



Telegram

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1974 JUN 17 PM 5:06

ICS IPMVEIB MVN

02133 TDVE MORRIS IL 126 06-17 225P CDT

PMS MR JAMES G KEPPLER REGIONAL DIRECTOR

DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY REGION 3

WUX US ATOMIC ENERGY

TELEGRAMS (OTHER THAN MONEY ORDERS)

DELIVERY requested? (YES-AGENT, NO-ADDRESSEE)

799 ROOSEVELT RD

AGENT SECTION

ADDRESSEE SECTION

Nbr. & Name

Nbr. 312-858-2660

GLENN ELLYN IL 60137

Date dtd 6-18 Time dtd 932A To 4M By MS

SUBJECT DPR-25

To be mailed or filed *mail*
Attempts to deliver (indicate DA or LY)

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3.

THIS WILL CONFIRM OUR CONVERSATION WITH F. MAURA OF YOUR
OFFICE AT 1315 HOURS THAT DATE CONCERNING A FAILURE TO OPERATE
PROPERLY ON MAY 22, 1974 OF MAIN STEAM DRAIN VALVE MO3-220-2.
WHILE CLOSING THIS VALVE PRIOR TO LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING THE
BREAKER TRIPPED AND REQUIRED RESETTING SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE THE
VALVE WOULD FULLY CLOSE THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT NOTED IN THE

*Received
5/22/74*

8305240170 740617
PDR ADDCK 05000237
PDR



Telegram

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
SHIFT ENGINEERS LOG AT THE TIME AND A A RESULT THIS REPORT
IS SUBMITTED LATE. A 10 DAY LETTER DETAILED THE CORRECTING
ACTION IS WORTH COMING IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATORY GUIDES
1.16.

B.B. STEPHENSON, SUPERINTENDENT DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER
STATION COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY RTE 1
MORRIS ILLINOIS 60450

NNNN

JUN 19 1974

159333-A



Commonwealth Edison
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60680

50-237

BBS Ltr.#376-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
May 28, 1974



Mr. J. F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, REPORT
OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B.1 OF THE TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS.
FAILURE OF MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 2-220-2 TO OPEN.

Reference: Notification to Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 1350 hours on May 22, 1974
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1417 hours on May 22, 1974

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 0400 hours on May 22, 1974. At that time, main steam line drain valve 2-220-2 failed to open. This malfunction is contrary to section 3.7.D.1 of the Technical Specifications which requires that all isolation valves listed in table 3.7.1 be operable during power operations.

PROBLEM

After performing a modification, in which the thermal overloads on MD2-220-2 were changed, the valve was functionally tested. During the functional test, the valve failed to open.

At the time of the failure, the unit was in the "Run" mode with thermal power at 2028 megawatts. Electrical load at the time of the failure was 637 megawatts.

INVESTIGATION

An investigation into the problem was initiated immediately by the station electrical department. The investigation revealed that the valve failed to open because the motor contactor failed to pick-up.

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inquiry

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COPY SENT REGION 3

May 28, 1974

An inspection of the motor contactor revealed that the air gap between the contactor coil and armature was too great. It was further discovered that the large air gap was caused by the loosening of the armature stop screw. The armature stop screw adjusts the air gap by preventing the armature from dropping too far open when the contactor is de-energized.

CORRECTIVE ACTION


To correct the failure, the armature stop screw was adjusted properly and a lock nut for the screw was tightened securely. During the adjustment of the stop screw, the lock nut was found only finger tight, and it is believed that the lock nut was loose since original installation.

Since this is the first occurrence of this type of failure, the corrective action taken at this time was to adjust the armature stop screw and tighten the lock nut. In addition, the adjustment and the tightness of the lock nut will be checked during subsequent breaker inspections. At this time, in view of cumulative experience, the corrective actions taken were adequate.

EVALUATIONS

During the failure of valve 2-220-2, the safety of the plant and public was not in jeopardy. When the 2-220-2 valve failed, it failed in the closed or isolated condition. In addition, the inboard isolation valve MO2-220-1 was also closed. Also at the time of the failure all safety systems were operable.

Sincerely,


B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

BBS:TEL:do