



Commonwealth Edison
Quad-Cities Generating Station
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BBS-74-46

March 1, 1974

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit One
Docket #50-254, DPR-29
Appendix A, 1.0.A.2, 3.7.A.1.b, and 6.6.B

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the details concerning an abnormal occurrence which took place on February 21, 1974 whereby the Unit One suppression chamber water level increased to approximately +2 1/4 inches thereby exceeding the requirement of +2 inches specified in section 3.7.A.1.b of the Technical Specifications. This abnormal occurrence was reported to you by telegram on February 21, 1974.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

On February 21, 1974, with Unit One operating at a steady state load of 720 MWe, a valve line up was in progress to fill the Unit One spent fuel pool from the condensate storage tank utilizing the 1C RHR pump cross-connected to the fuel pool cooling system. The normal suction valve from the torus to the 1C pump was closed and valves 1001-41 from the storage tank and 1001-42C to the 1C pump were unlocked and opened. This evolution lasted from about 2130 on the 20th to 0430 on the 21st. During this period of time the level in the suppression chamber gradually increased and exceeded the limit of +2" by about 1/4". The high level alarm at 1-1/2" was received, however, the rate of increase was very gradual and no immediate problem was suspected. The source of water to the torus was found to be leakage past valve 1001-42A which was locked closed.

This valve is the inlet to the 1A RHR pump suction from the storage tank and is in the same line downstream of valve 1001-41 which had been opened for the transfer. The 42A valve

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was seated manually and the excess water in the torus was pumped down at about 0600.

EVALUATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Effects of this abnormal occurrence are minimal. The total increase of water level amounted to 1/4 inch in excess of the Technical Specification limit. The basis for this limit is to maintain the required free air volume in the torus which is on the order of 112,000 cubic feet. Thus exceeding this limit by 1/4" for a short time has a relatively insignificant effect.

DETERMINATION OF CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION


The cause of this abnormal occurrence has been determined to be leakage of manual valve 1-1001-42A. The valve was in the closed position; however, it was not seated adequately to prevent leakage. Since this procedure for water transfer may be used again in the future, a note will be added to the precautions to alert operators to the potential for leakage to the suppression chamber.

CUMULATIVE EXPERIENCE

Quad-Cities Station has experienced suppression chamber level increases in the past associated with valving. However, none of these previous valving errors are similar to this occurrence. The valve line up was in accordance with the procedure and if the 1001-42A valve had been seated, the operation would have been successfully completed.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


B. B. Stephenson FOR
Station Superintendent

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cc: Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III