

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5 1 OF 9 2

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)
Low Fluid Oil Pressure Switch Calibration

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0	4	0	7	8	4	8	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	4	0	7	8	4	8	4	0	5	0	7	8	4	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.406(a)(2)	20.406(a)(3)	20.406(a)(4)	20.406(a)(5)	20.406(a)(6)	20.406(a)(7)	20.406(a)(8)	20.406(a)(9)	20.406(a)(10)	20.406(a)(11)	20.406(a)(12)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
A. R. Koon, Jr., Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance	8 0 3 3 4 5 - 5 2 0 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM
D	T G			N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 7, 1984, an inadequate calibration procedure was identified during the performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.1. The procedure failed to clearly identify and document calibration of the individual "Train" related "Low Fluid Oil Pressure" switches. Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 302.035 was revised and a calibration performed on each switch. One (1) switch in each channel was found to exceed the Technical Specification Allowable Limit of ≥ 750 psig. The procedure revision is considered adequate corrective action to prevent recurrence of this isolated event.

There were no adverse consequences from this event. This trip provides additional protection and conservatism beyond that required for the health and safety of the public. No credit is taken in any of the safety analyses (Chapter 15 of the FSAR) for this trip.

8405080096 840507
PDR ADOCK 05000395
S PDR

IE22
1/1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	0 2 0	0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On April 7, 1984, with the Plant in Mode 5, maintenance personnel identified that Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 302.035, "EHC Fluid Pressure Instrument Calibration," did not adequately address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.1 (Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 17A). The procedure failed to clearly identify and document calibration of the individual "Train" associated switches contained in the three (3) "Low Fluid Oil Pressure" switches. The deficiency was discovered during performance of the routine 18 month calibration.

The procedure deficiency was subsequently corrected and a calibration performed on each "Train" related switch. The calibration identified one (1) switch in each instrument channel, the setpoint of which was less than the Technical Specification allowable value of ≥ 750 psig (Table 2.2-1, Functional Unit 17A). The last known calibration of these switches was in March 1979. The three (3) pressure switches which were within calibration limits were last calibrated under STP-302.035 in November 1982. The following "As Found Values" were found on the pressure switches which were less than the 750 psig limit.

<u>PRESSURE SWITCH</u>	<u>TRAIN</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT (PSIG)</u>
IPS-5841	A	735
IPS-5842	B	715
IPS-5843	A	715

There were no adverse consequences from this event. The reactor trip on a turbine trip is actuated by two (2) out of three (3) logic from trip fluid pressure signals or by all closed signals from the turbine steam stop valves. A turbine trip causes a direct reactor trip above 10% turbine power. The trip provides additional protection and conservatism beyond that required for the health and safety of the public. This trip was included as part of good engineering practice and prudent design. No credit is taken in any of the safety analyses (Chapter 15 of the FSAR) for the trip.

The procedure revision completed on April 7, 1984, is considered adequate corrective action to prevent recurrence of this isolated event.

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 784

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

May 7, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
LER 84-020

Dear Sir:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #84-020 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD/dwf
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer	J. F. Heilman
T. C. Nichols, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr.	C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
E. H. Crews, Jr.	K. E. Nodland
E. C. Roberts	R. A. Stough
W. A. Williams, Jr.	G. Percival
D. A. Nauman	C. W. Hehl
J. P. O'Reilly	J. B. Knotts, Jr.
Group Managers	INPO Records Center
O. S. Bradham	NPCF
C. A. Price	File
D. A. Lavigne	

IE22
11