

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)										DOCKET NUMBER (2)					PAGE (3)		
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station										0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5					1 OF 0 2		

TITLE (4)

Inoperable Boration Flow Path

EVENT DATE (6)				LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)															
0	4	1	2	8	4	8	4	-	0	2	2	-	0	0	0	5	1	0	8	4	0	5	0	0	0						

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
5		20.402(b)	20.405(e)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(e)(1)	XXX	50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(e)				
0 1 0 1 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(e)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)				
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
A. R. Koon, Assoc. Mgr., Regulatory Compliance	AREA CODE 803 345-5209

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	
A	B IQ			N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	XXXXXX				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces / i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 12, 1984, at approximately 0200 hours, with the Plant in Mode 5, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) at half pipe, the discharge valve (XVG-8485A) for Charging Pump A was discovered closed. This made the boration flow path, as required by Technical Specification 3.1.2.1, inoperable. Immediate corrective action was taken to establish the required flow path. The cause of this event was due to personnel error. Corrective action taken to preclude occurrence consisted of the verification of "One Operable Boration Flow Path" in Modes 5 and 6 every shift. The Manager of Operations discussed the necessity of having an adequate shift turnover with all Shift Supervisors.

8405150421 840510
PDR ADCK 05000395
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5	8 4	— 0 2 2	— 0 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

In order to perform an Appendix J, Type C Leak Test on High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) valve XVG-8885-SI, the valve has to be isolated and the system drained. Authorization was given by the Shift Supervisor, 1600 to 2400 hour shift, on April 11, 1984, to close Charging Pump A discharge valve XVG-8485A and open XVG-8885-SI in preparation for Type C Leak Testing. The Control Room Operator was aware that manual opening of XVG-8485A was required to establish a boration flow path.

On shift turnover to the 0000 to 0800 hour (April 12) shift, the boration flow path valve lineup was not relayed to the on-coming shift.

During a routine review of the Main Control Board, at approximately 0200 hours, the operator discovered that the HHSI valve was open and that there was no indication of a decreasing level of the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST). (NOTE: With the system in its normal lineup and the HHSI valve open, gravity flow from the RWST to the RCS would occur.) An Auxiliary Operator was dispatched to check the valve lineup, and it was at this time that the discharge valve from Charging Pump A was found closed.

Immediate action was taken to return the boration flow path to its normal valve lineup.

In order to prevent recurrence, "One Operable Boration Flow Path" has been added to the Operator At the Control (Modes 5 and 6) log to be verified once each shift. Also, the Manager of Operations discussed the necessity of having an adequate shift turnover with all Shift Supervisors.

The status of the boration flow path was unknown for approximately two (2) hours due to a personnel error. During this time no core alterations or positive reactivity changes were made. In addition, the Reactor Makeup flow path was DANGER TAGGED out which minimized the consequences of this event.

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

May 10, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
LER 84-022

Dear Sir:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #84-022 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

RJB:OWD/dwf
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer
T. C. Nichols, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr.
E. H. Crews, Jr.
E. C. Roberts
W. A. Williams, Jr.
D. A. Nauman
J. P. O'Reilly
Group Managers
O. S. Bradham
C. A. Price
D. A. Lavigne

J. F. Heilman
C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
K. E. Nodland
R. A. Stough
G. Percival
C. W. Hehl
J. B. Knotts, Jr.
INPO Records Center
NPCF
File

1822
11