




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Quad-Cities Generating Station  
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NJK-74-89

May 24, 1974

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
Regulation  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545



Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30,  
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.4 and 6.6.B.1.a

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the details of an abnormal occurrence which was discovered on May 16, 1974. With Unit 2 operating at 755 MWe, the "B" loop of the RHR system service water piping was inspected for leaks using a closed circuit TV camera. During the inspection, a lump was discovered in the interior of the pipe. The occurrence was reported to the Region III Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone and to you and the Region III Directorate of Licensing by telegram on May 18, 1974.

#### PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

As a result of the findings of the investigation of the leakage from the "A", or lower, RHR service water line on Unit 1 as reported in my letter of April 15, 1974, and followed by Quad-Cities Special Report Number 13, it was agreed that the lower RHR service water line on Unit 2 be inspected. The line was removed from service at 2220 on May 14. The inspection, conducted on May 16 revealed a lump in the lower section of line 2-1005B-16"-D located 40' 9" west of the inside wall of #2 HPCI room. There were no leaks or cracks found. The portions of the pipe which had been removed to insert the TV camera were welded back in place on May 17. The various welds necessary to perform the inspection were magnetic-particle checked following weld completion. An operating hydrostatic test was conducted on the 2B RHR service water loop. The hydro verified the integrity of the 2B service water piping and it was placed back in service at 2000 on May 17.

#### SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Both loops of the low pressure coolant injection mode of the RHR system were operable at all times. One loop of containment cooling was operable as were Unit 2 and  $\frac{1}{2}$  emergency diesels as required by Technical Specifications. The amount of time the 2B RHR service water system was out of service was minimized. The successful hydrostatic test adds assurance that the line is still intact and safe for use. Therefore, the safety margin provided by the containment cooling mode of the RHR system is not affected.

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