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BBS Ltr. #39-75

Dresden Nuclear Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
January 17, 1975

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
REACTOR FEED PUMP MINIMUM FLOW LINE LEAK

- References:
- 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A
  - 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: P. Johnson, 1400 hours on January 8, 1975  
Telegram: Mr. James G. Keppler, 1555 hours on January 8, 1975
  - 3) Dresden Station Drawings M-347 and M-370

Report Number: 50-249/1975-4

Report Date: January 17, 1975

Occurrence Date: January 7, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois/

#### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Pin hole leak in 3B reactor feed pump minimum flow line to condenser. This occurrence represents an abnormal degradation of a boundary designed to contain radioactive material.

#### CONDITION PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence the unit was in the process of heating up. The mode switch was in the startup position and reactor pressure was about 475 psig.

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DESCRIPTION OF OCCURENCE

On January 7, 1975 at about 1630 hours a pin hole leak was detected in the 3B reactor feed pump minimum flow line to the condenser. The leak was discovered while the 3B reactor feed pump was in service. The leak occurred at a six inch to a three inch reducer on the pumpside of the main condenser isolation valve.

DISIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Design Error)

The failure of the pipe was due to a swirl being created by a velocity change through the off-set reducer. The swirling action caused the pipe in the area of the reducer to erode at a rate greater than that considered in the original design.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The failure of the 3B reactor feed pumps minimum flow line to the condenser did not place the safety of the plant or public in jeopardy. At the time of the failure only one feed pump was required. With both the 3A and the 3C feed pumps available for operation, unit startup was continued. In addition, all safety core cooling systems were operational at the time of the failure.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action taken was to isolate the failed section of pipe and to patch the leak. Additional corrective action will be taken during the next unit refueling outage when the mild steel portion of the line will be replaced with a chrome-moly section to reduce erosion (Modification M12-3-74-164).

FAILURE DATA

Failures of this type have occurred in the past and a modification has been submitted to replace the minimum flow lines of the feed pumps in the area of reducers during the next refueling outage.

*Arthur M. Robate*  
for B. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent

BBS:TEL:smp  
File/AEC