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BBS-74-18

January 25, 1974

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Regulation
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit Two
Docket #50-265, DPR-30
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.1.1.B, and 6.6.B

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the details concerning an abnormal occurrence which took place on January 17, 1974 whereby the setpoint of one high drywell pressure instrument drifted. This abnormal occurrence was reported to you by telephone and telegram on January 18, 1974.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

With Unit Two running at a steady state load of 780 MWe, routine calibration tests were being conducted on four high drywell pressure instruments which provide a reactor scram when drywell pressure reaches the instrument setpoint of 1.95 psig. The setpoint of one of these four instruments (2-1001-88A) was found to be 2.05 psig. This "as found" setpoint exceeded its limiting condition for operation (Table 3.1.1.B) of $\leq$ 2.0 psig. Recalibration of the 2-1001-88A instrument was begun immediately with a new setpoint of 1.90 established.

EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The failure of this pressure switch did not effect plant safety. Instrument 2-1001-88A is an "A" channel sensor in conjunction with 2-1001-88C. The setpoint of this latter pressure switch and of "B" channel pressure switches 2-1001-88B and 2-1001-88D were found to be within their limiting

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778

condition for operation. The 88C pressure switch in combination with either one of "B" channel's pressure switches would have provided a reactor scram if high drywell pressure had occurred.

DETERMINATION OF CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

The exact cause of instrument drift is not known. The involved switch is a Static-o-ring model 12N-AA5-PP. The setpoint of this switch was calibrated at 1.95 ± 0.1 psig on October 17, 1973 providing a .05 psig instrument drift margin. Functional tests using pressure of 3 psig were also performed on November 15, 1973 and December 22, 1973 with successful test results. The reduction of the instrument setpoint ranging from .05 to .15 psig from the LCO setpoint on these pressure switches has significantly reduced the frequency of similar occurrences. Consequently we do not consider justifiable a further reduction of the setpoint or an increase in the calibration surveillance requirement. Hence, no further corrective action is being considered.

EVALUATION OF CUMULATIVE EXPERIENCE FOR SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Setpoints of instruments of this type have a tendency to drift occasionally. Through continued surveillance recalibration and the existing setpoint margin for possible drift, occurrences of this nature are expected to be minimal in severity and frequency. This is reflected in the fact that this is the first such occurrence with this type pressure switch since the setpoint reduction from 2.0 psig on January 14, 1973.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent

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cc: Regional Director
Director of Regulatory Operations, Region III