



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

MAY - 4 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan  
 Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness  
 and Engineering Response  
 Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: *Richard W. Krimm*  
 Richard W. Krimm  
 Assistant Associate Director  
 Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT: Exercise Report of the April 13, 1983, Exercise of the  
 Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for  
 the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Plant

Attached is a copy of the Final Report of the joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Plant. This was a small-scale exercise for the State of Ohio and full-scale for Ottawa County. The report, dated April 19, 1983, was prepared by Region V of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The State of Ohio and Ottawa County demonstrated an overall capability to protect the health and safety of the public. There were, however, some deficiencies noted. A copy of the State's schedule of corrective actions is attached. However, as noted in the attached FEMA memorandum of November 23, 1983, FEMA Region V has requested Ohio to provide further corrective actions on NUREG-0654 criteria A.4 and J.10.d. As soon as we receive and analyze this further response, we will provide you with the results.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 287-0200.

Attachment  
 As Stated

8405080264 840504  
 PDR ADOCK 05000346  
 F PDR



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

NOV 23 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director, Office of  
Natural and Technological Hazards

Attention: Robert Turner

FROM:

*for Dan Bement*  
Frank Finch, Chairman  
Regional Assistance Committee

SUBJECT:

Addendum to the Davis Besse Final Exercise Report  
dated April 19, 1983

The corrective actions to the significant deficiencies reported in the Davis Besse Final Exercise Report are attached for the State of Ohio and Ottawa County. These now become an addendum to the report dated April 19, 1983.

Those corrective actions indicated for the State have been commented upon by Region V and transmitted to the State for further development. A copy of that letter and the Region's comments are attached. The deadline for further corrective actions has been set for December 16, 1983. These will be transmitted as addendum 2 to the Final Exercise Report when FEMA Region V has reviewed them and made appropriate comments.

The corrective actions to significant deficiencies at Ottawa County have been adequately addressed with the exception of NUREG-0654 criteria A.4 and J.10.d. These, too, have been returned for further corrective actions and will be forwarded to FEMA Headquarters as addendum 2 after Region V has reviewed them and made comments.

If you have any questions regarding these attachments, please contact Dan Bement at FTS 372-6011.

Attachments

*Rec'd 12/1*



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

NOV 23 1983

Richard M. Lockhart  
Deputy Director  
Ohio Disaster Services Agency  
2825 West Granville Road  
Worthington, Ohio 43085

Dear Mr. Lockhart:

FEMA Region V is in receipt of the State's corrective actions to the significant deficiencies noted during the Davis Besse exercise held April 13-14, 1983. Many of the responses do not adequately outline corrective actions that will be implemented to assure that criteria items will be corrected.

FEMA's response to the State's corrective action is attached. Further review and a reply should be made by the State to enable this office to determine that the deficiencies have been adequately addressed. Your response is requested no later than December 16, 1983.

Also, attached are the corrective actions submitted by Ottawa County with FEMA's comments to these typed directly below the County's comments. NUREG-0654 criteria J.10.d needs to be further developed by the County to assure a complete list of handicapped persons is maintained and distributed to support agencies. NUREG-0654 criteria A.4 will have to be demonstrated during the next exercise to ensure the capability of 24 hour operations in the EOC.

If you have any questions, please contact Dan Bement at FEMA Region V, Battle Creek, 372-6011.

Sincerely,

151  
Frank Finch, Chairman  
Regional Assistance Committee

Attachments

cc: Robert Turner, SL-NT-TH

STATE OF OHIO  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

2625 WEST GRANVILLE ROAD  
WORTHINGTON, OHIO 43085

RAYMOND R. GALLOWAY  
MAJOR GENERAL  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

DISASTER SERVICES AGENCY

RICHARD F. CELESTE  
GOVERNOR

AGOH-DS

October 25, 1983

Mr. Edward J. Roche  
Regional Director  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Region V  
300 South Wacker Drive  
Chicago, IL 60606

Dear Mr. Roche:

The attached material is in response to your request for corrective actions on discrepancies found during the April 13, 1983 Davis-Besse exercise.

Based on discrepancy AId, it is apparent that a closer coordination of exercise goals is needed. To this end, I suggest the following:

1. After the 90 day objective meeting and prior to the objectives being submitted to FEMA, meetings should take place to determine the scope and depth of each objective. This would clarify the degree to which each objective should be graded.
2. A greater participation on the part of the State in the pre-exercise briefing which is usually held the day before the exercise.
3. Observers should be in place one to two hours prior to the start of an exercise to discuss the arrangement of the EOC, maps, participating agencies, etc.

Although this would require additional time and expense, I feel there is a need to identify the scope and clarify the objectives of future exercises.

FOR THE DIRECTOR

  
RICHARD M. LOCKHART  
Deputy Director

KBC:kjs

Attachments: as stated

REC'D RECEIVING  
7 Nov 83 02 10  
F.E.M.A.  
REGION 5



## SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

April 13, 1983 Exercise

A-1-d (1) The exercise conducted on April 13, 1983 was a small scale exercise. As such, several activities were omitted or conducted on a reduced scale. Deficiency (A-1-d) states that a specific individual was not in charge of the overall response. The Deputy Director, (who is the responsible individual) does participate in all full scale exercises when the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated. During this exercise the EOC was not activated, therefore, neither the Deputy Director nor the EOC Controller participated.

The only demonstration of leadership that should have been observed would have been in the area of dose assessment. As indicated in the deficiency, this leadership was not evident. The dose assessment effort in Ohio is a combined effort of two agencies. The Ohio Department of Health has the primary responsibility. The Ohio Disaster Services Agency has the responsibility of activating the Dose Assessment Center, making the initial notifications, and making assessments, if necessary, prior to the arrival of the Department of Health. Once the Department of Health arrives, the ranking member of that department is responsible for all assessments. During this exercise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was an active participant. The NRC made contact by telephone early in the exercise requesting a point of contact for dose assessment information. Mr. Robert Quillin, Ohio Department of Health, who was in charge of assessment, informed the NRC that he would be the point of contact. As a result, Mr. Quillin spent 90% of his time on the phone answering questions or taking recommendations from the NRC. It was for this reason that no one appeared to be in charge of assessment. This will be corrected in the future by allocating sufficient personnel for coordination between the EOC and the NRC. It should be noted that officials in Ohio made an attempt to arrange a dry run exercise prior to April 13, 1983 to clarify procedures, determine needs and become familiar with NRC operations during an incident/exercise. The dry run did not occur.

In regard to the last comment of Ald, it is necessary for several people to have expertise in the different internal operations of assessment, therefore people are not normally assigned to specific positions. Pre-assignments have been made for certain positions, such as status board and map updates, and even these positions are subject to change.

J-9 (1) Efforts have been made to improve communications with the Joint Public Information Center. This improvement was in the form of equipment, not procedures. The Ohio Public Information Officer will now have available a direct outside line in addition to telecopy capability.

J-10-M (1) Ohio did agree with the utility and NRC decision, even though the assessment calculation did not indicate the necessity for a 7-mile evacuation. The scenario for this exercise included the loss of power resulting in the inability to use the DBNPS computer for assessment. This resulted in assessments being made by hand held calculators at the site. As a result, the utility representative did not have enough time to finish AD 1827.12.7, (an internal Davis-Besse Procedure), which determines the dose savings achieved through sheltering. The Ohio method did consider the dose savings.

(2) Corrective actions for J-10-M will involve a closer coordination of protective actions with the utility on the basis of projections. In addition, Ohio assessment personnel will have a quick reference available to insure all possible contingencies are considered.

(3) It should be considered that only under ideal conditions can an immediate decision be made. This will happen when the State, utility, and county agree. However, when there is a discrepancy, it will require 15 to 20 minutes to recheck all data, make necessary changes, reenter the correct data and consult with utility and the county.

J-11 For the purpose of this and all exercises, field samples are taken only as a demonstration of the ability to collect them. The only sample read in the field during an exercise is air. For a complete exercise of field sample analysis, a minimum of one day devoted to recovery and reentry

would be necessary. Therefore, certain assumptions are made, i.e. the Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission is present with the capability of rapid measurements, or results from the Department of Health Laboratory are assumed.

- During the scenario development, three to four hours of the second day was devoted to recovery and reentry. This was not sufficient time to properly exercise all aspects. In future exercises where recovery and reentry are to be tested, the scenario will be developed on a more realistic basis. As a recommendation, recovery and reentry should be exercised in discrete segments. This would provide the proper time frames to accomplish specific aspects of this portion of emergency response.

J-10-A The Toledo Edison Company (DBNPS) does not use pre-selected monitoring points; likewise, Ohio has no pre-selected sampling points for the ingestion pathway, and it is unlikely that a map of this type, covering 4,000 square miles, will ever be developed. However, the Ohio Department of Health does have the location of dairy farms and Ohio Environmental Protection Agency has data on potable water.

Ohio does have maps showing relocation centers, shelters and access routes. These were displayed in the conference room on the day of the exercise. These maps did include evacuation routes.

M-3 Ohio is now in the process of revising the recovery and reentry portion of the RERP. However, without standard planning guidance from FEMA or guidance from the Department of Energy on sample splitting or the standardization of sample analysis any revision will be based on Ohio's capability and actions only.

FEMA REGION V  
RESPONSE TO  
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  
for  
DAVIS BESSE

- A.1.d Under the small-scale criteria being used at the time of the Davis Besse exercise, it was necessary for the State to demonstrate 1) direction and control; 2) communications; 3) one optional item, which for this exercise was accident assessment. In order to demonstrate direction and control and communications, the EOC had to be activated, but limited staffing would have sufficed as long as those persons necessary to carry out direction and control and the communications capability were present. Any other functions needed to interface with the County demonstration could have been simulated. This criteria will be reevaluated during the next Davis Besse exercise.
- J.9 The concern conveyed with our comment for J.9 is that of coordination between the State and County regarding protective actions and release to the press after the recommendations are made. The primary concern is coordination of protective actions. Your comment does not compensate for the deficiency noted in J.9.
- J.10.m It is felt by the Region V staff of Technological Hazards that the State is avoiding the problem, "takes too long to reach a decision, being 25 minutes during the exercise." The State's comment being, "it will always take 15-20 minutes to reach the decision even in ideal circumstances when the utility, State, and County agree." Seems that some alternate method should be used, if there is one, to reduce the time element. The State seems reluctant to undertake any research into this possibility.
- J.11 This criteria item will be reevaluated during the next Davis Besse exercise.
- J.10.a The maps located in the conference room are not of use to emergency response personnel in the EOC. These maps must be displayed in the EOC as specified in NUREG-0654. The first paragraph of the State's response for J.10.a indicates a map including pre-selected monitoring points will not be developed. Since NUREG-0654 criteria includes this map, a request for waiver will be needed from FEMA and NRC.
- M.3 The significant deficiency stated in the final report for this criteria item is concentrating on the fact that in many cases the State concurred with the utility recommendation before getting input from the County that the State had requested. It appears much more interaction with the County response team is necessary before concurring with the utility recommendations. The County should, also, be kept informed of decisions made by the State. The new State of Ohio RERP section on reentry and recovery procedures will be reviewed when received which will, hopefully, alleviate the problems encountered during this exercise.
- M.5 Corrective actions were not outlined by the State for this significant deficiency noted in the Davis Besse exercise.

**OTTAWA COUNTY  
DISASTER SERVICES AGENCY**

COURT HOUSE  
315 MADISON, ROOM 308  
PORT CLINTON, OHIO 43452  
PHONE (419) 734-4431 EXT. 205

James P. Greer  
Director/Coordinator

Residence 734-3892  
Emergency Phone Only 734-4404

July 8, 1983


Mr. Richard M. Lockhart  
Deputy Director  
Ohio Disaster Services Agency  
Adjutant General's Department  
2825 West Granville Road  
Worthington, Ohio 43085

Dear Mr. Lockhart:

Enclosed is the Ottawa County response to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (F.E.M.A.) critique of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) exercise conducted April 13-14, 1983. All "Major deficiencies" identified in Section IV of the report have been addressed. In addition, the county felt compelled to respond to a number of the "minor deficiencies".

Please incorporate these comments for submission to F.E.M.A.. Ottawa County would appreciate a copy of the entire report that is transmitted to F.E.M.A.

Sincerely,

  
James P. Greer

JPG/tm

The decision to activate the siren system was agreed upon by the County and Utility well over a month before the exercise. Residents were notified of the planned test in Nuclear Newsletter Spring 1983 (see attachment - 1) which was distributed in late March 1983. Local media (Newspapers, Radio and Television) cooperated in reaffirming the test through bulletins issued on April 12 & 13, 1983.

In previous discussions with the Emergency Broadcast System (E.B.S.) and W.O.S.E. Weather Radio, officials indicated a reluctance to activate their systems for tests, drills or inadvertent activation of sirens. Arrangements have been made with Port Clinton radio station W.O.S.E. 94.5 FM to broadcast informational bulletins as a public service independent of E.B.S.

This comment is relative to NUREG-0654, criteria E.5, relating to EBS. Although this was not officially observed during the exercise, FEMA Region V is appreciative of these arrangements made with W.O.S.E. 94.5 to broadcast informational messages.

In your attachment I distributed to the local population in March 1983, stating the sirens will be sounded one of the exercise days, this was not sent to FEMA Region V and further a newsletter is not considered official notification to FEMA that sirens will be tested on the day of the exercise.

While accident assessment is not identified as a local function, Ottawa County maintains an assessment team. It is directed by the State Radiological Analyst and includes representatives from the Ottawa County Health Department, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Northwest District), Ohio Health Department-Radiological Health Unit.

Procedures are being implemented and equipment is being acquired to insure a timely decision making process and rapid dissemination of emergency information.

Comment noted.

County has the capability to transmit and receive messages utilizing the telecopier. Procedures and equipment are tested on the 1st Tuesday of every month at 9:00 a.m.

The comment made in the Final Report was related to the one telecopier that was on-line and received messages during the exercise and could not transmit. The intent of this comment was to virtually describe this one machine, not to say the capability to send messages was not available from the County via other machines. This comment was not indicating a deficiency on the part of the County.



The Ottawa County Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Ottawa County Standard Operating Procedures identify the following chain of command for emergency situations: President of the Board of (Ottawa County Commissioners), Commissioners present with the most seniority, "2nd" Commissioner, Sheriff etc. It is the position of the board that as long as the executive group is functioning smoothly, there is no need for one individual to take a command position.

The method used in our Exercrit (evaluation document) to paraphrase criteria A.1.d asks for the demonstration that a specific individual by title was effectively in charge of emergency response. The Ottawa County evaluation team did not indicate this criteria item to be a deficiency. The intent was to describe briefly in the report the method used by the County in their decision making and how the information was relayed to the emergency operations staff.

Page 3- J 13 3

According to Ohio Pupil Transportation Laws and Regulations 1975 (Ohio Department of Education and Ohio Department of Highway Safety) Section One, II. 806-919-02. "District boards of Education may permit the use of school buses in the event of civil emergency. VII. 806-919-11. "School buses may be used by Ohio governmental agencies during times of civil emergencies".

FEMA Region V did not have a copy of this law at the time of this exercise. It was our understanding that Ohio State Law prohibited the use of school buses for evacuation purposes. We are now in receipt of a copy of the law.

DATE 05/11/77

PAGE 3

Page 13 J 14 J

and barricades are provided and erected by the Ottawa County Engineer on County and Township Roads and the Ohio Department of Transportation on State Routes. Both agencies supply manpower and equipment to man those road blocks not handled by the Highway Patrol or Sheriff's Department.

Comment noted.

LATE 07/11/12

PAGE 6

Repeated attempts to place copies of Nuclear Newsletter at public use areas i.e. Garages, Car grounds, Trailer Parks, etc. have been unsuccessful. The vast majority of owners/operators were adamant about not allowing such information at their facilities. It is the consensus opinion that this type of literature serves to cause undue concern over safety within the area and tends to "scare off" prospective business. A common statement made by owners/operators was similar to : "I'm trying to bring people into the area and you're trying to scare them away."

Another attempt will be made to place emergency information in the public use areas through the use of "Gases Information Stickers". The stickers have been ordered (see attachment 1) and upon receipt, a sample will be forwarded to your office.

Your comment here and attachment 2 are indicative of your efforts to overcome the deficiency in criteria G.2.

Confidential rosters of mobility impaired persons can be obtained through the following agencies:

- Ottawa County Health Department
- Ottawa County Regional Planning Commission
- Ottawa County H.S.D.S.
- Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home
- Ottawa County Welfare Department
- Riverview School and Training Center
- Easter Seals of Ottawa County
- March of Dimes of Ottawa County
- Local Fire/Rescue (See Attachment 2)

These lists are available for emergency use only.

Emergency information disseminated to residents through Nuclear Newsletters and the telephone directory states that upon learning of an accident at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power station, residents should "Put your green I HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED card in the window that can be seen from the road. If you have misplaced your card, tie a white rag to the handle of your door. This is for local fire and Emergency Medical Service personnel who will check each residence to ensure notification. If you need assistance, do not take either action until emergency personnel come to your home." Public information bulletins issued via E.C.S., A.O.A.M. Weather Radio, etc. will also instruct residents to follow these procedures.

In the event of an emergency, brochures state that these

Persons will be transported by the National Guard to: The Luther Home of Mercy (Millston, Ohio) and various hospitals and nursing homes in Erie and Sandusky Counties. Persons requiring transport beyond the means of the National Guard will be transported via County Medical Service Units, Life Flight and members of the Ottawa County Mutual Aid Agreement.

Because of liability and the eminent threat to public health and safety a complete demonstration of these capabilities is not justifiable in exercise situations.

To further amplify FEMA's original comment for J.10.d, the intent of our comment was not to advocate an actual demonstration of transporting handicapped persons. The deficiency relates to the need for a compilation of a list of all handicapped persons with special needs. The capability to implement the procedures to evacuate all handicapped persons should be demonstrated. If the Health Department has the primary responsibility to implement movement of handicapped, the procedures should be coordinated with all other support agencies involved in the activation of this portion of the plan. Further attempts should be made to contact other handicapped persons not on the nursing care lists and made available to support agencies.

Page 10 J 10 4

Stacy County has undertaken construction of an Emergency Operations Center (E.O.C.) to be completed in the Spring of 1994. Maps appropriate, such as indicating evacuation routes, relocation centers, shelters, sampling points etc. will be mounted. Status boards and other "visual aids" will further assist agencies in managing their resources.

FEMA will accept this comment as intent to correct the deficiency found in maps and will look forward to evaluation of this criteria item at the next exercise.

Page 40 J 11 0

Population distribution maps and other "Visual Aids"  
will be located in the new County E.O.C..

FEMA will accept this comment as intent to correct the deficiency found during  
the exercise and looks forward to evaluation of this during the next exercise.

10/11/00

Page 11



Due to limited resources (both manpower and finances), a shift change demonstration has not been deemed reasonable by county agencies. In the past emergency situations ( i.e. blizzards, floods, and tornadoes) the 2 on 1 off concept of operations has been employed by agencies with no loss of functional capability. Further, the county has been assured that in an actual radiological incident, local governmental resources will be augmented by the utility and by State and Federal agencies within 24 hrs.

FEMA recognizes the manpower and financial burden that exercises place on the County; however, criteria is established necessitating demonstration of a shift change.

Because of the unique 2-day exercise scenario, many local agencies were "excused" from the second day participation by utility and State officials. It was felt that these agencies had fully demonstrated their capabilities without continuing to drain their resources on day 2.

Procedures were implemented and demonstrated on both days of the exercise by the Executive, Assessment and Public Information sections of local government. Due to the limitation of our facility, these groups were isolated from the assembly area of the E.C.C.. Apparently the configuration placed the E.E.P.A. team at a disadvantage for proper observation of the overall county efforts.

The following events are from the Ottawa County E.C.C. log on day 2.

April 14, 1980:

10:49 Release terminated

10:55 Classification downgraded to "Alert"

12:09 Drill time 2 days forward

12:20 Based on previous samples, utility recommends  
ALL P.O.'S within 2 miles be suspended

12:20 Drill activity complete

12:32 State concurs with E.C.C. regarding 12:20  
recommendations

12:35 County requests clarification from utility regarding  
status--still in "Alert" or downgraded? County informed  
" LL STILL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN TERMINATED".

See Attachment 4 - Press release

Ottawa County is not in a position to control the flow of an

Exercise. Local Government can react only to the data it is presented. It is hoped that in future scenario development, more attention will be given to the reentry and recovery portion of the exercise. Further, a more realistic time frame should be developed for the accumulation of data, assessment of data, recommendations and public information during the reentry/recovery phase.

FEMA concludes from this comment that endeavors will be made on the part of Ottawa County to encourage the State to develop a scenario that will activate more agencies during reentry and recovery phases of the next exercise.

# NUCLEAR NEWS

SPRING 1983

## Davis-Besse to test plans in April



*Planning Culminates in Exercise – Officials from Toledo Edison, state, and county agencies will talk to reporters during the April exercise.*

The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, the State of Ohio, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and other local and state agencies will test emergency plans for the nuclear station in a full-scale exercise April 13 or 14.

"The exercise is being announced in advance this year to alert residents that the sirens will be sounded sometime during this two-day period."

Judith Hirsch, Emergency Planning Supervisor, said. No emergency action will be necessary by residents.

Normally, when the sirens sound, residents should turn their radio or television sets to an Emergency Broadcast Station for information as to the nature of the emergency.

**How does the Davis-Besse plan work?** The Davis-Besse plan explains what Toledo Edison and Davis-Besse personnel do in an emergency. It also identifies the participation by state, county, and local agencies.

The State and County plans provide procedures for actions to be taken by County and State agencies and protective actions needed to be taken by the public.

**What happens during an exercise?** Each exercise is different and follows a planned script, called a scenario.

This scenario is kept a secret from but a handful of Toledo Edison and government officials who develop it. The idea is to simulate what would happen in an actual situation.

At Davis-Besse, reactor operators are handed cards at specified times, telling of some simulated "problem" at the station. The operators must respond to each "problem" as it is presented. Often, these "problems" are compounded to make it more demanding for the operators.

For example, even if an operator makes a correct response, the card tells the operator that a piece of equipment failed to respond as expected and that the problem is becoming more serious and involves additional malfunctioning equipment.

This is a real test of the operators' knowledge of the station and its operation. In all previous exercises at Davis-Besse, the operators have been complimented by the NRC for their emergency response actions and their knowledge of the plant and procedures.

**What are the others doing?** State and County officials use the information of simulated plant and weather conditions to determine their actions. In an exercise, if the appropriate

response called for roadblocks to be set up, county highway department personnel would go to the appropriate locations and place the materials near, but not blocking, the intersection. This gives an idea of the time involved in traveling to the intersections and setting up the roadblocks.

In previous exercises, volunteer firemen have made house to house checks by knocking on doors, simulating what they would do to check to make sure all residents had been notified. Residents were told of the exercise, asked if they knew how to respond appropriately and told where to get additional information. Again, this gave an idea of the time needed to complete resident notification. It is this type of knowledge that will help ensure responses are timely and correct in the event of an unlikely real emergency.

This year, federal and regional NRC officials will also participate in the exercise. This will be an opportunity for them to test their own emergency response plans.

Even the news media will get involved. Reporters travel to the Public Information Center at the Davis-Besse Administration Building for information updates. Generally, these media carry news stories about the exercise. This gives the public information teams an opportunity to test the information cycle and determine how well they can get information to the public through the media.

During the exercise time, you may want to take this opportunity to review Nuclear Newsletter #11 to make sure you know what to do in an emergency. Copies are available by writing to the Media Relations Department at Toledo Edison or contacting the Ottawa County Disaster Services Office in the Courthouse. This information can also be found in your local telephone book.

### WHAT'S INSIDE

Fall Refueling	
Planning Underway	p. 2
Nuclear Waste Act Signed	p. 6
New Insurance Program in Effect	p. 8



June 20, 1983

Larry Grove  
Radiological Analyst  
Ohio Disaster Services Agency  
315 Madison  
Port Clinton, Ohio 43452

Dear Mr. Grove:

In discussions with Jim Williams and Judy Hirsch, I understand that you will coordinate the distribution of siren information stickers to area hotels, motels, and parks.

These stickers are currently on order so you should have them within a month. When distributing the stickers, please ask hotel/motel managers to post them in each room. State parks should post them in restrooms and in information centers.

I have designed a form (attached) for hotel/motel managers and state park officials to sign indicating that they understand how the stickers are to be used. When you distribute the stickers, please have them sign this form and give it to you. Return the signed forms to me and I will keep them on file.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Judy Hirsch or myself.

Sincerely,

*Jeanne B. Rife*

Jeanne B. Rife

cc: Judith Hirsch

DATE 1-24-83  
PHONE 3154  
P. R. PROJECT? YES X NO  
DATE REQUIRED 7-2-83  
X-3-107

o R:fr

When steady warning sirens sound, tune your AM radio to:  
**WSPD 1370.42**  
For more information, refer to telephone directory white pages.

① The sirens are tested every Friday at noon.

1st Friday of every month the test is upon hearing sirens

30 sec is in duration. There should be reference to

some length of radius and sent to

the actual for posting in restrooms, &

warning signal (sirens will sound for 3-5 minutes)

White lettering on brown background

② I would prefer that the sticker read similar to:  
tune your radio to: AM-WSPD 1370  
FM-WOSE 94.5

\* ③ The siren system is used for all life threatening situations (ie. Nuclear, Tornado, Hazardous Materials spill etc.) If the sticker refers to the phone book, it should be made clear that this information is applicable to an accident at D.B.N.P.S. only

TYPE OF WORK REQUIRED	ASSIGNED TO	INSTRUCTIONS
RESEARCH	④ - I trust those stickers haven't been in planning for 5 months without notifying us!	Jim Green
COPY		Rec'd 12:30 PM
ART		6/27/83
PHOTOGRAPHY		
PRODUCTION		
COORDINATION		

QUANTITY	STOCK	SIZE	TOTAL ANTICIPATED COST	AREA	FUNCTION
2000-3,000				910	1375

INITIATED BY AREA HEAD APPROVAL CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS AREA HEAD APPROVAL



Toledo Edison

# NUCLEAR NEWSLETTER #11

For neighbors of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

December, 1982

## Unit produces one billion kwh in 12 weeks

The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station generated more than one billion kilowatt hours for Toledo Edison in the first twelve weeks of operation following the unit's return to service in early September from a refueling, maintenance and testing outage. During November, the unit provided 51 per cent of Toledo Edison customer needs.

"Work completed during the last refueling outage has left the plant in an excellent material condition," Terry D. Murray, Davis-Besse Station Superintendent, said. "This assists in keeping us ahead of the normal plant maintenance and further assures smooth unit operation."

During the refueling outage this summer, Toledo Edison was able to meet energy demands with its coal-fired stations, Bay Shore and Acme, and its part-ownership of the Bruce Mansfield Station, located on the Ohio River. Mild summer temperatures, which reduced the need for air conditioning, and the depressed economy further enabled the Company to meet demand with its own generation, reducing the need to buy expensive outside power.


Planning is already going forward for the next refueling outage, now scheduled for Fall of 1983.

### WHAT'S INSIDE...

Sirens serve many purposes . . . p. 3

Edison forms Nuclear Safety Division . . . p. 7

Annual emergency preparedness info: Checklists, Map and Instructions . . . p. 4



**OPERATORS MONITOR CONTROL PANEL** - Reactor operators are at control panels in the control room, where station conditions and performance are monitored and controlled.

## Company stresses safe operation

Nuclear power plants, by comparison to other industrial facilities, have established an excellent safety record in more than 20 years of operation. This fine record is expected to continue due in part to safety features designed into the stations, including recent improvements as a result of the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident experience. At Davis-Besse, an equally important factor is management's commitment to safe operation.

The controversy about nuclear safety often centers on the radioactive materials used to generate energy and the fear that an accident might allow

radiation to enter the environment.

Physicists and engineers have proven that it is impossible for a nuclear reactor to explode like a nuclear bomb. Bombs require a tight grouping of highly fissionable uranium atoms. Fuel in a nuclear reactor, however, contains only a very low percentage of fissionable material which is grouped loosely and cannot be made to explode. The fissionable atoms are simply too diluted in concentration to react rapidly enough for explosion. An analogy is to compare a lump of coal to a stick of dynamite. A lump of coal simply cannot blow up.

(cont. pg. 2)

Based on improving conditions at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and the reduction of the emergency level to alert state and county officials have removed protection action orders to residents, but are advised not to consume unprocessed milk from lactating animals within the two mile radius until state and county health agriculture and EPA officials assess the situation.

State and local health and agriculture officials are currently also taking milk samples from farms located outside the ten mile zone, but within the 50 mile ingestion pathway.

All public water supplies are ~~as~~ safe however streams are still considered ~~as~~ unsafe because of contaminated surface run off due to rain and should not be used to water livestock.



## 3301-53-12 Nonroutine use of school buses

(A) The regulations governing nonroutine use of buses apply to vehicles owned and operated by boards of education or under contract to a board of education. Such regulations pertain to summer use of buses as well as during the regular school year.

(B) City, exempted village and local superintendents shall issue a trip permit for each co-curricular use of a school bus. The permit shall provide the following information:

- (1) Date of the trip;
- (2) Destination of the trip;
- (3) Purpose of the trip;
- (4) Name of the school district;
- (5) Driver's name;
- (6) Bus registration number;
- (7) Total miles of the trip;
- (8) Superintendent's signature.

(C) School buses may be used to transport pupils to and from any event that is a planned part of the classroom or the educational program. Expenses may be paid from the general fund.

(D) School buses may be used to transport participating pupils to and from any co-curricular activity program approved by the district boards of education. Pupil participants living on the most direct route to the activity from the school may be picked up and discharged as far as is practical. These expenses shall not be paid from the general fund.

(E) Each event that requires the use of more than five school buses to transport participants to and from a co-curricular activity shall require a resolution by the district board of education.

(F) School buses shall not be used for pleasure trips.

(G) School buses shall not be used to transport spectators, either student or adult.

(H) Adults may be transported to assist the teacher on educational trips, if approved by the superintendent.

(I) Students may not be transported to observe college or professional games—i.e., football team, band, etc.

(J) School buses shall not be used for combination trips such as taking students to a museum in the morning and to view a football contest in the afternoon.

(K) Board-owned school buses may be used for trips outside the state, provided the entire trip does not exceed 120 miles from the sending school.

(L) School buses may be used by Ohio governmental agencies during time of civil emergencies. Questionable use should be clarified with assistance of the department of education. (Example of a civil emergency—Ohio national guard reserves require transportation to not threatened area.)

HISTORY: Eff. 9-1-70  
Former EDO-919-11

## 3301-53-13 General regulations

(A) Transportation of special equipment. When it is necessary to transport special equipment, each passenger on the bus must be seated.

(B) Emergency drills. The transportation supervisor and/or the bus driver should conduct a minimum of two rear door emergency evacuation drills on each school bus each year. Drills shall be conducted on the school grounds, or off the highway area. Responsible pupils should be assigned to open the emergency door and assist younger pupils from the bus.

(C) Forbidden cargo. While students are riding on the bus, animals, firearms, ammunition, explosives, or other dangerous materials or objects which may interfere with safe operation of the vehicle shall not be transported.

(D) Unauthorized passengers. No unauthorized passengers shall be transported on a school bus. (Example: Pre-school age children.)

HISTORY: Eff. 9-1-70  
Former EDO-919-12

## Chapter 3301-85

## Purchase of School Buses

Note: Chapter 3301-85 of the Administrative Code was filed pursuant to Chapter 119 of the Revised Code.

3301-85-01 Regulations for the distribution of state subsidies for the purchase of school buses

3301-85-02 Eligibility for subsidies for purchase of school bus(es)

3301-85-03 Method of determining need of school districts for state support for bus purchasing

3301-85-04 Method of determining priorities among the eligible districts for payments

3301-85-05 Procedure to be followed by an eligible school district in applying for state school bus subsidy payments

3301-85-06 Calculation of state subsidy for purchase of school buses as defined by the current appropriations act

3301-85-07 Regulations for the distribution of state subsidies for the purchase of school buses

(A) State subsidies to school districts paid for the purchase of school buses shall be based upon section 3317.07 of the Revised Code upon determination that pupils residing more than one mile from school could



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

MAY 19 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural  
and Technological Hazards  
Attention: Megs Hepler, Field Operations Branch

FROM: Acting Chief, Technological Hazards Branch

SUBJECT: Exercise Final Report, Davis Besse Site-Specific  
Off-Site Exercise, April 13, 1983

Attached is a copy of the Davis Besse April 13, 1983, Final (Exercise) Report, a copy of the letter transmitting it to the Ohio Disaster Services Agency (ODSA) and a copy of the scenario. The Federal evaluation team concluded the State of Ohio and Ottawa County demonstrated an adequate level of preparedness to protect the population. There are however a number of significant discrepancies indicated in the report that will require immediate attention. Of particular concern is the time delay in establishing the seven-mile protective actions and repeat discrepancies.

We have requested that Ohio provide a schedule of corrections by June 22, 1983, and upon receipt you will receive a copy.

This report does however reflect seven significant discrepancies for Ohio and six for Ottawa County in addition to the minor discrepancies as indicated in the report. We have indicated in our transmittal of the report to the State that although they need only respond to the significant discrepancies, Ohio has been requested to establish their own schedule of corrections to the minor discrepancies. We feel this necessary in order that all discrepancies receive the necessary attention to improve the over all plans and implementing procedures.

*Dan Bement*  
Dan Bement

Attachments

PART I

FINAL REPORT, APRIL 19, 1983  
on the  
DAVIS BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
SMALL-SCALE JOINT EMERGENCY EXERCISE  
April 13-14, 1983

EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

State of Ohio  
Davis Besse ECC (EOC) State  
Ottawa County  
Roving Exercise Observers

Total 8

NUMBER OF EVALUATORS

1 Federal/1 Contract  
1 Contract  
2 Federal  
3 Federal

2

Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station

Unknown - Observed by  
NRC

Involved States not Participating  
Involved Localities not Participating

None

None

Prepared by the:

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION V  
NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION  
TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS BRANCH  
Federal Center  
Battle Creek, Michigan 49016

*Del*  
*82404170378*

## PART II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This portion of the report highlights the findings of eight (8) off-site exercise observers of the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station small-scale exercise for the State and full-scale for the county. This exercise was conducted on April 13 and 14, 1983. The evaluation team observed the emergency response capability of the Ohio Disaster Services Agency (OSDA), the Ottawa County Disaster Services Agency (OCDSA), and supporting organizations. This exercise was conducted at the time the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) tested their Federal response capability.

The purpose of this exercise was to test radiological emergency response planning and preparedness of the State of Ohio and Ottawa County. The intent of this report is to indicate those areas where improvements are necessary as well as to indicate where improvements have been made since the November 6, 1980, exercise.

The State of Ohio and Ottawa County demonstrated an adequate ability to protect the population should there be an accident at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station. There were noted several significant deficiencies, some of which are considered repeats, that must receive immediate attention to correct. The particulars of these discrepancies are discussed in detail in this report.

A particular incident occurred that inhibited the ability of a FEMA contract observer to evaluate the Emergency Control Center, ECC (EOF). The ECC security would not permit this observer into the facility for some two hours after the exercise began. This precluded the opportunity to observe the initial emergency actions. The State should provide the ECC (EOF), EOC and any other function requiring security a list of observers so that access can be made without interruption to the evaluation process, and/or utility procedures changed to allow access of FEMA evaluators once FEMA evaluators have been identified by the Senior FEMA exercise official as having legitimate business in these utility locations.

I. Emergency Operations Facilities & Resources

State: Physical facilities of the State EOC have been evaluated during previous exercises and found to be adequate. During this exercise the State notified Indiana and Michigan of the site area emergency at the plant. The State also made arrangements for the State patrol to escort the NRC from the airport to the plant.

Internal message handling procedures were weak. No one person was assigned to receive and record messages, etc.

In this exercise and previous exercises Federal evaluators noted the lack of maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, shelter areas and population distribution. These maps should be displayed and used. This is a repeat deficiency from previous exercise.

Local: The assembly room in the County Courthouse was quickly converted into an emergency operations center. Improvements were made in this facility since the last exercise. Security was good but during the first day caused some internal coordination delays between the operations room and the execution room. This was corrected the second day.

It is recommended that more frequent staff briefing (to include support organizations) be conducted to keep the EOC informed of the total picture.

Map displays within the EOC need improvement. Key maps depicting evacuation routes, population distribution, relocation centers, etc. were missing.

## II. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff

State: Since this was a small-scale exercise for the State, only key (limited) staff were involved in this exercise. Alerting and activation of these individuals was accomplished by telephone and went smoothly.

Local: Alerting and mobilization of Ottawa County emergency staff has improved since the last exercise. The ability, though, to provide a 24-hour continuous operational capability was not demonstrated. A complete shift change of the emergency staff during the next exercise is recommended to enable the Federal evaluation team to make a determination.

Shift change during those exercises also provided an excellent opportunity for additional back-up staff to gain experience.

## III. Emergency Operations Management

State: The Federal evaluation team at the State was not able to determine what individual was in charge of State emergency response. This is a recurring comment from the previous full-scale exercise. No briefing was conducted to inform response personnel of the situation when they reported to the State EOC at the site area emergency declaration.

The Federal evaluation team at Columbus was not able to determine if the person representing the Governor was involved in any request to ask for a Federal Disaster Declaration.

Local: Ottawa County staff was well organized and displayed competence in performing their duties. County SOP's are developed and were used during the exercise. More periodic briefings should be conducted to keep EOC staff informed of the total picture.

The Executive Committee collectively made decisions and displayed enthusiasm, concern, and leadership to interpret data. Significant time delays between State and County occurred regarding the PAG

to evacuate out to 7 miles in section M, N, and L.

#### IV. Public Alerting and Notification

State: Not observed at the State level during this exercise.

Local: This section was not evaluated during this exercise. FEMA was informed prior to the exercise that the siren system would not be sounded. Apparently the decision to sound the siren system was made the day before the exercise and the system was activated at approximately 5:19 p.m. Wednesday evening. In addition the EBS system was not demonstrated during the exercise. It is recommended that decisions regarding activation of the prompt alert and notification system be made well in advance of the next exercise. It is further recommended that the EBS system be utilized during the next exercise to enable the evaluation team to evaluate this part of the system. For purposes of this evaluation FEMA request a copy of the most recent monthly test so it can be included in our evaluation report.

#### V. Public and Media Relations

State: The State public information officer was part of the media staff at the JPIC and coordinated State and county releases with the utility. The media facility at the plant is spacious, has good visual displays. More use of the visual displays is recommended. A rumor control number was established. News media kits were good. No technical representative was available at the first news briefing. Briefings were conducted frequently and were generally well done but there were significant delays of news releases during the general emergency phase of the exercise. News media people reported problems with the telephone during the exercise. Recommend this problem be looked into as well as ways to eliminate delays of media release during critical phases of an exercise. Since the facility is on site it is recommended consideration be given to exercise the alternate JPIC at the next exercise.

Local: Ottawa County had a spokesperson at the JPIC who coordinated county releases and participated in news briefings. Again news release delays were experienced during the general emergency phase. No actual written release was provided for the two mile evacuation and the written news release for the seven mile evacuation did not get out until approximately 9:45 p.m. Wednesday evening. More use of visual displays outlining the evacuation area and the shelter area would be helpful for the media to carry this information to the public. In the opinion of the evaluation team information was not provided the news media on a timely basis during the general emergency phase.



## VI. Accident Assessment

State: The State projections (computer output) indicated evacuation to 2 miles, shelter to 7 miles. The utility recommendations based on more conservative procedures indicated evacuation to 7 miles. It took 25 minutes for the State to decide to use the utility rather than the State Department of Health procedures and protective action recommendation. The State and utility dose projections were essentially the same and were not of issue during this 25 minute period. If the utility PAG are to be used under certain circumstances then the State plan should be revised to reflect this.

Local: Accident Assessment is a function for the State. The State deploys field teams and conducts technical calculations.

Once the decision was made to evacuate to 7 miles Ottawa County took 25 minutes to implement the PAG.

## VII. Actions to Protect the Public

State: During the exercise too much time was spent between the State representative at the ECC and the County agreeing on recommendations concerning the area to be evacuated. When the State dose assessment room finally knew what areas the county was going to evacuate, they failed to inform the county that according to the State map the county's zone of evacuation and sheltering did not cover all of the 7-10 mile radius.

Local: There was an adequate demonstration by Ottawa County and the host Sandusky County to adequately protect the public through sheltering, reception, and care as demonstrated at the Vanguard Vocational Training School (reception and care center) and the Alkinson Grade School (shelter).

It is recommended the next exercise actually demonstrate an evacuation of a group of people to a reception/congregate facility and processed through the facilitation to a shelter.

The delay discussed earlier in making the evacuation to 7 miles affected a timely implementation of the evacuation process. Approximately 25 minutes was taken by the county to decide the boundary of the evacuation and sheltering zone.

## VIII. Health, Medical, Exposure Control Measures

State: During this small scale exercise the Federal evaluation team observed the State used their computer to develop average exposure to the population if they had remained in the plume. However, the population was evacuated and the results of computations did not estimate time exposure. The State of Ohio does not recommend use of KI for the general population or emergency workers.

Local: There was an adequate capability shown by the Ohio highway patrol, county sheriff, and Ohio Department of Transportation to establish road blocks and control access to the evacuated area as observed by the Exercise Director.

The decontamination demonstration at the Ottawa County garage was limited to telling emergency workers how to operate radiological monitoring equipment, a briefing on decontamination procedures and the monitoring and washdown of contaminated equipment. This type of training should have been provided to emergency workers prior to the exercise so they could demonstrate their ability to perform these functions. This capability should be demonstrated during the next exercise.

Also recommend medical facilities and treatment be demonstrated at the next exercise.

#### IX. Recovery and Reentry Operations

State: Recovery and reentry operations at the ECC was acceptable. However, more discussion between the State EOC and the county should have occurred. The State should have waited for field data to come in before concurring with utility recommendations. More time should be allotted deciding to implement recovery and reentry. The next exercise needs to more fully demonstrate recovery and reentry procedures. This is a repeat comment from previous exercises.

Local: The scenario for this exercise called for a demonstration of recovery and reentry procedures. Yet the exercise was terminated before these procedures were fully demonstrated. The next exercise must allow for a more complete demonstration of recovery and reentry procedures.

#### X. Relevance of the Exercise Experience

State: The Federal evaluation team feels the exercise was of benefit to those activated at the State during this small scale exercise. Decision making was dramatically tested when the utility and NRC recommended protective actions using more conservative standards than the State. NRC participation brought out some aspects not usually considered by the State.

The scenario was not developed according to deadlines established by the NRC and FEMA. It did not make clear what was going to happen off site and changes were made the day of the exercise. Some players had access to the scenario. Recommend future scenarios to objectives be discussed between the State, the utility, FEMA and NRC at least 90 days prior to the exercise and that deadlines be met.



Local: The Federal evaluation team feels this exercise was of benefit to the officials and emergency operations staff of Ottawa County. The scenario was not completed according to the deadline established by FEMA and the NRC. The scenario as finally developed did provide an opportunity for Ottawa County to demonstrate most emergency response capabilities.

#### Conclusion

During the exercise the State of Ohio and Ottawa County demonstrated an adequate ability to protect the population if the events in the scenario had been real. However, several significant deficiencies were observed at both the State and Ottawa County that need to be corrected. Some of these significant deficiencies at the State are repeat deficiencies.

## PART III

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY LISTINGS

This detailed discussion follows the format of the composite Exercrit for each jurisdiction evaluated during this exercise. The team leader, using input from team members, prepares the consolidated exercrit for the site being evaluated. Comments will be made for each element listed in the composite Exercrit, even if no deficiency is noted. Each State and locality will be treated separately.

STATE OF OHIO

## SUMMARY I

Emergency Operations Facilities & Resources (Space, Internal Comm., Displays, Security)

The physical facilities of the State EOC have been evaluated during previous exercises and found to be adequate. During this exercise the State notified Indiana and Michigan of the site-area-emergency. They also made arrangements for the Ohio Highway Patrol to meet and escort the NRC response team. Internal communications were poor. It was not one person's assignment to receive and record messages, enter on the status board, etc.

During previous exercises we have noted the lack of maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, shelter areas, and population distribution. These maps should be prepared, displayed and used. Maps should be maintained in both the accident assessment room and the operations room. Maps showing monitoring points should include the utility locations as well as the States. If they are not already so, the maps used in the State and county should be the same.

## F 1 b

Adequacy of Communications Systems (Primary and Backup) with Continuous State/Local Governments within the EPZs

There is a dedicated phone and TTY line between the State office, the county and the ECC. During the early part of the exercise, messages were lost in transmission, i.e. the TTY didn't work. There is a backup radio to the county. Michigan and Indiana were notified of the site area emergency by telephone.

## F 1 c

Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriate, with Federal Emergency Response Organizations

The State used telephone for communication with the NRC National who were participating in the exercise. Because this was a small scale exercise, no other Federal agencies were contacted.

F 1 d

Adequacy of Communications Systems between the Nuclear Facility and Near-Site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs

The assessment room staff in the EOC did not talk directly with NRC at the EOF, which was a weakness since NRC was making recommendations along with the utility. Communications with the State Representative at the ECC (EOF) was by commercial telephone.

C 1 c

Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources Needed to Support Federal Response

The State DSA arranged to have the State Patrol meet the NRC plane and escort the NRC response team to the ECC (EOF).

Adequacy of EOC working Space and Amenities

The EOC has been evaluated during previous exercises and is generally adequate. However, the accident assessment room could be larger and the ventilation could be improved.

Adequacy of EOC Internal Communications, Including Equipment, Displays, and Message-Handling Procedures

The status board was not maintained in a consistent fashion. Some plant internal conditions were recorded while others were not. Internal communications were poor. It was not one person's assignment to receive and record messages on the status sheets, etc. It was done catch as catch can. Recommend that this become a specific area of responsibility so that important data would be consistently recorded.

Adequacy of EOC Security Measures

This criteria was previously evaluated and found adequate during the February, 1983, Beaver Valley exercise.

H 3

Overall Adequacy of the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)

This criteria was previously evaluated and found adequate during the February, 1983, Beaver Valley exercise.

J 10 a

Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas

There seemed to be difficulty between the State and county EOC staffs in determining on their maps the points of references to be used for evacuation. It could not be determined if this was due to the use of different maps, plotting problems or just a communications problem. The

F 1 d

Adequacy of Communications Systems between the Nuclear Facility and Near-Site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs

The assessment room staff in the EOC did not talk directly with NRC at the EOF, which was a weakness since NRC was making recommendations along with the utility. Communications with the State Representative at the ECC (EOF) was by commercial telephone.

C 1 c

Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources Needed to Support Federal Response

The State DSA arranged to have the State Patrol meet the NRC plane and escort the NRC response team to the ECC (EOF).

Adequacy of EOC working Space and Amenities

The EOC has been evaluated during previous exercises and is generally adequate. However, the accident assessment room could be larger and the ventilation could be improved.

Adequacy of EOC Internal Communications, Including Equipment, Displays, and Message-Handling Procedures

The status board was not maintained in a consistent fashion. Some plant internal conditions were recorded while others were not. Internal communications were poor. It was not one person's assignment to receive and record messages on the status sheets, etc. It was done catch as catch can. Recommend that this become a specific area of responsibility so that important data would be consistently recorded.

Adequacy of EOC Security Measures

This criteria was previously evaluated and found adequate during the February, 1983, Beaver Valley exercise.

H 3

Overall Adequacy of the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)

This criteria was previously evaluated and found adequate during the February, 1983, Beaver Valley exercise.

J 10 a

Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas

There seemed to be difficulty between the State and county EOC staffs in determining on their maps the points of references to be used for evacuation. It could not be determined if this was due to the use of different maps, plotting problems or just a communications problem. The

end result though was an unacceptable time delay in establishing evacuation information. Maps used in the State and county EOC's should be the same to minimize any difficulty in plotting procedures. The maps displayed in the EOC showed state monitoring points only, and should include the utility monitoring points as well. There should also be a map displayed showing ingestion pathway monitoring points. Maps showing relocation centers and shelter areas are in the plan and the plans are available. These maps as well as a map showing evacuation routes should be displayed in the EOC.

J 10 b

Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Population Distribution Near Nuclear Facility by Evacuation Areas

There was no small map displayed in the EOC showing population distribution, however, it is in the plan and the plan is available in the EOC. A map depicting population distribution should be displayed in the EOC.

SUMMARY II

Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff (Staffing, 24-Hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)

Being a small scale exercise a shift change was not included in the scenario. The alerting and activation of response organizations and personnel went smoothly. The telephone was used for this purpose. A backup system does not exist.

The EPA representatives to the accident assessment section were at the EOC well before the start of the exercise.

A 1 e

Capability for 24-Hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Communications

This being a small scale exercise it was not required by the scenario.

A 4

Capability for 24-Hour Continuous Emergency Response Operations

This being a small scale exercise it was not required by the scenario.

E 1

Adequacy of Procedures used for Notif. of Emer. Response Organizations Including Means for Verification of Messages

A telephone was used to notify emergency response organizations. This system worked well, although verification call backs were not observed. No backup system is available but recommended.

E 2

Adequacy of Procedures Used for Alerting, Notifying and Mobilizing Emergency Response Personnel

The telephone was used for alerting, notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel. Those calls that were initiated for the site area emergency were made after normal business hours and were completed within 30-45 minutes after declaration. There is no backup system.

C 2 a

If appropriate, Timely Dispatch of a Representative to Licensees Near-Site EOF

Timeliness of dispatching a State representative to the licensees near-site EOF was not demonstrated although a State representative was at the ECC (EOF) during the exercise.

F 1 a

Adequacy of Emergency Response Communications Equipment Used with Prompt Activation

Telephones were used and was adequate. Recommend a backup system. Actions taken were timely.

F 1 e

Adequacy of Communications Equipment Used for Alerting and Activating Emergency Response Personnel

Telephone is used and is adequate. Recommend backup system. Actions taken were timely.

F 2

Capability to Communicate with Fixed and Mobile Medical Support Facilities

N/A.

H 4

Demonstration of Timely and Efficient Activation and Staffing of EOCs and Other Facilities

Although personnel from State EPA were at the EOC early, the Health Department did not respond until after being called at their office. Actions taken were timely.

SUMMARY III

Emergency Operations Management (Organization, Control, Leadership, Support by Officials, Decision Making)

Again during this exercise there was no demonstration of "hands on leadership" by the Director of DSA, the Deputy Director, or the Assistant Director or the Director of Radiological Health Department. There were no briefings of the response personnel who reported to the EOC with the Site Area Emergency. The Federal exercise plan created a disaster declaration without a request from the Governor.

A 1 a Evidence that Specific Organizations Have Been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response

Response organizations have been established.

A 1 d Demonstration that a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effectively in Charge of Emergency Response

There was no demonstration of hands on leadership by the Director of DSA, the Deputy or Assistant Director. In the Accident Assessment Room nobody was clearly in charge. The person who should have been was playing Governor for NRC's benefit on the first day. On the second day he could have been but was not an effective leader. Jobs got done but not be preassigned stations. Recommend each person have preassigned duties. Lack of leadership was most apparent the second day when message handling was weakest.

A 2 a Demonstration that Primary & Support Functions & Responsibilities Have Been Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements

This element has been adequately demonstrated in previous exercises.

C 1 a Evidence that a Specific Person Has Been Authorized to Request Federal Assistance (State Only)

Although the scenario did not require this action in the State plan, the Governor (Director of DSA) is authorized to request Federal assistance as in any other disaster. During this exercise, the prerogative was usurped by the NRC.

D 3 An Emergency Classification System Was Effectively Used and was Consistent with that of the Utility

The emergency classification described by NUREG 0654 is used by the utility and the State. Use of a consistent classification was adequately demonstrated.

D 4 Adequate Written Procedures are Used for Emergency Actions Consistent with Facility RECC and Local Offsite Conditions

Written procedures in the accident assessment room were adequate, but were violated when the decision was made to go with more conservative NRC recommendation. The plan should be changed or the State should stick to their procedures. Emergency procedures in determining protective measures was not timely.

Demonstration of Effective Coord. Between Emergency Response Dir. & Staff, thru Oral Briefings, Staff Meetings, Etc.

Briefings for the response personnel that come aboard with site area emergency were not conducted. As the need arose,



individuals were brought up to date and then asked for specific information. When the exercise ended, the representative from Welfare had not been briefed.

Adequacy of Support and/or Participation by Elected Officials

Not observed

SUMMARY IV Public Alerting & Notification (Means of Notification - Sirens, Vehicles, or Other Systems)

Not observed

E 5 Evidence of a Reliable System for Dissemination to the Public of Appropriate Info Received from the Licensee, e.g., EBS

Not observed

E 6 Adequacy of Means Used for Notification & Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume EPZ (Within 15 Minutes)

Not observed

E 7 Effective Use of Instructional Messages for the Public in Affected Areas

Not observed

J 10 c Adequacy of Means Used for Notifying all Segments of Transient and Resident Population

Not observed

SUMMARY V Public and Media Relations (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination)

The State staff at the JPIC was adequate and an 800 number was available for rumor control. Considerable effort was put forth to exchange and coordinate information among the JPIC staff.

The utility had no technical representative for the first briefing making it awkward for the information officer as he addressed reporters and responded to their questions. The news kits provided reporters were good. Most briefings were done well, but sometimes delayed by the clearing process at the county. More effort needs to be made to involve the EBS station. The facility is excellent, however, should the plume blow over the facility, persons inside would have to remain until radiation decayed to a safe level and conversely no one could enter until this level had been reached.



G 1

Evidence of Dissemination of Information to the Public,  
Within the Last Year

A check of local motels, restaurants, gas stations, resulted in a "mixed bag" of information. Most had no information. Only one gas station 5 miles west of plant had mailings 3 or 4 times per year. They were pleased with information. Military units nearby had no information, but were prepared to help when needed.

G 2

Evidence of a Public Info Program for Permanent & Transient  
Pop in the Plume EPZ, such as Posted Notices, etc.

There were no signs posted in local parks and beaches. Page 14 of the local phone book although had emergency information.

G 3 a

Appropriate Points of Contact for the Media Have Been  
Designated

The State had adequate points of contact. The crew knew what they were doing, they did their best, despite the need to clear their releases in writing with the County EOC commissioners. The clearing process slowed down the release of information to the public.

Adequacy of Joint Media Facility, Where Appropriate

The Joint Press Information Center (JPIC) is an excellent facility onsite. It is fully equipped for a full-scale emergency. The building that houses this facility is radiation resistant. The seating capacity is adequate for more than 200 people. Lighting, visuals for TV taping facilities are good. Each briefing was taped. The bank of 18 phones require "collect" placement of calls. You cannot call locally or receive calls on these phones which could present a problem.

Adequacy of Issued Press Release

The slow down of the county review process made it necessary for the State to "bunch up" their releases late on the first day. There should have been a separate story when radiation was detected off site. The utility has more modern equipment, such as a word processor. Not all of the releases followed a chronology of events.

G 4 a

A Media Spokesperson Has Been Designated who has Access to  
All Necessary Information

The State had good backup representation at the JPIC to handle inquiries at most times. Much effort was made to coordinate information.

G 4 b      Adequacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information Among Spokespersons

Exchange of information among spokespersons was good. Proper agency was always designated. All persons were careful to clear information before writing releases or briefing media.

G 4 c      Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control Measures

The State has a toll free 800 number. They had four people handling inquiries. Thus, all calls could be handled rapidly. Inquiries generally received responses within 15 minutes. A record was kept of all persons who called.

SUMMARY VI      Accident Assessment (Staff & Field Operations, Monitoring, Equipment, Technical Calculations, Use of PAGs)

The computer was effectively used to perform a quick and thorough analysis of plume location and projected doses. The State projection (computer output) indicated evacuate to 2 miles, shelter to 7 miles. The utility recommendation, based upon more conservative procedures, indicated evacuation to 7 miles. It took 25 minutes for the State to decide to use the utility rather than the State procedures and protective action recommendations. The State and utility dose projections were essentially the same and were not at issue during this 25 minutes. The State should have made a more rapid and timely decision whether to adopt the utility's or their own computer-based PAG recommendations. If the utility proposed PAGs are to be used under certain circumstances, as was the case at this exercise, then the plan should be revised to reflect this fact. The State failed to inform the county that according to the State map, the county's zone of evacuation and zone of sheltering did not cover all of the 7 mile radius and remaining portions of the 7-10 mile radius, respectively, as had been agreed upon.

H 7      Adequacy of Offsite Radiological Monitoring Instruments

Not tested in this exercise

H 12      An Adequate Central Point Has Been Established for Receipt and Analysis of Field Monitoring Data and Sample Media

Not tested in this exercise

I 7      Adequacy of Capability and Resources for Field Monitoring Within the Plume EPZ

Not tested in this exercise

- I 8      Adequate Capability to Make a Rapid Assessment of Magnitude & Location of Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards
- The use of a computer facilitated quick and thorough analysis of the plume location and projected doses.
- I 9      Capability for Measurement of Radioiodine Concentrations in Plume EPZ Under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)
- Not tested in this exercise
- I 10      Capability for Relating Measured Parameters to Dose Rates and Estimated Integrated Doses (State Only)
- Not tested in this exercise
- I 11      Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)
- Not tested in this exercise
- J 10 m      Capability to Recommend, Protective Action, Based on PAGs, in Plume EPZ (State Only)
- It took 25 minutes for the State to decide whether to agree with the utility's recommendation on protective action or to go with the protective actions based upon the State procedures. The source of the discrepancy was that the utility plan station supporting procedures AD 1827.12.7 Section 5.1 recommended evacuation at lower cumulative doses than the State procedures. The State dose assessment room spent most of the 25 minutes trying to substantiate the reason for the discrepancy. A decision should have been made immediately to go with either the utility or State projections.
- When the State finally agreed with the utility, they violated their own procedures. Either the plan should be changed or the State should always go with currently adopted procedures.
- When State finally put the areas the county was going to evacuate on their map, it showed that not all of the 7 mile radius was being evacuated and not all of the 7-10 mile radius was being sheltered. The State failed to notify the county of these facts.
- C 3      Evidence of Availability & Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only)
- Not observed

## SUMMARY VII

Actions to Protect the Public (Sheltering, Evacuation, Reception & Care, Transportation)

The demonstration of actions to protect the public including evacuation, sheltering and the adequacy of the protective measures were weak. During the exercise too much time was spent between the State representative at the ECC and county agreeing on recommendations and providing press releases concerning the area to be evacuated.

When the State dose assessment room finally knew what areas the county was going to evacuate, they failed to inform the county that not all of the 7 mile radius was being evacuated.

J 2      Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite Individuals to Offsite Locations

Not observed

J 9      Capability for Implementation of Protective Measures

During the exercise too much time was spent on the coordination between the county and State agreeing to protective action recommendations and producing press releases.

J 10 d      Adequacy of Methods Used for Protecting Mobility Impaired Persons, Including Institutionally Confined

Not observed

J 10 g      Adequacy of Methods Used for Implementing Relocation of Populace

The methods used for evacuating areas or determining the area to be evacuated were not timely. A procedure should be implemented in the plan that would make evacuation areas more easily determined.

J 10 k      Adequacy of Organizations Identification of and Means for Dealing with Potential Impediments to Evacuation

Not observed

J 11      Adequacy of Protective Measures in Ingestion EPZ, Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Plants, Etc. (State Only)

Press releases prepared concerning ingestion pathways (water, milk). However, water press release was prepared way before data could be provided. Teams were not sent out to obtain soil and vegetation samples. Teams were sent out to do water and milk.

- J 10 h Adequate Relocation Centers Have Been Established at Least 5 Miles & Preferably 10 Miles Outside the Plume EPZ
- Not observed
- Adequacy of Facilities, Supplies & Equipment at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers
- Not observed
- Adequacy of Staffing at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers
- Not observed
- J 12 Adequacy of Procedures for Processing Evacuees in Relocation Ctrs, Including Hlth Care, Decon & Rad Monitoring, Etc.
- Not observed
- SUMMARY VIII Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures (Access Control, Adequacy of Equipment, Use of KI)
- The State used computer to develop average exposure to population if they had remained in the plume. However, population was evacuated and therefore results of computations did not estimate true exposure. The State of Ohio does not recommend the use of KI for the general population or emergency workers.
- J 10 c Adequacy of Provisions for Use of KI for Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Persons in Plume EPZ
- The State does not use KI.
- J 10 f Adequacy of Methods Used by State Health Department in Decisions to Administer KI to Central Population (State Only)
- Not observed
- J 10 j Adequacy of Control of Access to Evacuate Areas
- Not observed
- K 3 a Adequacy of a 24-Hour a Day Capability to Determine Dose Received by Emergency Workers
- Not observed

- K 3 b      Demonstration of Adequate and Frequent Emergency Workers  
Dosimeter Readings & Maintenance of Dosage Records
- Not observed
- K 4      Evidence That an Adequate Decision Chain has been Established  
to Authorize Exposure for Emer. Workers in Excess of PAGs
- Not observed
- K 5 a      Evidence that Appropriate Action Levels have been Specified  
for Determining Need for Decontamination
- Not observed
- K 5 b      Adequacy of Measures for Decontamination of Emergency  
Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal
- Not observed
- L 1      Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup  
Hospital and Medical Services for Handling Personnel
- Not observed
- L 4      Adequate Capability Demonstrated for Transportation of  
Radiological Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities
- Not observed
- M 4      Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population  
Exposure (State Only)
- The State used a computer code to develop average exposure if people had stayed. Since they evacuated out to seven (7) miles, most of population dose was not estimated.

SUMMARY IX      Recovery and Reentry Operations (Adequacy of Plans and  
Procedures)

Procedures demonstrated at the ECC for recovery and reentry were acceptable. However, more discussion between the State EOC and the county should have occurred. The State should have waited for field data to come in before concurring with the utility recommendations. More time should be allotted for the decision making process of recovery and reentry operation.

Because Federal standards have not been promulgated the State seems to be taking an indifferent, wait and see attitude toward this problem rather than developing procedures of their own.

M 3

Adequacy of Established Means for Informing Response Org  
That Recovery and Reentry Can Be Initiated (State Only)

The State reacted to messages from the utility based on plant conditions. They had to ask for field data and then did not wait for it before concurring with the utility.

The State recommended livestock on stored feed during the accident. After the release was terminated, the utility made a recommendation concerning ingestion pathway problems only within 2 miles, OK outside 2 miles. The State concurred, despite having no data on the ingestion pathway. Data from the utility on soil samples was received at about the same time the State concurred on 2 miles with the utility, but the State was not aware of soil sample data. In the "2 day later" portion of the exercise, State concurred with the utility recommendation to suspend all protective actions. Then issued a press release on the isolation of milk samples. (This section picked up from Opelka, Sec. VII, Element J11.) Contact with the impacted county could have been more extensive during ingestion pathway analysis. This is especially true because the county had decisions to make.

M 1

Adequacy of Procedures Demonstrated for Reentry and  
Relaxation of Protective Measures Allowing Reentry

Procedures for reentry were demonstrated. However, in future exercises these procedures should be carried out further. More time should be allotted for this function. The idea was expressed "nobody has given us the procedures for recovery so we should do like Penna. and not bother." This negative approach to this problem was expressed several times in different ways.

SUMMARY X

Relevance of the Exercise Experience (Benefit to  
Participants, Adequacy of the Scenario)

The scenario adequately mobilized the limited State response staff for this small scale State exercise. Because of the nature of the scenario dose assessment capabilities were barely tested. Decision making was dramatically tested when the utility and NRC recommended protective actions using more conservative standards than the State. While it was not part of the off-site scenario, the exercise brought out several aspects of operations not previously considered by the State that result from Federal participation in operations.



We have several problems with this scenario. Changes have been submitted at the last minute. The document did not always make clear what actions were going to be exercised and what simulated. A continuing problem has been the failure of the State to comply with the time line set forth in memo 14. We observed during this exercise some players, other than the designated DSA representatives, had access to the scenario and others had a flow chart of exercise times and events.

N 1 b

Adequacy of Scenario to Test Capability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources

The scenario adequately mobilized the limited State response personnel for this small scale exercise.

N 1 a

Adequacy of Ex. to Test Integrated Capabilities & Major Portions of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected Org.

This was a small scale exercise at the State EOC. Because of the nature of the scenario, dose assessment capability was barely tested. Decision-making was dramatically tested in dose assessment room because the utility/NRC was saying something different than State procedures called for (utility evacuated at lower cumulative dose). Scenario was adequate to test the capabilities of the public information staffs.

Benefit of Exercise to Participants

The public information staff learned some lessons, including the necessity to educate the press about "scenarios". Participants in the dose assessment room and the EOF learned how the situation changes when the NRC response team is present. The State experienced a take over by the NRC to declare national disaster. Most areas of the exercise pertaining to public information were demonstrated.



OTTAWA COUNTY

## SUMMARY I

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES & RESOURCES  
(Space, Internal Comm., Displays, Security)

The assembly room in the County Building was used as the Emergency Operations Center during the exercise. This room was quickly converted for this purpose and provided an adequate facility for the emergency staff. There were improvements made since the last exercise and the Final Exercise Report provides some minor recommendations for additional improvements.

Internal coordination between the operations room and the executive room was time-consuming because of the security requirement to process through the security check point. Fortunately, this was recognized during the second day and procedures implemented to minimize the time loss. Otherwise, EOC security was adequate..

There should be more frequent staff briefings and representatives of the support organizations should provide status briefings so the entire emergency staff would be aware of the emergency responses. It is recommended that a council member provide periodic briefings to the emergency staff on the decisions that have been rendered.

There was an inadequate display of maps in the EOC depicting evacuation routes, population distribution, relocation centers, control points, monitoring points, etc. These maps should be prominently displayed to facilitate the decision-making process.

## F.1.b.

Adequacy of Communications Systems (Primary and Backup)  
with Continuous State/Local Governments Within the EPZ

The State and County were in contact via dedicated line and radio backup through Red Cross volunteers located in the County EOC. The State communications van would be here for backup during an actual emergency with Ohio National Guard van as a third communication capability if needed, but was not demonstrated during this exercise as this exercise was small scale for the State.

## F.1.c.

Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriate, with Federal  
Emergency Response Organizations

This is not requested at the County level.

F.1.d.

Adequacy of Communications Systems Between the Nuclear Facility and Near-Site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs

The State, County and EOF at the utility have a three-way dedicated (open line) demonstrated during the exercise. The Red Cross operated a backup radio capability to the State, EOF and JPIC. There is also an automatic telecopy capability that stays on-line receiving messages as appropriate to the County. Not all messages transmitted between the utility and the State are received on it. It cannot transmit.

C.1.c.

Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources Needed to Support Federal Response

The Federal Response Team would have to come into Toledo if coming via air or perhaps drive in, taking 3½ hours. There are some hotels/motels in the area, but if this were (the Federal team to come in) necessary during the months of May-September, lodging would be a problem in the town of Port Clinton. The team quite possibly would be better lodged in Toledo, some 38 miles away.

Adequacy of EOC Working Space and Amenities

The EOC working space was adequate with the necessary tables, telephones, and lighting. Better use of EOC space could be facilitated by narrowing the "U" shape, allowing more room to maneuver behind the chairs. It was quiet and worked well. The RAD assessment officer was separated from the operations room as was the PIO who also required a more private area in which to facilitate decision-making and cross-conversations with the JPIC respectively.

Adequacy of EOC Internal Communications, Including Equipment, Displays, and Message-Handling Procedures

Equipment such as tables, phones, in/out boxes were effectively used; however, the maps were lacking as needed by the participating agencies in the operations room. The status board should reflect the emergency classification boldly at the top of the board to immediately draw the attention of the participants. When the page was changed, it was no longer obvious what emergency classification was existing.

Adequacy of EOC Security Measures

Security at the EOC was excellent. The security persons had a listing of authorized persons to issue passes and required I.D. which they held until

you left. All areas not immediate to the EOC entrance and nearest exist were posted and "roped" to keep persons out of all other areas. It is suggested that the executive committee work area be included in the secured area rather than outside because this would be a very curious place for the press to infiltrate. This is, also, adjacent to the PIO office of operations which should also be included in the secured area.

H.3.

Overall Adequacy of the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)

The overall adequacy of the EOC would be "good." Unfortunately, the executive committee was not located in the operations room which made it difficult for the players to know what was going on all the time unless they provided more frequent briefings relative to the emergency situation and the decisions they have made.

J.10.a.

Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas

Maps showing evacuation routes, sampling points, relocation centers and shelter areas were not displayed in the EOC. A map showing monitoring points was located in the RAD assessment room. The Ohio State Highway Patrol (SHP) had maps they used for plotting roadblocks but they were not visually available to the other participants. A map should be displayed in the EOC and perhaps they (the SHP) could brief the other agency participants showing these road-block areas.

J.10.b.

Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Population Distribution Near Nuclear Facility by Evacuation Areas

The population distribution maps were not displayed in the EOC. The two maps in the EOC were the same and only indicated sectors of the EPZ by A-R, less I and O, and did not include population figures per sector.

SUMMARY II

ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF  
(STAFFING, 24-HOUR CAPABILITY, ALERTING TIMELINESS)

The initial alert and notification of the County's emergency staff was accomplished by the Sheriff's dispatch officers. Their procedures improved since the last exercise because more than one person activated the call list which greatly expedited the response capability.

The ability to provide a 24-hour per day continuous operational capability was not demonstrated during this exercise. A complete shift change of the emergency staff during the next exercise is necessary to make a determination of adequacy. This shift change also provides an excellent opportunity for training additional staff members as well.

SUMMARY II  
(Cont'd)

The emergency response staff reported to the EOC in a timely manner and demonstrated the capability to access the emergency situation and implement spontaneous responses.

A.1.e.

Capability for 24-Hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Communications

The County has the capability to receive, on a 24-hour continuous basis, the initial as well as followup messages and activate the emergency response team. This is accomplished primarily through the Sheriff's dispatch office.

A.4.

Capability for 24-Hour Continuous Emergency Response Operations

The capability to provide for a 24-hour continuous operation was not demonstrated by a shift change of the emergency staff. This capability should be definitely demonstrated during the next exercise.

E.1.

Adequacy of Procedures used for Notif. of Emer. Response Organizations Including Means for Verification of Messages

There were adequate procedures implemented for the notification of emergency response organizations which included the verification of messages.

E.2.

Adequacy of Procedures used for Alerting, Notifying and Mobilizing Emergency Response Personnel

The initial alerting and notification of the emergency response personnel has improved since the last exercise in that more than one person was used to place the notification calls. The Sheriff's dispatcher, however, was not aware that there is a form in the plan to be used in the receipt of emergency information. This form should be used in the receipt of emergency information. This form should be used because it is more efficient than using a blank piece of paper as they did and also eliminates the possibility of not obtaining important information concerning the emergency.

C.2.a.

If Appropriate, Timely Dispatch of a Representative to Licensees Near-Site EOF

The County had a representative at the Emergency Control Center (ECC) (EOF).

F.1.a. Adequacy of Emergency Response Communications Equipment  
Used with Prompt Activation

Not observed

F.1.e. Adequacy of Communications Equipment Used for Alerting  
and Activating Emergency Response Personnel

There is adequate communications equipment through the use of telephones, pagers, and radio to alert and activate emergency response personnel.

F.2. Capability to Communicate with Fixed and Mobile Medical  
Support Facilities

The Sheriff's Department has the capability to communicate with all ambulance rescue squads via radio (primary) and phone (backup). When an evacuation takes place, a rescue squad Fire Department volunteer would be sent to man the communications desk at the Fire Department where he could relay messages via phone to the hospitals not having the medical radio capability. Most hospitals do have that equipment however.

H.4. Demonstration of Timely and Efficient Activation and  
Staffing of EOCs and Other Facilities

The EOC was completely operational at 4:50 which took 1½ hours approximately. The emergency response persons were in the EOC in a timely manner, prior to that time of a fully operational EOC, but it took more time to get the tables set and phones connected.

SUMMARY III EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (ORGANIZATION, CONTROL,  
LEADERSHIP, SUPPORT BY OFFICIALS, DECISION MAKING)

The emergency staff was well organized and displayed competence in performing their duties independently. The emergency response agencies had SOPs available for their use that coincided with the utility's recommendations.

Briefings should be given more frequently regarding recommendations and actions taken by all response agencies in order to keep all persons informed of the progression of activities and to enhance overall operations of the County EOC.

The executive committee, consisting predominantly of elected officials, with the assistance of the Ottawa County DSA Director, and the County PIO,

SUMMARY III  
(Cont'd)

collectively made decisions. All displayed genuine concern, enthusiasm, and leadership to interpret data received and respond appropriately. No one person commanded the leadership role; the executive committee responded as a group.

It took approximately one to one and one-half hours for State and County officials to make the determination to evacuate those people affected by the plume. This is an excessive amount of time to make this decision and could seriously affect the safety of the people in the affected area.

A.1.a.

Evidence that Specific Organizations Have Been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response

The emergency response organizations were all represented in the EOC. On the second day of the exercise not all of the staff reported to the EOC. The recommendation given is more briefings by those representatives in order to keep all of the agencies represented in the EOC up-to-date as to the responses being taken by those agencies. The status board was used to post all actions, but it would be more meaningful if a briefing and, if possible, visual aids, to explain the decision, could be given. This would be feasible in the case of State Highway Patrol (roadblocks), Agriculture (map showing location of farms), RAD assessment (briefing on the sectors being affected by the plume).

A.1.d.

Demonstration that a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effectively in Charge of Emergency Response

There was no one individual in charge of the emergency response. The commissioners did this collectively in the executive committee with the assistance of the Ohio DSA representative for Ottawa County, Civil Defense Director, Jim Greer. Mr. Greer would brief the EOC response agencies' representatives.

A.2.a.

Demonstration That Primary & Support Functions & Responsibilities Have Been Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements

The National Guard is specifically designated to support the County Engineer with roadblocks, Sheriff's Department with security after evacuation or if all County resources are used up. They would supplement the Sheriff's Department depending on the situation. They would evacuate two nursing homes and possibly assist the Health Department evacuate. They will evacuate all except: bleeders, persons requiring oxygen or cardiopulmonary resuscitation



A.2.a.  
(Cont'd)

(CPR) requirements. They are also capable of providing a mobile communications van to back up (third line backup) the State, Communication Mobile Van.

C.1.a.

Evidence that a Specific Person Has Been Authorized to Request Federal Assistance (State Only)

Not observed

D.3.

An Emergency Classification System was Effectively Used and Was Consistent with that of the Utility

The emergency classification system used was the same as that used by the utility.

D.4.

Adequate Written Procedures are Used for Emergency Actions Consistent with Facility RECC and Local Offsite Conditions

The emergency response agency representatives had SOPs available for their use during the exercise. Use of these by some did not appear to delay their response time. Apparently, they were using these as a check and balance system.

Demonstration of Effective Coord. Between Emergency Response Dir. & Staff, thru Oral Briefings, Staff Meetings, Etc.

It was apparent that the agencies represented were adequately performing according to their operating procedures, but as stated prior, the evidence was in overheard phone conversations and responses written on the status board. Oral briefings were not made by the agency representatives in the operations room. The only evidence was the messages appearing on the status board. More briefings should be made by executive committee spokesperson and agency representatives in the EOC.

Adequacy of Support and/or Participation by Elected Officials

The County Commissioners were part of the executive committee who were making the decisions. These elected officials provided adequate support and expressed a genuine concern to make the proper decisions.

## SUMMARY IV

PUBLIC ALERTING & NOTIFICATION (MEANS OF NOTIFICATION - SIRENS, VEHICLES, OR OTHER SYSTEMS)

Officially, this section was not observed; however, the sirens were sounded at 5:19 p.m., Wednesday evening. It was not known by the exercise evaluation team that the outdoor warning system would be demonstrated until the pre-exercise meeting. The scenario indicates they were not to be demonstrated.

E.5.

Evidence of a Reliable System for Dissemination to the Public of Appropriate Info Received from the Licensee, e.g., EBS

The notification or request to the Emergency Broadcast Station (EBS) was made but no emergency message was broadcast. In future exercises, the EBS stations should broadcast emergency messages to enhance the public information program.

E.6.

Adequacy of Means Used for Notification & Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume EPZ (Within 15 Minutes)

Not observed

E.7.

Effective Use of Instructional Messages for the Public in Affected Areas

Not observed

J.10.c.

Adequacy of Means Used for Notifying all Segments of Transient and Resident Population

Not observed

## SUMMARY V

PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (PUBLICATIONS, PRESS FACILITIES, MEDIA BRIEFINGS, RELEASE COORDINATION)

News kits provided by the State and utility were well done and included timely information. The JPIC facility was good, except for the bank of telephones that could only be used for collect calls in the local area. Seating is available for more than 200 persons in a well-lighted area. Visuals were good, but seldom, if ever, referred to by technical representatives to clarify or explain what was going on in and around the plant. Use of these aides would provide a better understanding of the emergency.

The media briefings were timely except for some delays while information for news releases was being cleared by



SUMMARY V  
(Cont'd)

various officials. The delay was not noticeable at the County level where the commissioners required hard copy for review. Relays were most significant after the General Emergency had been declared. This delay was about an hour and one-half between the declaration order and the news release announcing the declaration.

There was no technical representative on hand at the JPIC during the first news briefing on Wednesday morning. The result was a lack of expertise after the first news release was read to the reporters. It is most important to have a technical representative available at all times to respond to questions.

The coordination of releases was done in a timely fashion with the exception noted above. Each agency representative made sure that all agreed to whatever facts were gathered and assembled into a news release.

The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) should have been activated. There needs to be more follow-up to ensure that the EBS system is used and frequently activated during a General Emergency.

G.1.

Evidence of Dissemination of Information to the Public Within the Last Year

A check with the local motels, restaurants, gas stations, etc., resulted in a "mixed bag" of information. Most of these facilities did not have any information. One Marathon gas station, 5 miles west of the plant, had received mailings three or four times in one year. The 200th Civil Engineering Squadron, Air Guard, and Camp Perry had not received any information from the utility but was prepared to assist in emergencies. Channel 24 transmitter and others knew of the test coming up but had not obtained any mailings from the utility.

G.2.

Evidence of a Public Info Program for Permanent & Transient Pop. in the Plume EPZ, Such as Posted Notices, Etc.

There are no posted signs anywhere within the EPZ. The Federal evaluators surveyed local parks and beach areas. Page 14 of the local phone books included emergency information on protective actions to take. Aside from the information contained in the phone book, there is no information program to provide to the public use areas in an effort to inform the transient population.

G.3.a.

Appropriate Points of Contact for the Media Have Been Designated

The County had a representative at the JPIC with a back-up at the County EOC. However, the process bogged down because the commissioners demanded hard copy for review before a release could be made. The utility volunteered to send a public information officer representative to the County to try to speed up the process (on second day).

Adequacy of Joint Media Facility, Where Appropriate

Although the JPIC is on-site, it is a protected area with stored supplies for emergencies and is similar to a bomb shelter in that sense. It is well equipped and can seat more than 200 persons. The use of visuals was good, although seldom referred to. A bank of 18 phones were available, but outgoing calls could not be made. This frustrated reporters. All other equipment was adequate. Phones capable of outgoing calls should be provided.

Adequacy of Issued Press Releases

The insistence of the County commissioners to review all news releases in hard copy slowed the release time significantly and made it necessary to "bunch up" their releases. Late on the first day there should have been a separate release when radiation was detected off-site. Utility releases were prepared on a word processor and reviewed promptly. Not all releases followed the chronology of events, e.g., the 7:30 evacuation notice was not released until 9:45 p.m. Need better organization at the County EOC.

G.4.a.

A Media Spokesperson Has Been Designated Who Has Access to All Necessary Information

The County had good contacts at the JPIC to assist and answer questions. Their help was familiar with the County road systems, etc. These County contacts were generally available to answer questions. During the exercise, the County PIO was present in the County EOC rather than the JPIC; however, he did spend some time at the JPIC on the second day of the exercise. He received and transmitted news releases from a separate office adjacent to the executive committee room. He was also in the operations room conversing with the emergency response agencies in the EOC. He did not receive the press or release information from the EOC.

G.4.b.

Adequacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information  
Among Spokespersons

County information was good due to expertise of their assistants. Efforts were made at all times to coordinate information with the utility and the JPIC. The County PIO was in direct contact with the State PIO at the JPIC via telephone and telecopier. The County PIO would relate information to the State PIO and the State PIO would write the news releases, send the draft release up to the County PIO via telecopier and he would revise it as necessary and transmit these releases via telecopier to the State PIO for release.

G.4.c.

Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control  
Measures

Ottawa County had a working rumor control number. This number was posted in the JPIC. Calls to this number were routed through the switchboard operator at the County EOC. The caller's name and phone number was noted and they would be given a response as soon as possible. As planned, the number was not posted at the JPIC though until the General Emergency was declared.

SUMMARY VI

ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (STAFF & FIELD OPERATIONS, MONITORING,  
EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL CALCULATIONS, USE OF PAGs)

This function was not demonstrated by the County. The County doesn't have a monitoring team and the State had demonstrated their field assessment capabilities at the Beaver Valley exercise on February 16, 1983.

The County promptly concurred with the State's recommendation to evacuate yet delayed the actual implementation by approximately one-half hour. This delay was apparently due to the County trying to determine the geographic boundaries affected by the evacuation.

H.7.

Adequacy of Offsite Radiological Monitoring Instruments

Not observed

H.12.

An Adequate Central Point Has Been Established for Receipt  
and Analysis of Field Monitoring Data and Sample Media

Not observed

I.7.

Adequacy of Capability and Resources for Field Monitoring  
Within the Plume EPZ

Not observed

- I.8. Adequate Capability to Make a Rapid Assessment of Magnitude & Location of Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards  
Not observed
- I.9. Capability for Measurement of Radioiodine Concentrations in Plume EPZ Under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)  
Not observed
- I.10. Capability for Relating Measured Parameters to Dose Rates and Estimated Integrated Doses (State Only)  
Not observed
- I.11. Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)  
Not observed
- J.10.m. Capability to Recommend, Protective Action, Based on PAGs, in Plume EPZ (State Only)  
Not observed
- C.3. Evidence of Availability & Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only)  
Not observed

## SUMMARY VII

ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (SHELTERING, EVACUATION, RECEPTION & CARE, TRANSPORTATION)

There was an adequate demonstration by Ottawa County and the host, Sandusky County, to adequately protect the public through sheltering, reception and care as demonstrated at the Vanguard Vocational Training School's Reception and Care Center and the Atkinson Grade School shelter location.

It is recommended that future exercises include actual demonstrations of capabilities for transportation of evacuees (mobile and/or institutionalized); hospital and ambulance transportation, care and treatment for the radiologically injured, and greater involvement of other responsible personnel (ambulance and bus operators, hospital staffs, etc.) to more adequately train and test the major portions of the Ottawa County response capabilities.

SUMMARY VII  
(Cont'd)

There was a significant time delay in the decision making process to evacuate the affected population after receiving this recommendation from the State. This seriously affected a timely implementation of the evacuation process.

J.2.

Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite  
Individuals to Offsite Locations

The Davis Besse utility representative would call in at the Sheriff's Department who would be dispatching for Carroll Township, notify the fire department volunteers (Rescue Squad) who would initiate the procedures necessary to transport the individuals out of the plant. This was not demonstrated during this exercise.

J.9.

Capability for Implementation of Protective Measures

This criteria was not demonstrated during this exercise. The next exercise should allow for a demonstration of protective measures.

J.10.d.

Adequacy of Methods Used for Protecting Mobility Impaired  
Persons, Including Institutionally Confined

There were no attempts to demonstrate this capability for protecting the mobility impaired during this exercise. However, according to County Health Department personnel each County maintains a list of health department clients that will require transportation due to their immobility in case of an accident at the Davis Besse plant. The Health Department estimates 70-80 mobility impaired persons who will require transportation. This is the number of persons now receiving visiting nurse care. Any other mobility impaired persons requiring transportation have not made contact with the Health Department.

The Ohio National Guard would be used to assist in the evacuation of nursing homes and, depending on the situation, the County Health Department's evacuation would be augmented by the National Guard. The National Guard will not transport bleeders, persons requiring oxygen, or CPR.

J.10.g.

There were no attempts to demonstrate the relocation of the populace capability as part of this exercise. It is recommended that this element be included as part of future scenarios. Evacuation of persons is, according to the plan, to be accomplished through the use of school buses and church buses. This is against Ohio State law if for other than school students. Therefore, this matter must be resolved. If it is evacuation of an

J.10.g.  
(Cont'd)      impaired person, this is accomplished via rescue squads (fire department volunteers), or in the case of some nursing homes, the National Guard would do it.

J.10.k.      Adequacy of Organizations Identification of and Means for Dealing with Potential Impediments to Evacuation

Dealing with impediments to evacuation would be handled the same as in the manner as day-to-day accidents. The Sheriff's Department would answer the call and get the nearest wrecker service in to remove the car. If the National Guard is on the site, an accident report would not be made, the National Guard would have the equipment to remove the impediment.

J.11.      Adequacy of Protective Measures in Ingestion EPZ, Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Plants, Etc. (State Only)

Not observed

J. 10.h.      Adequate Relocation Centers Have Been Established at Least 5 Miles & Preferably 10 Miles Outside the Plume EPZ

Adequate relocation centers have been established outside the ten mile EPZ as demonstrated during this exercise and as depicted in the State's written plan.

-      Adequacy of Facilities, Supplies & Equipment at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers

The two relocation facilities utilized for the exercise were school buildings and are adequate for this purpose. Equipment already in the two schools (i.e., cafeteria, chairs, tables, foodstuffs, etc) were readily available. Agreements for assurance of adequate supplies of cots and blankets are a standing disaster agreement between the Red Cross and local and State officials.

-      Adequacy of Staffing at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers

There was adequate staffing at the Vanguard Vocational Technical School Relocation Center, and the Atkinson School Shelter (Sandusky County) by personnel from the Sandusky County Health Department, the American Red Cross, the Helena Community Volunteer Fire Department and the "Buckeye Breakers" CB Club of Sandusky County.



J.12.

Adequacy of Procedures for Processing Evacuees in Relocation Ctrs, Including Health Care, Decon & Rad Monitoring, etc.

There was an adequate demonstration of procedures for processing evacuees in the relocation center at the Vanguard Vocational Technical School, including health care, decontamination, and radiological monitoring.

SUMMARY VIII

HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES (ACCESS CONTROL, ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT, USE OF KI)

There was an adequate capability shown by the Ohio Highway Patrol, the County Sheriff's Office and the Ohio Department of Transportation to establish roadblocks and control access to the evacuated areas.

There were no attempts to demonstrate measures for health, medical and exposure control procedures. This capability should be demonstrated completely during the next exercise.

The decontamination demonstration at the Ottawa County Highway Garage was limited to telling the emergency workers how to operate the radiological monitoring equipment; a briefing on decontamination procedures; and the monitoring and washdown of contaminated mobile equipment. This type of training should have been provided to the emergency workers prior to the exercise so they could show their ability to perform these functions during the exercise. The next exercise should allow for such a demonstration.

J.10.e.

Adequacy of Provisions for Use of KI for Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Persons in the Plume EPZ

The State has elected not to use KI.

J.10.f.

Adequacy of Methods Used in Making Decisions to Administer KI to Central Population

Not applicable. See J.10.e.

J.10.j.

Adequacy of Control of Access to Evacuated Areas

Roadblocks are placed by the Sheriff's Department prohibiting the entry of persons to the area. This was demonstrated during the exercise. It was not evident that the roadblocks were actual rather than simulated from the EOC.

- J.10.j  
(Cont'd) Briefings made by the Highway Patrol and visuals (use of maps) indicating where they had set up roadblocks would have been helpful. It is recommended to have a map displayed in the EOC indicating the location of roadblocks. This would be very helpful in briefing the staff also.
- K.3.a. Adequacy of a 24-Hour A Day Capability to Determine Dose Received by Emergency Workers  
  
This function could not be observed during this exercise. No dosimeters were issued to the emergency response team in Ottawa County EOC. This capability should be observed at the next exercise.
- K.3.b. Demonstration of Adequate and Frequent Emergency Worker Dosimeter Readings & Maintenance of Dosage Records  
  
This function was not demonstrated during this exercise. The EOC responders at the County did not use dosimeters and no monitoring teams were out in the field.
- K.4. Evidence that an Adequate Decision Chain has Been Established to Authorize Exposure for Emergency Workers in Excess of PAGs  
  
Not demonstrated. Not part of the scenario.
- K.5.a Evidence that Appropriate Action Levels Have Been Specified for Determining Need for Decontamination  
  
Not demonstrated. Not part of the scenario.
- K.5.b. Adequacy of Measures for Decontamination of Emergency Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal  
  
Not observed
- L.1. Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup Hospital and Medical Services for Handling Personnel  
  
Not observed
- L.4. Adequate Capability Demonstrated for Transportation of Radiological Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities  
  
Not observed
- M.4. Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population Exposure (State Only)  
  
Not demonstrated. State function only.



## SUMMARY IX

RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS (ADEQUACY OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES)

Recovery and reentry procedures are an integral function of the protection procedures afforded to the evacuated populace. The scenario for this exercise called for a demonstration of this capability, yet the exercise was abruptly terminated at the Alert stage before these procedures were fully demonstrated. The next exercise should definitely allow for and completely demonstrate recovery and reentry procedures.

M.3.

Adequacy of Established Means for Informing Response Org That Recovery and Reentry Can Be Initiated (State Only)

State only

M.1.

Adequacy of Procedures Demonstrated for Reentry and Relaxation of Protective Measures Allowing Reentry

The procedures were not demonstrated for reentry and recovery during this exercise although the scenario called for some activity. The exercise ended abruptly with the "Alert" classification still in use. There was no evidence that any action was being taken by an responders in the EOC. If there was, they didn't brief anyone to keep them informed.

## SUMMARY X

RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE (BENEFIT TO PARTICIPANTS, ADEQUACY OF THE SCENARIO)

This exercise was beneficial to the emergency staff as it afforded them an opportunity to train and demonstrate their ability to protect the population should an accident occur at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Unfortunately, the scenario developed to test the overall emergency capabilities was not completed in a timely manner. In fact, the scenario was delivered to FEMA one work day before the exercise which did not allow sufficient time for a review nor time for the State to implement changes. Further, the scenario was weak by not allowing important emergency response functions to be demonstrated such as recovery and reentry procedures, a more complete demonstration of the reception and care facilities capability to care for evacuees, etc.

Future scenarios must be completed in a more timely manner and allow for a more complete demonstration of the major elements of the emergency responses.

N.1.b.

Adequacy of Scenario to Test Capability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources

The scenario was very weak in the recovery/reentry portion. It could have had more detailed events that came up and perhaps could have encompassed actions for all the agencies represented in the EOC rather than just the minimum expectations. Recovery and reentry will have to be more thoroughly exercised to determine the capability of the County to perform it. The exercise should not have ended as abruptly at that point. Incidents/accidents could happen while evacuees were returning from the evacuation centers, therefore, the staff should remain at the EOC until everything is back to normal.

N.1.a.

Adequacy of Ex. to Test Integrated Capabilities & Major Portions of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected Org

All participants have varying degrees of involvement during the exercise regarding actions to protect the population. It was felt the staff knew their duties and performed them without confusion. A more challenging scenario would keep the participants more involved. The emergency response staff should have more activities in future exercises such as evacuation of schools as an example or accidents on the roads during evacuation, etc. Perhaps some additional response requirements for all of the agencies involved would test their response capability more.

Benefit of Exercise to Participants

It is felt that the exercise participants benefited from the exercise. There was very little commotion between agencies, they all worked independently to the point of not really knowing what each was doing. They would give their comment to the civil defense director and he would get it to the status board through the use of message handling procedures. No complaints were heard. The commissioners indicated it was a good training vehicle for them in determining actions to be taken.

## PART IV

SUMMARY LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIESState of Ohio

AID

There was not an adequate demonstration at the State EOC that a specific individual was in charge of the over all response. This lack of leadership was also true in the accident assessment room. This lack of leadership was more evident during the second day of the exercise when message handling was not handled as efficiently.

Due to the NRC's response role, the State had a staff member portray the Governor for the benefit of the exercise and it was felt that he could have projected this role more effectively.

The staff seemed to lack organization in that the individuals did not appear to have pre-assigned duties and responsibilities although the taskings were completed, it is felt that predesignated assignments would facilitate the overall efficiency.

J 9

The capability to implement protective measures was not adequately demonstrated at the Emergency Control Center, ECC (EOC). During the exercise, too much time was spent coordinating between the State and County, on agreeing to protective action recommendations and press releases.

J 10 m

The capability to provide recommended protective actions based on Protective Action Guides (PAG's) in the plume EPZ was not adequately demonstrated. It took approximately twenty-five (25) minutes for the State to decide whether to agree with the utility's recommendation on protective actions based upon the State procedures. The source of the discrepancy was that the utility's Plan Station Supporting Procedures (AD 1827.12.7, Sec. 5-1) recommended evacuation at lower cumulative doses than the State procedures. The State dose assessment room spent most of the twenty-five (25) minutes trying to substantiate the reason for the discrepancy. A decision should have been made immediately to go with either the utility or State projections.

When the State finally agreed with the utility, they violated their own procedures. Either the plan should be changed or the State should always go with currently adopted procedures.

When the State finally put the areas the county was going to evacuate on their map, it showed that not all of the seven (7) mile radius was being evacuated and not all of the seven to ten (7-10) mile radius was being sheltered. The State failed to notify the county of these facts.

J 11

The State did not demonstrate adequate procedures for the protective measures in the ingestion EPZ. There were press releases prepared concerning the ingestion pathways (water, milk). However, the press release regarding water contamination was prepared and released before the data could be provided. The teams were not sent out to obtain soil and vegetation samples but were sent out to do water and milk analysis.

J 10 a

The maps displayed in the EOC showed the State monitoring points only and should include the utility monitoring points as well. There should be also a map displayed depicting the ingestion pathway monitoring points. Maps showing the relocation centers and shelter areas are in the plan and this document was available. These maps as well as a map reflecting the evacuation routes should be displayed in the EOC.

There seemed to be difficulty between the State and county EOC staffs in determining on their maps, the points of references to be used for evacuation. It could not be determined if this was due to the use of different maps, plotting problems, or just a communications problem. The end result was an unacceptable time delay in establishing evacuation information. Maps used in the State and county EOC's should be the same to minimize any difficulty in plotting procedures.

M 3

The State did not demonstrate adequacy of established means for informing the response organization that recovery and reentry can be initiated. The State reacted to messages from the utility based on plant conditions.

They had to ask for field data and then did not wait for it before concurring with the utility. The State recommended that livestock be placed on stored feed during the accident. After the release was terminated, the utility made a recommendation concerning the ingestion pathway problems only within two (2) miles which would be acceptable outside the two (2) mile range. The State concurred, despite having no data on the ingestion pathway. Data from the utility on soil samples was received at about the same time the State concurred on the two (2) mile recommendation with the utility, but the State was not aware of the soil sample data. In the "2 day later" portion of the exercise, the State concurred with the utility recommendation to suspend all protective actions. Then issued a press release on the isolation of milk samples. Contact with the impacted county could have been more extensive during the ingestion pathway analysis. This is especially true because the county had decisions to make.

This criteria was identified in the Final Report of the February 16, 1983, Beaver Valley exercise as being a significant deficiency too.

M 5

The capability for periodic estimation of the total population exposure was not adequately demonstrated by the State. The State used a computer code to develop the average exposure if the people had stayed. Since they evacuated out to seven (7) miles, most of the population dose was not estimated.

#### Ottawa County

G 2

There are no posted signs that could be found in the public use areas that would provide emergency information to the public should there be a nuclear power plant accident. The Federal evaluators surveyed local parks, beach areas, travel parks, restaurants, etc., and were unable to locate any dissemination of emergency information. It was noted, however, that page 14 of the local telephone directory includes information on protective actions but because this, the information program is inadequate.

J 10 d

There were no attempts to demonstrate the capability to protect the mobility impaired persons during this exercise. However, according to the County Health

Department personnel, each county maintains a list of Health Department clients that will require transportation due to their immobility in case of an accident at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station. The Health Department estimates that 70 to 80 mobility impaired persons will require transportation. This is the number of persons now receiving visiting nurse call. Any other mobility impaired persons requiring transportation have not made contact with the Health Department.

The Ohio National Guard would be used to assist in the evacuation of nursing homes and, depending upon the situation, the County Health Department's evacuation would be augmented by the National Guard. The National Guard on the other hand will not transport bleeders, persons requiring oxygen, or CPR.

A program must be developed to ensure that health, welfare and the mobility impaired persons are adequately cared for. This should be completely demonstrated during the next exercise.

A 4           The capability to provide for a twenty four (24) hour continuous operation was not demonstrated by a shift change of the emergency staff. This capability should be definitely demonstrated during the next exercise.

J 10 a       Maps showing evacuation routes, sampling points, relocation centers and shelter areas were not displayed in the EOC. A map showing the monitoring points was located in the RAD assessment room. The Ohio State Highway Patrol (SHP) had maps they used for plotting roadblocks but they were not visually available (displayed) to the other participants. A map should be displayed in the EOC and perhaps the SHP could brief the other agency participants showing these roadblock areas.

J 10 b       Population distribution maps were not displayed in the EOC. The two maps in the EOC were the same and only indicated sectors of the EPZ by "A" thru "R", less I and O, and did not include population figures per sector.

M 1

The procedures were not demonstrated for reentry and recovery during this exercise although the scenario called for some demonstration of capability. The exercise ended abruptly at the "Alert" classification still in force. There was no evidence that any action was being taken by any responders in the EOC. If there was, the staff was not briefed on procedures. This capability should be fully demonstrated during the next exercise.



## PART V

SUMMARY LISTING OF MINOR DEFICIENCIESState of Ohio

- J 10 g      The methods used for evacuating areas or determining the area to be evacuated were not timely. A procedure should be implemented in the plan that would make evacuation areas more easily determined.
- E 1      Telephone was used to notify emergency response organizations. This system worked well, although verification call backs were not observed. There is no backup communication system available for notification of emergency response organizations. It is recommended that alternate means be provided for.
- M 1      Procedures for reentry were demonstrated. However, in future exercises those procedures should be carried out further. More time should be allotted for this function. The idea was expressed that "nobody has given us the procedures for recovery so we should do as Pennsylvania and not bother." This negative approach to this problem or attitude was expressed several times in different ways. (This was the observers way of describing the attitude he felt was displayed by the State staff.)
- E 2      The telephone was used for alerting notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel. Those calls that were initiated for the Site Area Emergency were made after normal business hours and were completed within 30-45 minutes after declaration. There is no backup system.
- F 1 a      Telephone was used for alerting and activating the emergency response network which is adequate. Recommend that a backup system be provided.
- F 1 e      Telephone was used for alerting and activating the emergency response personnel is acceptable yet a backup communication system is recommended.
- G 1      A survey of local motels, restaurants, gas stations, parks, etc., was made to determine the dissemination of emergency information to public in the EPZ. Most of the facilities surveyed had not been provided with emergency information. Only one gas station located

approximately five (5) miles west of the utility had received "mailings" three or four times per year and they were pleased with this information. The National Guard units nearby indicated that they have not received any information from the utility but were prepared to assist during emergencies anyway. A more aggressive emergency information program to the general public is necessary to satisfy this criteria.

G 2

There was no evidence of a public information program established for the permanent and transient population such as posted signs, etc. It was noted that on page 14 of the telephone directory that emergency information was provided. As with criteria G 1, a more aggressive emergency information program should be implemented.

G 3 a

The State has adequate points of contact for the media and the staff performed their jobs in a good manner. The problem was the lack of timeliness in news releases because of the county commissioners desire to have all releases in hard copy prior to letting the information out to the public. This greatly affected the timeliness and procedures should be implemented to expedite the news release process.

J 10 b

There was no map displayed in the State EOC showing the population distribution. However, it is available in the plan which was accessible to the staff. A map depicting the population distribution should be posted in the EOC and readily available to the staff.

#### Ottawa County

G 4 c

Ottawa county had a working rumor control number. This number was posted in the JPIC. Calls to this number was routed through the switchboard operator at the county EOC. The callers name and phone number was noted and they would be given a response as soon as possible. As planned the number was not posted at the JPIC though until the general emergency was declared.

N 1 a

All participants have varying degrees of involvement during the exercise regarding actions to protect the population. It was felt the staff knew their duties and performed them without confusion. A more challenging scenario would keep the participants more

involved. The emergency response staff should have more activities in future exercises such as evacuation of schools as an example or accidents on the roads during evacuation, etc. Perhaps some additional response requirements for all of the agencies involved would test other response capabilities more.

N 1 b

The scenario was very weak in the recovery/reentry portion. It could have had more detailed events that came up and perhaps could have encompassed actions for all the agencies represented in the EOC rather than must the minimum expectations. Recovery and reentry will have to be more thoroughly exercised to determine the capability of the county to perform it. The exercise should not have ended as abruptly at that point. Incidents/accidents could happen while evacuees were returning from the evacuation centers. Therefore, the staff should remain at the EOC until everything is back to normal.

A 1 a

The emergency response organizations were all represented in the EOC. They were doing their assigned functions independently. On the second day of the exercise not all of the staff reported to the EOC. The recommendation given is more briefings by those representatives in order to keep all of the agencies represented in the EOC up-to-date as to the responses being taken by those agencies. The status board was used to post all actions, but it would be more meaningful if a briefing, and where possible, use of visual aids to explain the decision, could be given. This would be feasible in the case of State Highway Patrol (roadblocks), Agriculture (map showing location of farms), RAD assessment (briefing on the sectors being affected by the plume).

N 2 a

The National Guard is specifically designated to support the County Engineer with roadblocks, Sheriff's Department with security after evacuation or if all county resources are used up, they would supplement the Sheriff's Department. Depending on the situation, they would evacuate (2) nursing homes and possibly assist the Health Department evacuate. They will evacuate all except: bleeders, persons requiring oxygen or CRP requirements. They are also capable of providing a mobile communications van to backup (third line backup) the State Communications Mobile Van.

- H 3           The overall adequacy of the EOC would be "good." Unfortunately, the Executive Committee was not located in the operations room which made it difficult for the players to know what was going on all the time unless they provided more frequent briefings relative to the emergency situation and the decisions they have made.
- C 1 c           The Federal response team would have to come in to Toledo if coming via air or perhaps drive in, taking 3½ hours. There are some hotels/motels in the area to accommodate the Federal team; however, during the months of May through September, lodging would be a problem in the town of Port Clinton. The team quite possibly would be better lodged in Toledo some 38 miles away.
- E 2           The initial alerting and notification of the emergency response personnel has improved since the last exercise in that more than one person was used to place the notification calls. The Sheriff's dispatcher, however, was not aware that there is a form in the plan to be used to record emergency information which would be more efficient than using a blank piece of paper as they did. This would also eliminate the possibility of not obtaining important information concerning the emergency.
- G 1           A check with the local motels, restaurants, gas stations, etc., resulted in a "mixed bag" of information. Most of these facilities did not have any information. One Marathon gas station, 5 miles west of the plant, had received mailings three or four times in one year. The 200th Civil Engineering Squadron, Air Guard, and Camp Perry had not received any information from the utility but was prepared to assist in emergencies. Channel 24 transmitter and others knew of the test coming up but had not obtained any mailings from the utility.
- G 3 a           The County had a representative at the JPIC with a back-up at the County EOC. However, the process bogged down because the commissioners demanded hard copy for review before a release could be made. The utility volunteered to send a public information officer representative to the County to try to speed up the process (on second day).
- G 4 a           The County had good contacts at the JPIC to assist and answer questions. Their help was familiar with the County road systems, etc. These County contacts were generally

available to answer questions. During the exercise, the County PIO was present in the County EOC rather than the JPIC; however, he did spend some time at the JPIC on the second day of the exercise. He received and transmitted news releases from a separate office adjacent to the executive committee room. He was also in the operations room conversing with the emergency response agencies in the EOC. He did not receive the press or release information from the EOC.

G 4 b

County information was good due to expertise of their assistants. Efforts were made at all times to coordinate information with the utility and the JPIC. The County PIO was in direct contact with the State PIO at the JPIC via telephone and telecopier. The County PIO would relate information to the State PIO and the State PIO would write the news releases, send the draft release up to the County PIO via telecopier and he would revise it as necessary and transmit these releases via telecopier to the State PIO for release.

J 10 j

Roadblocks are placed by the Sheriff's Department prohibiting the entry of persons to the area. This was demonstrated during the exercise. It was not evident that the roadblocks were actual rather than simulated from the EOC. Briefings made by the Highway Patrol and visuals (use of maps) indicating where they had set up roadblocks would have been helpful. It is recommended to have a map displayed in the EOC indicating the location of roadblocks. This would be very helpful in briefing the staff also.

## PART VI

SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

A schedule for the correction of the significant deficiencies listed for the State of Ohio and Ottawa County is to be provided to the Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V, by June 18, 1983. These are listed in Part IV of this report and include NUREG 0654 criteria items Ald, J9, J10m, J11, J10a, A4, J10a, J10b, and M1 for Ottawa County.