

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401



June 27, 1974



Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-7441W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning core spray
system pumps 1B and 1D which failed to start during routine
surveillance testing on unit 1 and is submitted in accordance with
Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973.
This event occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 on
June 18, 1974.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-7441W
Report Date: June 28, 1974
Occurrence Date: June 18, 1974
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

Identification of Occurrence

Core spray system pumps 1B and 1D failed to start during routine surveillance testing on unit 1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The unit was at 100-percent power.

Description of Occurrence

During the performance of a surveillance instruction on core spray system loop II logic, pumps 1B and 1D failed to start when called upon by a simulated automatic initiation signal.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

A bent contact arm on a relay that permits initiation of the loop II core spray pumps would not allow the contact on that arm to have an adequate amount of wipe to perform its intended function. This relay is one of two relays which actuate on decreasing reactor pressure to allow the core spray system loop II pumps to start if called upon by automatic initiation.

Analysis of Occurrence

The failure of the relay contact would not have inhibited the core spray system loop II pumps from starting had they been automatically initiated. The contact that failed has another contact in parallel with it that actuates from a redundant signal to perform the same function.

Corrective Action

The bent contact arm was immediately repaired and checked for adequate wipe. The surveillance instruction was completed with satisfactory results.

Failure Data

The relay on which the bent contact arm is located is a 250V dc, type HFA51A, manufactured by General Electric Company.