NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	1 5	8 4	8 4	— 0 1 9	— 0 0	0 5	1 5	8 4	SSES - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 8 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
L.A. Kuczynski - Nuclear Plant Specialist-III	7 1 7 — 5 4 2 — 3 7 5 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A	J M	*	*	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 15, 1984, in accordance with the station's approved personnel protection procedure, operation's personnel removed two fuses associated with the Unit 2 primary containment isolation logic because of work being done to incorporate an approved modification into the logic circuitry. Due to a bypass jumper which had been incorrectly installed by construction personnel, the fuse removal caused a false high drywell pressure signal. This resulted in actuation of the common Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System and Standby Gas Treatment System. These systems are Engineered Safety Features. The fuses were reinstalled and equipment returned to its normal status. The jumper was subsequently installed properly and the modification completed.

* Not Applicable.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	8 4	— 0 1 9	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On April 15, 1984, properly completed documentation was issued to construction personnel to hang bypass tags. This temporarily modified the isolation circuitry to the Unit 2 reactor head spray valves so that a plant modification could be made to the circuitry. The valves were not required to be operable with the unit in Mode 5 (Refuel). When two fuses were pulled under properly completed personnel protection documentation associated with the modification, a false high drywell pressure signal resulted. The signal actuated the lockout relay on Division II Zone III, which tripped three Zone III (Refueling Floor) fans, closed three Unit 2 isolation dampers and actuated the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS) and Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS).

After verification that the high drywell pressure signal was indeed false, the CREOASS and SGTS were returned to their normal (Standby) status, the Unit 2 isolation dampers were opened, the lockout relays reset and Zone III ventilation returned to normal. It was determined that one of the bypass jumpers had been physically installed across the wrong terminals, a cognitive error. The total activity involved the installation of two jumpers, one for Division I isolation signal and the second for Division II. After installing a jumper in panel 2C661A3 between points TBB-77 and TBB-79, the personnel proceeded to panel 2C661B3 to install a jumper between points TBC-77 and TBC-79. The termination blocks were all properly identified, however, the physical location in the respective panels is different. When installing the second jumper, the jumper was inadvertently installed between TBB-77 and TBB-79 in Panel 2C661B3 instead of TBC-77 and TBC-79. Subsequently, the jumper was connected across the proper terminals and the modification successfully completed.

The subject work activity and associated error were reviewed in detail with the work crew involved (non-licensed utility personnel). The necessity to accurately identify and verify termination points when performing work in electrical panels was discussed in detail. Safe operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 was not affected by this event. Although caused by personnel error, all system actions were per design and in a conservative direction.

PP&L Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101 • 215/770-5151

May 15, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-019-00
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-2204

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 84-019-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) in that, due to an improperly installed jumper, a false high drywell pressure signal was initiated which resulted in an unanticipated Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

H.W Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

LAK/pjg

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. R.H. Jacobs
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 52
Shickshinny, PA 18655

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