

Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
New Jersey Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY • 539-6111

April 3, 1970

Dr. Peter A. Morris  
Director  
Division of Reactor Licensing  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Dr. Morris:

Re: Oyster Creek No. 1  
Docket No. 50-219

In accordance with the reporting requirements of the Jersey Central Power & Light Company Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16, Section 3. c. 1., the following abnormal occurrence disclosed a condition that prevented a nuclear system from performing one of its safety functions.

On March 25, 1970 during the course of performing a surveillance test on the reactor high pressure scram pressure switches, it was observed that the sensing line to the high pressure scram pressure switch had developed a leak at a "Swage-Lok" fitting, which caused a level indicator to fail--up scale. At this time, an attempt was made to tighten the fitting and the leak increased, causing the excess flow check valve in the primary pressure sensing line to close.

The result was a zero pressure signal to the pressure sensors mounted on this rack. (High Pressure Scram, High Pressure Isolation Condenser Actuation, Condenser Low Vacuum Scram By-pass, Core Spray Valve Permissive, Triple Low Level Auto Depressurization, Level Transmitter to Feedwater Control System, Reactor Pressure Indicator Transmitter and Auto-Relief Valve Pressure). At first investigation, it was noted that the Protective Instrumentation Limiting Conditions for Operation could not be met, the system operators were notified to prepare for a plant shut-down and repairs to the tubing fitting were immediately started. Repairs were completed prior to initiating the shut-down. (It was approximately 50 minutes from time of occurrence until system was again normal.)

On March 25, 1970, AEC Compliance was notified of this incident and informed that notification was made upon the basis of the inability to meet a Limiting Condition for Operation.

Upon review of this incident by the Operations Supervisor and the Plant Operating Review Committee, it was determined that the single failure of this

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
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sensing line prevented the operation of both Isolation Condensers upon receipt of a reactor high pressure signal. Emergency Condenser isolation on pipe-break was still operable as was Emergency Condenser actuation by low-low level and manual operation from the control room.

As a result of this determination, a study is in progress to determine the wiring modifications necessary to establish the ability of the Emergency Condensers to operate on a high pressure signal in the event of a loss of a single pressure sensing line. Modifications will be completed as soon as the wiring changes have been reviewed and accepted as the proper corrective action to be taken. In the mean time, all operating personnel have been made aware of the present situation and reminded that plant emergency procedures call for verification of automatic action and manual initiation of such action is required.

Very truly yours,



George Kelcec  
Manager of Generating Stations

CK/jc

cc: Mr. Robert W. Kirkman, Director  
Division of Compliance, Region I  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
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Newark, New Jersey 07102