

Turkey Point Plant
September 8, 1972

Mr. John O'Leary, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: TURKEY POINT PLANT UNITS 3 and 4
DOCKET NOS. 50-250 & 50-251
UNUSUAL EVENTS 72-1, 72-2, 72-3

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

In accordance with Technical Specifications 6.6.2b, the following three Unusual Events are reported:

72-1. Simultaneous safety injection on both units.

At 5:15 a.m., August 12, 1972, Preoperational Procedure T-4000.1, Integrated Test of Engineered Safeguards System and Emergency Power System was in progress on Unit 4. Unit 4 is not licensed for operation and the reactor coolant system was open. Unit 3 was in cold shutdown. The first part of the test was injection of safety injection and containment spray signal with offsite power available. All safeguards related equipment functioned properly. The second part of the test was injection of safety injection water into the reactor coolant system and containment spray signal with loss of offsite power to both units with both diesels available. As loads were sequenced on the A diesel, severe voltage transients were noted and voltage decayed sufficiently to cause the 3A and 4A busses to restrip on undervoltage. The voltage transient was caused by safety injection loads for both units sequencing back onto the busses. The safety injection signal was present on No. 3 unit because 3A inverter was out of service and its vital bus was being fed from the AC maintenance source (motor control center).

Normally the three safeguards channels are fed by inverter A, inverter B and an AC source from a motor control center. Consequently, with the A inverter out of service, two safeguards channels were being fed from motor control centers. When all AC power was lost to both units for the loss of offsite power portion of the test, the two AC channels fed by motor control centers generated signals for safety injection because of the fail safe feature of the circuitry. This 2 out of 3 logic gave a safety injection signal for Unit 3.

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The diesels are not designed to supply safety injection loads for both units simultaneously, but to supply safety injection loads for the accident unit only, and hot shutdown loads for the other unit. Design changes will be required to prevent loss of offsite power from causing spurious 2 out of 3 logic signals. The safety injection initiating signals for Unit No. 4 have been inhibited to prevent simultaneous safety injection actions on both units. The safeguards design is under review and this problem will be resolved and implemented prior to fuel loading on Unit 4.


72-2. Charging Pump Packing Failure

On August 21, 1972, during normal operation of the 3A charging pump, the packing in the center stuffing box failed. The charging pump is a Union Pump Company type TX-150 positive displacement triple plunger pump. When the center plunger rod stuffing box assembly was disassembled and inspected, the plunger was found to be badly scored, the male packing adapter retainer ring was found broken into three pieces and the chevron packing rings deformed. The deepest scores on the plunger appeared to originate from deep blisters in the coating. The outer two plunger rod stuffing box assemblies had been leaking, but not excessively during the previous pump operation. The coating on these two plungers was found to be intact, but with some unbroken blisters on the surface opposite the stuffing box. The damaged parts were returned to the vendor for failure analysis. The cause of the failure is not known at this time. Corrective action will be determined after the vendors' report is reviewed.

72-3. Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test Failure

On August 21, 1972, during a routine weekly load test in accordance with Operating Procedure 4304.1, the A diesel generator could not produce the test output of 2750 KW. The diesel was run for 55 minutes but the highest loading obtained was 2350 KW. The diesel controls were checked and the governor was found dirty and sluggish. The governor was cleaned and adjusted. The diesel generator was then tested and performed satisfactorily.

Sincerely yours,



A. D. Schmidt
Director of Power Resources

ADS/DWJ:vv

cc: Director, Region II, Directorate of Regulatory Operation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Suite 218
230 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia