

# Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

May 15, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Failure of Torus to Reactor Building  
Vacuum Relief Valve V-26-18

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, Paragraph 1.15.F. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, Paragraph 6.6.E, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, on Friday, May 4, 1973.

While performing local leak rate testing, it was found that one of the torus to reactor building vacuum breaker lines would not hold pressure between the isolation valves (V-26-17 & 18). The lack of air leakage through check valve (V-26-17) indicated that the leakage was through the butterfly valve (V-26-18).

Details of the valve are as follows:

Air Operated Butterfly, Rockwell  
Size - 20"  
Rating - 150 psi  
Operator - Conoflow Corp.

Inspection of V-26-18 showed that the valve was 0.010 inches off the seat, indicating that the linkage on the valve arm required adjustment.

The valve was inspected and the boot seat and butterfly disc were found in good condition. The valve was found to be 0.010 inches off the seat. The boot seat and butterfly disc were cleaned and the valve



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
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linkage was adjusted to position the valve disc properly on the seat. The adjustment consisted of increasing the stroke in the close direction. The line between the isolation valves was then pressurized and the leakage was calculated to be 0.492 SCFH well within the technical specification limit. The cause of the change in linkage adjustment has not been determined.

There was no safety significance associated with this occurrence since the redundant component (check valve V-26-17) was shown to be leakage tight. This is implied by the fact that the check valve was not moved during the testing period, so that the maximum possible leakage through the check valve was 0.492 SCFH.

To prevent a reoccurrence of this type problem, indicating marks were placed on the disc shaft. Several operating tests will be performed prior to plant startup to verify repeatability of linkage and valve position based on these markings. Also, additional leak rate measurements will be performed prior to plant startup to verify the adequacy of relying on these new markings to ensure the valve has closed properly following future operability surveillance tests.

Very truly yours,



Donald A. Ross  
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

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Enclosures (40)

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1