




Commwealth Edison  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

BES Ltr.#650-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
September 6, 1974



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  
2B CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP VENT LINE RUPTURE.

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A

2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 1320 hours on September 1, 1974  
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 0825 hours on September 3, 1974

Report Number: 50-237/1974-43

Report Date: September 6, 1974

Occurrence Date: September 1, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

#### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 0900 hours on September 1, 1974, the 2B condensate booster pump vent line was found to be ruptured.

#### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At 0900 hours on September 1, 1974, Unit 2 was in the run mode producing 1390 MWt and 428 MWe.

#### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

At 0630 hours on September 1, 1974, a condensate pump room flood alarm was received. A shift operator was sent to investigate the situation. The operator reported approximately 6 inches of water in the room and noted no apparent leakage. It should be noted at this point that due to radwaste problems, operations had been unable to pump the condensate pump room.

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September 6, 1974

At 0800 hours, a shift foreman was sent to the condensate pump room to further assess the situation. At this time it was found that the water level had risen to approximately 20 inches. Further investigation revealed that the 2B condensate booster pump vent line was ruptured and water was blowing out of the line. Attempts were made to isolate the pump but the water spraying out made working difficult. It was felt that the pump could not be isolated in time to prevent the water level from reaching the pump motors and the unit was manually scrambled. After the condensate system was shut down, the pump was isolated and the water flow stopped.

#### DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Component Failure)

Upon checking, the cause of the occurrence was failure of the pipe nipple coming out of the casing. Reduction of wall thickness coupled with vibration of the condensate feedwater system appear to be the causes.

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

There were no safety consequences to the public or plant personnel as a result of this occurrence because the ability to safely shut the plant down was not impaired and all leakage was contained in the turbine building basement and processed in the Radwaste facility.


#### CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action was to shutdown the plant and isolate the pump. Further corrective action consisted of replacing all similar nipples on Unit 2 condensate booster pump vent lines. Verified with pump vendor that seal cooling installation was proper. Investigation also underway with Crane Valve Company to determine why valve is so difficult to operate and what can be done. Valve operator is on site but hand wheels are still needed to make them operable. Also, a work request has been written to inspect the nipples on Unit 3.

#### FAILURE DATA

Previous operating history has revealed numerous problems with leakage for this piping configuration, however, none of these previous problems involved a line severance or separation. In light of this information, all nipples and any other fittings in the vent lines which appeared suspect were replaced.

Sincerely,

  
B. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent

BBS:LJD:do