 1445 hours on January 6, 1975  
3) Dresden Station Drawing M-361

Report Number: 50-249/1975-3

Report Date: January 30, 1975

Occurrence Date: January 3, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

#### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Failure of Unit 3 Clean-up Inboard Isolation Valve MO3-1201-1 to open.

#### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence the unit was in the "run" mode with thermal power at about 1173 megawatts. The unit was operating at an electrical load of 376 megawatts and the cleanup system was being placed in service.

#### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On January 3, 1975 at about 2340 hours the cleanup system was being placed in service following minor repairs. While placing the system on line the inboard isolation valve MO-3-1201-1 failed to open.

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January 30, 1975

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Design Deficiency)

On inspection of the valve it was found that four mounting bolts which holds the motor end bell in place had sheared allowing the end bell to fall free. Subsequent torque caused the rotor to break free. The cause of the bolts shearing was due to a design deficiency in sizing the mounting bolts for this size of motor.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE


The failure of the 3-1201-1 valve to open did not place the safety of the plant or public in jeopardy. At the time of the failure the outboard isolation valves were operational, and the failure of the 3-1201-1 valve was in the closed or isolation condition. In addition all emergency core cooling systems were operational during the time of the failure.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

No immediate corrective action was required because the unit was in the process of shutting down due to high reactor water chloride content. The motor was replaced with the motor from the unit 2-1201-1 valve as unit 2 was shutdown for a refueling outage. The motor from unit 3-1201-1 valve was returned to the vendor for rewiring. The vendor has been informed of the failure and assistance has been requested. Additional corrective actions will be based on vendor recommendations.

FAILURE DATA

This is the first failure of unit 2 or 3 1201-1 valves in this manner since 1971.

  
C. B. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent

BBS:RWC:smp

File/AEC