




Commonwealth Edison  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

BBS Ltr.#574-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
August 9, 1974



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  
UNCOUPLING OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE K-11 IN UNIT 2.

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A

2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 1545 hours on August 2, 1974  
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1620 hours on August 2, 1974

3) Drawing Number: M-34

Report Number: 50-237/1974-36

Report Date: August 9, 1974

Occurrence Date: August 2, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

#### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

At about 1355 on August 2, 1974, CRD K-11 (38-43), while being withdrawn from position "42" to "48", went into an overtravel condition. The overtravel indication is indicative of an uncoupled CRD.

#### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence, the reactor was increasing power from 408 MWe and 1344 MWt to 460 MWe.

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DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

While CRD K-11 (38-43) was being withdrawn from position "42" to "48", a "rod overtravel" alarm annunciated and both the four rod and full core displays for the rod went blank.

The initial action taken was to attempt to recouple by inserting and withdrawing the rod five (5) times. On four series of insert and withdraw, the rod went into overtravel on the coupling check. The fifth attempt was successful in getting the CRD coupled.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCEComponent Failure

At this time, the failure mechanism is not known, therefore, a followup letter will be issued subsequent to K-11's overhaul. However, prior failures of this type were explained as having occurred because of dislocated inner filters. This CRD, as the previous CRD failures, was modified and overhauled in the Spring 1972 refueling outage.

This drive uncoupling did not endanger public health or safety because the control blade was capable at all times of being inserted into the reactor core.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The corrective action taken was to insert the rod to position "00", electrically disarm it, and remove it from service. This action was completed on August 2, 1974. In addition, the three symmetrical rods with respect to K-11 were inserted to position "00" in order to prevent possible nuclear consequences.

The control rod drive will be removed during a subsequent extended maintenance outage. At that time, a thorough inspection will be made to determine the mode of failure and a followup letter submitted to your office.

FAILURE DATAControl Rod Drive K-11 (38-43)

This uncoupling phenomenon occurred three (3) times before; February 19, 1973, March 14, 1974, and June 15, 1974. Inspections of the February 1973 and the March 1974 failures showed that in both cases, dislocated inner filters were at fault. The CRD that failed in June 1974 is presently positioned at "00" and electrically disarmed. (See Incident Report I12-2-74-21). This CRD will also be removed during the next extended maintenance outage.

Sincerely,

Arthur M. Roberts

for R. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent