



Commonwealth Edison
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

BBS Ltr.#787-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
October 31, 1974

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
UNCOUPLING OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE P-12 IN UNIT 2.

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A

- 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
Telephone: Mr. P. Johnson, 0845 hours on October 24, 1974
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 0930 hours on October 24, 1974

- 3) Drawing Number: M-34

Report Number: 50-237/1974-36

Report Date: October 29, 1974

Occurrence Date: October 23, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

At about 1700 hours on October 23, 1974, CRD P-12 (54-47), was being withdrawn from position "00" to "48" following a scram test. The CRD went into an overtravel condition. The overtravel indication is indicative of an uncoupled CRD.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence, the reactor was holding at a steady state of 283 MWe and 1150 MWt for scram testing.

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October 31, 1974

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

While CRD P-12 (54-47) was being withdrawn from position "00" to "48" following a scram test, a "rod overtravel" alarm annunciated and both the four rod and full core displays for the rod went blank.

The initial action taken was to immediately insert the CRD to "00" and remove it from service.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Component Failure)

At this time, the failure mechanism is not known, therefore, a followup letter will be issued subsequent to overhaul.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

This drive uncoupling did not endanger public health or safety because the control blade was capable at all times of being inserted into the reactor core.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The corrective action taken was to insert the rod to position "00", electrically disarm it, and remove it from service. This action was completed on October 23, 1974. In addition, the three rods symmetrical with respect to P-12 were inserted to position "00" in order to enhance computer monitoring capabilities.


The control rod drive will be removed during the forthcoming refueling outage. At that time, a thorough inspection will be made to determine the mode of failure and a followup letter submitted to your office.

FAILURE DATA

Control rod Drive P-12 (54-47)

Prior failures of this type were explained as having occurred because of dislocated inner filters. This CRD, as were the previous failed CRD's, was modified and overhauled in the Spring 1972 refueling outage. Six drives have experienced this type of failure in the past. Inspections have shown that dislocated inner filters were at fault.

Sincerely,



B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

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