Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960 • 539-6111

January 5, 1972

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Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington D.C. 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Trip of Diesel Generator No. 1 During Surveillance Test

During a surveillance test of diesel generator no. 1 on December 28, 1971, the unit tripped off the line as the result of an empty fuel oil tank. This incident is being reported as an abnormal occurrence in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.

Each diesel generator at Oyster Creek is equipped with one, 130-gallon fuel oil day tank, one main fuel oil pump which takes suction from the day tank, and two fuel oil transfer pumps which take suction from the 15,000-gallon main oil tank. The fuel oil level in the day tank is controlled by float switches located in the day tank and operate so that as fuel is consumed by the engine and the fuel level drops, a fuel transfer switch will activate the no. 1 fuel transfer pump to maintain the day tank level. If the fuel level continues to drop, another low level transfer switch will activate fuel transfer pump no. 2 and a local annunciator at the unit will indicate a fuel transfer fault.

The two fuel oil transfer pumps are operated by 230-volt, single-phase, capacitor start motors. Upon investigation it was found that both motor-starting switches were not making proper contact so that, at times, the pumps would run and at other times they would not. In this instance, neither the no. 1 pump nor the backup no. 2 pump started. As a result, the day tank went empty and the engine shut down.

As an immediate temporary measure, the backup transfer pump motor from diesel generator no. 2 was moved to diesel generator no. 1 to drive the preferential no. 1 pump and the unit was made available. The no. 1 diesel generator was out of service for approximately five hours. Subsequently, the switches were cleaned and replaced on all four fuel oil transfer pump motors.

2K-2/4
PNE-1/12
JK-2/3
JJ-2/1
VT-2/7

Incidents

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The probability analysis in Appendix L of the FDSAR was based on one diesel and shows that even with only one diesel the probability of requiring engineered safety features at the same time as the second diesel fails, is quite small. Since the requirements for operation of engineered safety features can be supplied by one diesel, there was no nuclear safety significance involved in this event as the second diesel was always available.

In order to prevent a recurrence of this incident, a test of the fuel oil transfer pumps has been added to the monthly maintenance surveillance check sheet; and the inspection of the motor-starting switches has been added to the six-month maintenance surveillance check sheet. In addition, the local annunciator that indicates a fuel transfer fault will be connected to sound a remote alarm in the station control room.

Twenty-five copies of this report are enclosed.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

IRF/pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Division of Compliance, Region I