

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE  
37401



August 20, 1974

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, DC 20545




Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-50-260/744W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning HPCI steamline  
auto isolation and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to  
Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. This event occurred  
on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2 on August 10, 1974.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
E. F. Thomas  
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC  
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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## ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-50-260/744W  
Report Date: August 20, 1974  
Occurrence Date: August 10, 1974  
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2

### Identification of Occurrence

HPCI steamline auto isolation.

### Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The reactor was operating at 800 psig in the hot functional phase of the startup test program at approximately 4-percent power.

### Description of Occurrence

While performing a manual start of HPCI as called for in Startup Test Instruction 15, HPCI isolated due to excessive steamflow. HPCI was initiated a second time and isolated again due to excessive steamflow. A third manual start was successful. An automatic initiation followed this and met all surveillance and STI criteria.

### Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The isolation was caused by spurious spiking of the PdIS switches monitoring HPCI steamflow during a cold start of the HPCI turbine.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The isolation of HPCI presented no danger to the safe shutdown of the reactor since other engineered safeguard systems were available at this time. HPCI did operate following the isolation and met all SI and STI criteria. An isolation during auto initiation of HPCI would remove the system from service at a time it might be badly needed.

### Corrective Action

Snubbers were added to the instrument lines and 3-second time delay relays were added to each logic channel to prevent these spurious flow spikes from causing an isolation during a cold turbine start.

### Failure Data

This is similar to a problem experienced on unit 1 and reported in BFAO-7435W. The same modifications discussed above were made on unit 1 at that time.