

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR COMPANY
Turkey Point Plant
October 5, 1972

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

RE: TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO. 3
DOCKET NOS. 50-250 & 50-251
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE NO. 3-72-6
ERRONEOUS PRESSURIZER LEVEL INDICATION



Dear Mr. O'Leary:

In accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2 a(1) and in amplification of the Company's telegram to Director, Region II, Directorate of Regulatory Operations of September 29, 1972, this report is submitted.

On August 29, 1972, while at hot shutdown, it was noted that the pressurizer level cold calibration channel indication differed from the level indicated by the three narrow range hot calibration channels. The disagreement was found to be caused by zero drifts from -90 mv to -111 mv on a 1-5 volt scale in the three narrow range level transmitters (LT-3-459, LT-3-460, and LT-3-461). The transmitters are Barton Model 386 Differential Pressure Transmitters. The cause of the drifts was thoroughly investigated but no reason for the problem could be found. The three transmitters were immediately vented, back-flushed and recalibrated.

On September 20, 1972, while at cold shutdown, during routine calibration, it was found the three transmitters had again experienced zero drifts of -80 mv, -200 mv, and -400 mv for LT-3-459, LT-3-460, and LT-3-461, respectively. Again, no cause could be found for the drifts. Technical representatives from Westinghouse and Barton arrived on site on October 2, 1972 to determine and correct the problem. The representatives felt that the drifting was caused by the transmitter transducers. New transducers manufactured by a new process were installed and the transmitters will be tested and monitored closely to verify proper operation.

The erroneous level indication was an abnormal occurrence, in the sense of Section 1.13.1, Technical Specifications, because the indicated pressurizer level was lower than the actual level and hence, the high pressurizer level reactor trip would not have operated at the proper 92% pressurizer level, but, instead, at about 95% for the August 29 incident and at about 97% for the September 20 incident. Thus, the safety system setting was less conservative than the level in Section 2.3 of the Technical Specifications. However, reactor safety was not affected because the high pressurizer level reactor trip is automatically disabled below 10% power and, since Unit 3 has not yet gone critical, the trip was not in effect during the period of erroneous level

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indication. Had the erroneous reading occurred during operation above 10% power, the automatic pressurizer level control would have maintained level about 3% above programmed level and in a casualty situation, the reactor would have tripped at about 95% or 97% pressurizer level.

This letter is submitted beyond the ten day reporting deadline because it was not realized until September 27, 1972, that the erroneous indication constituted an abnormal occurrence.

Sincerely,


A. D. Schmidt
Director of Power Resources

ADS:DWJ:dg

cc: Mr. John Davis, Director
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