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BBS Ltr.#676-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
September 19, 1974

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

50-237

10-1-74

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
MAIN STEAM LINE HI RADIATION MONITOR "B" FAILURE TO INDICATE A HI-HI ALARM AND TRIP DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE.

- References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A
- 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 0915 hours on September 10, 1974
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1335 hours on September 10, 1974
- 3) Drawing Number: Tech Manual GEK-13958 Drawing 104R798 Rev.9

Report Number: 50-237

Report Date: September 19, 1974

Occurrence Date: September 10, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

While performing routine surveillance, "Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Scram and Isolation Functional Test" on Dresden Unit #2 Monitor "B", the reactor operator reported what was thought to be a failure to receive the "B" main steam line high radiation scram and isolation alarm.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Unit #2 was operating in a steady state plant condition of 676 MWe. Routine surveillance "Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Scram and Isolation Functional Test" on monitor "B" was in progress.

September 19, 1974

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

At 0245 hours on September 10, 1974, while performing routine surveillance testing of Unit #2 main steam line high radiation monitor "B", the reactor operator reported what was thought to be a failure to receive the "B" main steam line high radiation scram and isolation alarm. Monitor "B" was de-energized and repair of the monitor requested. The instrument mechanic checked the monitor at approximately 0345 on September 10, 1974 and found the monitor to be operating satisfactorily.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Deficient Operating Procedures)

The operator did not hold the "trip test (depressed)" switch S6 in the depressed position for a period long enough to allow the electrical charge accumulated across time delay capacitor "C51" to decay, thereby de-energizing the trip circuit B relay K6 and activating the "B" main steam line high radiation scram and isolation alarm.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

A time delay kit was previously installed on the "B" monitor in accordance with field disposition instruction, NBEA, M12-2-74-76. Main steam line high radiation monitors "A", "C" and "D" do not, as yet, have the time delay kit installed. The reactor operator did not realize the time delay kit was installed on the "B" monitor.

During the period of de-energization of the monitor, the safety of the plant personnel or the general public was not jeopardized because this unit automatically trips one reactor protection channel. Thus any signal from the other channel will initiate a plant shutdown.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The time delay kit will be installed in all the main steam line hi radiation monitors. A procedure change has been made instructing the operator to hold the switch for a specified time period.

FAILURE DATA

This is the first occurrence of this type.

Sincerely,

B. B. Stephenson
for
B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

BBS:WEH:dc