

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE  
37421



August 23, 1974



Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, DC 20545


Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-50-259/7444W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning recirculation jet pump riser differential pressure switch PdIS-68-17 malfunction and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. This event occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 on August 13, 1974.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
E. F. Thomas  
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC  
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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## ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-50-259/7444W  
Report Date: August 23, 1974  
Occurrence Date: August 13, 1974  
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

### Identification of Occurrence

Recirculation jet pump riser differential pressure switch PdIS-68-17 malfunction.

### Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor was at rated power during commercial operation.

### Description of Occurrence

During routine surveillance testing, recirculation jet pump riser differential pressure switch PdIS-68-17 was found to operate outside technical specification setpoint limit of  $\leq 1.5$  psid. The as-found setpoint was 2.0 psid.

### Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

It was determined that the installed switch contact had malfunctioned and could not be adjusted to operate below 2.0 psid. This is considered a random switch failure.

### Analysis of Occurrence

Switch PdIS-68-17 is one of four switches arranged in one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic, which in conjunction with reactor pressure, less than 900 psig and a 2-second time delay, activates the break detection logic and loop selection for LPCI injection. The other three switches were functionally tested and found to operate satisfactorily. Thus the logic would have performed its intended function if required.

### Corrective Action

The malfunctioning switch contacts were replaced, calibrated to the setpoint, and functionally tested. The new switch contacts operated satisfactorily and the switch was returned to service.

### Failure Data

Differential pressure indicating switch, Barton Model 288; S/N 288-5540; Range 0 to 10 psid. This mode of failure has not occurred previously for this equipment.