



Commonwealth Edison
Quad-Cities Generating Station
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BBS-73-243

November 19, 1973

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit One
Docket No. 50-254; DPR-29
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.2.A, and 6.6.B

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the details concerning an abnormal occurrence which took place on November 9, 1973, whereby the setpoint of three Primary Containment Isolation System instruments drifted. This abnormal occurrence was reported to you by telephone and telegraph on November 9, 1973.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

During the day shift hours on November 9, 1973, with the Unit One reactor in the Hot Standby mode, routine calibration of the sixteen main steam line differential pressure switches which monitor flow was conducted. The setpoints of three of these switches were found to exceed the limiting condition for operation (Tech Spec Table 3.2.1.). The three switches in question and their "found" setpoints are as follows:

<u>DPIS No.</u>	<u>Setpoint</u>	<u>Location</u>
1-261-2G	110 PSID	"B" Steam Line
1-261-2J	109.5 PSID	"C" Steam Line
1-261-2M	109.5 PSID	"C" Steam Line

A setpoint of 109 PSID has the equivalent of 120 percent flow.

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November 19, 1973

Recalibration of these switches was undertaken immediately with the following new setpoints established.

<u>DPIS NO.</u>	<u>SETPOINT</u>
1-261-2G	105.5 PSID
1-261-2J	105.5 PSID
1-261-2M	106.5 PSID

EVALUATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The failure of the above mentioned pressure switches did not effect plant safety. With all other pressure switches operable, isolation would have occurred if high flow was experienced. DPIS 1-261-2G is the "A" channel sensor on the "B" steam line. Isolation would have occurred with the other three correctly set pressure switches. DPIS 1-261-2J is located on "C" steam line and is the input for RPS channel "A" and DPIS 1-261-2M is on the same steam line but in RPS channel "B". The two remaining pressure switches would have been sufficient to isolate the "C" steam line at less than 120% flow.

DETERMINATION OF CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

The exact cause of instrument drift is not known and an investigation by Commonwealth Edison is continuing. The involved switches are Barton model 278. The setpoints of these and all other similar instruments were recalibrated to 107 \pm 1 psid in January 1973, thus providing at least 2 psid margin for the instrument drift. The reduction of the instrument setpoint by 2 psid from the LCO setpoint has significantly reduced the frequency of similar incidents. Consequently we do not consider justifiable a further reduction of the setpoint or an increase in calibration surveillance requirement. Hence, no further corrective action is being considered.

EVALUATION OF CUMULATIVE EXPERIENCE FOR SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Setpoints of instruments of this type have a tendency to drift occassionally. Through continued surveillance recalibration and the existing setpoint margin for possible drift, occurrences of this nature are expected to be minimal in severity and

Mr. J. F. O'Leary


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November 19, 1973

frequency. The only other occurrence since the setpoint change to 107 psid was reported in my letter of March 6, 1973. That event also included a drift of no more than one psi on the instrument switches.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "B. B. Stephenson".

B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent

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cc: Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III