

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000325

PAGE (3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Spurious Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 Valves

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	13	95	95	- 08 -	00	06	02	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract and Text)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Jeanne F. McGowan, Regulatory Affairs Specialist

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(910) 457-2136

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 13, 1995 Unit One was preparing for Startup from the B110R1 Refuel Outage. The Unit was in Cold Shutdown at 0% power. At 2038 hours a PCIS Group 6, Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) System, isolation occurred. The Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and both Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) trains automatically started. The isolation signal was received from the K82 relay in the D12-K609B circuitry of the Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring subsystem and the K82 relay re-energized with no operator action. The Group 6 valves were left in the closed position and the SBGT remained running until the cause of the isolation could be determined. No trip or isolation signals were received that would have caused the action of the K82; however the expected actions resulting from the de-energizing K82 relay did occur (ie. Reactor Building Ventilation isolation, Group 6 isolation, and SBGT start). After verifying that there were no actual conditions warranting the Group 6 isolation, Operations returned the affected systems to the normal configuration. The cause of the event is unknown. Potential events which would de-energize the K82 relay were investigated, no apparent cause could be determined. No corrective actions are required. The safety significance was minimal, all systems functioned as designed.

The cause classification for this event per the criteria of NUREG-1022 is Other.

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**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
**TEXT CONTINUATION**

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TITLE

Spurious Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 Valves

INITIAL CONDITION

On May 13, 1995 Unit One was preparing for Startup from the B110R1 Refuel Outage. The Unit was in Cold Shutdown at 0% power.

EVENT NARRATIVE

On May 13, 1995 at 2038 hours a PCIS Group 6, Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) System, isolation occurred. The Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and both Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) trains automatically started. The isolation signal was received from the K82 relay in the D12-K609B circuitry of the Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring subsystem and the K82 relay re-energized with no operator action. The Group 6 valves were left in the closed position and the SBGT remained running until the cause of the isolation could be determined. Another actuation of the K82 relay occurred at approximately 2345 hours with no plant effects due to the equipment remaining in the same configuration from the previous actuation. No trip or isolation signals were received that would have caused the action of the K82; however the expected actions resulting from the de-energizing K82 relay did occur (ie. Reactor Building Ventilation isolation, Group 6 isolation, and SBGT start). After verifying that there were no actual conditions warranting the Group 6 isolation, Operations returned the affected systems to the normal configuration on May 14, 1995 at 0845 hours.

The K82 relay is normally energized and can be de-energized by 3 normal trip signals; reactor building ventilation radiation upscale, main stack high radiation, or the reactor building ventilation exhaust air temperature high. All three relays have Control Room annunciation associated with them. No annunciators associated with the three relays were received during the Group 6 isolation and it is unlikely that one set of contacts would open momentarily without the relay changing state. The K82 would also de-energize if the 24 Vdc power supply was lost or interrupted. Other relays powered from the bus would also have been affected with associated Control Room annunciation being received. Again, there were no such occurrences at the time of the event. Lightning can cause a disturbance on the bus and there were thunderstorms in the area, however, no definite activity could be confirmed during the time of the event. The only other possibility for the K82 relay de-energization would be the intermittent failure of the relay due to age.

Investigation into the cause of the Group 6 isolation included the installation of a strip chart recorder on the associated relays and contacts required to de-energize the K82. A periodic test was performed with the strip chart recorder in place to monitor the reaction of the contacts and relays. The periodic test, PT 4.1.1, Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Monitoring System Functional Test, inserts a signal to de-energize the K82 relay. The K82 relay responded as required during the test and the reset. The recorder remained installed on the relays and contacts for an additional 48 hours with no abnormal occurrences.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event is unknown. As evidenced by the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS), the K82 relay cycled about nine times between 2038 and 2049 hours, and another 3 times at approximately 2345 hours. The potential events which would have caused the de-energization of the K82 relay were investigated with no apparent cause determined.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

None

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The safety significance was minimal. The PCIS Group 6 isolated as required by the de-energization of the K82 relay. All other systems responded as required.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None

EIIS COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

System/Component

Primary Containment Isolation System  
Containment Atmospheric Control System

EIIS Code

JM  
VA