



Commonwealth Edison
Quad-Cities Generating Station
Post Office Box 216
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NJK-76-129

April 9, 1976



J. Keppler, Regional Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket No. 50-254, DPR-29, Unit 1
Appendix A, Sections 3.5.H.1, 6.6.B

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-254/76-12 for
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of
Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.b

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

[Handwritten signature]
N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK/DRA/lk

cc: G. A. Abrell

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REPORT NUMBER: RO 50-254/76-12

REPORT DATE: April 9, 1976

OCCURRENCE DATE: March 10, 1976

FACILITY: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Cordova, Illinois 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

The watertight door on the RHRS service water pump vault 1B exceeded limits when it was leak rate tested.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit One was in the REFUEL mode for a scheduled refueling outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On March 10, 1976, at 2:30 p.m., a member of the Technical Staff, along with the Maintenance Department, leak rate tested the 1B RHRS service water vault submarine door. The test rig was installed on the inside of the vault and pressurized with air to 15 psig. The gasket and the handle of the door were soap bubble tested for leakage. A small area along the gasket was found to be leaking.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Equipment Failure

The apparent cause of this occurrence is designated as equipment failure. Upon completion of the initial pressurization, the door was opened and visually inspected. The gasket in the area of the leakage was found to be dried out and the adjacent knife edge was rough, thus preventing proper seating.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

In the event of a flood in the condensate pump pit, all three RHR service water vaults would have remained dry and operable. Even though the 1B vault door did not pass the leak test, since the leakage was minor the vault integrity would have remained intact. Also, because the vault doors were being pressurized in the reverse direction, the leakage would most likely not have occurred in the event of a flood. In a flood condition, the water head from the flood water would pressurize the door in the sealing direction. Thus, there were no effects on the health and safety of the public related to this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Work Request 953-76 was written to accomplish repairs to the leaking seal. The repairs consisted of polishing the knife edge with an abrasive cloth,

and lubricating the gasket with a silicone lubricant. The door was then leak rate tested and found to be within specifications.

FAILURE DATA:

The submarine doors were purchased from the U.S. Navy, and manufactured by Electric Boat Drydock and Shipbuilders. There have been no previous occurrences of this type, thus there are no safety implications based on cumulative experience related to this occurrence.