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BBS Ltr. #572-75

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
RR #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
September 2, 1975

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operation-Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE SENSOR SETPOINT DRIFT

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A

2) Notification of Region III of U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Telephone: Mr. R. Knop at 1000 hours on August 24, 1975
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler at 1235 hours on August 25, 1975

3) Drawing Numbers: 12E3465/12E3466

Report Number: 50-249/75-36

Report Date: September 2, 1975

Occurrence Date: August 23, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Reactor high pressure sensors 263-55A, -55B, and -55C were found with setpoints above the Technical Specification limit of 1060 psig.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Unit-3 was in the shutdown mode for a refueling outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

At approximately 1300 hours on August 23, 1975, a routine scheduled calibration of the reactor high pressure sensors revealed that sensors 263-55A, -55B, and -55C had setpoints above the 1060 psig limit.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Unusual Service Conditions)

Setpoint drift on these sensors appears to be aggravated by extended periods at zero pressure. The switches had not been tested since April 7, a period of nearly five months. In each case the setpoint error amounted to less than 5% of the operation range.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The reactor high pressure sensors initiate a reactor scram upon sensing excessive vessel pressure. Had the unit been operating with the setpoints remaining uncorrected, three of the four sensors would not have precipitated a reactor scram at 1060 psig. However, any such transient in reactor pressure would have been preceded by an increase in neutron activity. Since the neutron monitoring system was always operable during reactor operation, plant personnel and the general public were not jeopardized by this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The switches were immediately reset to within the station limits of 1055 $\pm$.5 psi.

To prevent a recurrence of this nature, General Electric and the station are currently evaluating suitable replacements for the Meletron Model 372 switches presently in service.

FAILURE DATA

Meletron Model 372 pressure sensors have had a history of setpoint drifting on both units 2 and 3.

B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

BBS:ARZ:smp

File/NRC