TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401

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August 23, 1974

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-50-259/7444W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning recirculation jet pump riser differential pressure switch PdIS-68-17 malfunction and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. This event occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 on August 13, 1974.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

Enclosure
CC (Enclosure):
Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-50-259/7444W
Report Date: August 23, 1974
Occurrence Date: August 13, 1974
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

Identification of Occurrence

Recirculation jet pump riser differential pressure switch PdIS-68-17 malfunction.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor was at rated power during commercial operation.

Description of Occurrence

During routine surveillance testing, recirculation jet pump riser differential pressure switch PdIS-68-17 was found to operate outside technical specification setpoint limit of $\leq$ 1.5 psid. The as-found setpoint was 2.0 psid.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

It was determined that the installed switch contact had malfunctioned and could not be adjusted to operate below 2.0 psid. This is considered a random switch failure.

Analysis of Occurrence

Switch PdIS-68-17 is one of four switches arranged in one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic, which in conjunction with reactor pressure, less than 900 psig and a 2-second time delay, activates the break detection logic and loop selection for LPCI injection. The other three switches were functionally tested and found to operate satisfactorily. Thus the logic would have performed its intended function if required.

Corrective Action

The malfunctioning switch contacts were replaced, calibrated to the setpoint, and functionally tested. The new switch contacts operated satisfactorily and the switch was returned to service.

Failure Data

Differential pressure indicating switch, Barton Model 288; S/N 288-5540; Range 0 to 10 psid. This mode of failure has not occurred previously for this equipment.