

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5

PAGE (3)

1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
INOPERABLE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SUB SYSTEMS

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | | DOCKET NUMBER(S) | | | | | | | |
| 0 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | | | DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |

| OPERATING MODE (9) | | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following): (11) | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|--|---|--|------------------|--|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 3 | | 20.402(b) | | 20.406(e) | | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | | 73.71(b) | | | |
| POWER LEVEL (10) | | 20.406(a)(1)(i) | | 50.38(a)(1) | | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | | 73.71(c) | | | |
| 0 | | 20.406(a)(1)(ii) | | 50.38(a)(2) | | 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A) | | | |
| 0 | | 20.406(a)(1)(iii) | | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A) | | | | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(iv) | | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | | | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(v) | | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 50.73(a)(2)(ix) | | | | | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER
TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE 8 0 5
5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1

| COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
☒ NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 7, 1984, at 0930 PST, while in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), it was discovered that both subsystems to Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) (BG) had been inoperable since 1910 PST on April 6, 1984. This condition was not in compliance with Technical Specifications Sections 3.0.3 and 3.5.2. Both ECCS subsystems were restored to operable condition at 1010 PST on April 7, 1984. The causes contributing to this condition were 1) operators failed to recognize that a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) had been exceeded and 2) an operating procedure that did not provide adequate guidance to alert operators to a Technical Specification requirement. Corrective actions include revision of the applicable operating procedures, review of all other safety-related operating procedures to detect and correct similar situations, and initiating the development of a Plant Component/Technical Specification cross reference document for operator use.

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PDR ADOCK 05000275
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

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| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 1 0 0 0 2 7 5 8 4 - 0 1 3 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | | |
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| | | | | | | | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On April 7, 1984, at 0930 PST while in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), it was discovered that both subsystems of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) (BQ) had been inoperable since April 6, 1984 at 1910 PST (14 hours, 20 minutes). This condition was not in compliance Technical Specification sections 3.0.3 and 3.5.2.

On April 6, 1984, the plant experienced an anticipated safety injection as part of steam generator safety valve (RV) startup testing. The safety injection resulted in the discharge of the contents of the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) (TK) (CB) into the Reactor Coolant System (AB). To recharge the BIT with 12 percent boric acid solution, licensed operators, using approved procedures, inhibited the automatic opening feature of the BIT inlet and outlet valves (ISV) (CB) during the recharging operation. This practice prevents problems which might occur due to an inadvertent safety injection signal (JE) while the BIT is being drained prior to recharging with boric acid. With the BIT inlet and outlet valves disabled, there is no ECCS flowpath from the charging pumps (P) (BQ) through the BIT to the Reactor Coolant System. Operations personnel were concentrating on restoring the BIT and did not consider the requirement of the ECCS Technical Specification. Additionally, the approved operating procedure did not provide any Technical Specification guidance to the operators that two sections of Technical Specifications were involved.

After completion of recharging the BIT with 12 percent boric acid solution, and upon discovery of this condition, the BIT inlet and outlet valves were made operable and the system returned to operable status by 1010 PST on April 7, 1984.

Postulating a scenario in which the plant was initially operating in modes 1 or 2, following the injection of the BIT into the core the plant would be in a condition in which additional boron injection would not be required. Additionally, in the event a valid SI signal had subsequently occurred while the high head injection flowpath was isolated, operator action would have been required to perform Emergency Operating Procedure OP-0, "Reactor Trip With Safety Injection," and to identify the absence of flow. At that time, manual action initiated by the operators would have been required to restore high pressure injection by manually shutting the circuit breakers (52) for the isolation valves.

The ECCS and the BIT are not required in Modes 4, 5, and 6.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

A new operating procedure, OP B-1C:IV, "12 PERCENT BORIC ACID SYSTEM - RESTORING BORON INJECTION TANK AFTER SAFETY INJECTION" has been written to allow recharging the BIT without exceeding Technical Specifications. All safety-related operating procedures are being reviewed to identify and correct similar situations, if they exist. A method is being developed to enable the cross-reference of major plant components to Technical Specification sections. Operations personnel will be trained in its use.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E +

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

May 7, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-173

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-013-00
Inoperable Emergency Cooling Subsystems

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the inoperability of Emergency Core Cooling Subsystems and resulting noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.03 and 3.5.2 on April 7, 1984.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,


for J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

IE-22
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