



Illinois Power Company
Clinton Power Station
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727
Tel 217 935-5623
Fax 217 935-4632

John G. Cook
Vice President

U-602450
L45-95(05 - 22)LP
2C.220
JGC-219-95
May 22, 1995
10CFR50.73

Docket No. 50-461


Document Control Desk
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Clinton Power Station - Unit 1
Licensee Event Report No. 95-004-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 95-004-00: Personnel Error During Plant Startup Results in Increasing Reactor Pressure Above 150 psig Prior to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Being Operable. This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely yours,


J. G. Cook
Vice President

MRS/csm

Enclosure

cc: NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager
NRC Resident Office, V-690
Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
INPO Records Center

9506050141 950522
PDR ADOCK 05000461
S PDR

IF22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE
INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB
7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK
REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Clinton Power Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000461

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4) Personnel Error During Plant Startup Results in Increasing Reactor Pressure Above 150 psig
Prior to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Being Operable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
04	27	95	95	004	00	05	22	95	None	None	
OPERATING MODE (9)		2	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)		000	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)		
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)		
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER		
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text,		
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		NRC Form 366A)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

H. E. Bouska, Operations Shift Supervisor

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(217) 935-8881, Extension 3369

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X

NO

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE (15)

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

During reactor startup, with the plant in Mode 2 (STARTUP), the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was not operable, as required by Technical Specifications, prior to increasing reactor pressure above 150 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). The operability test to declare the RCIC system operable had been performed but the test return line isolation valves which allows recirculation flow of water from the RCIC storage tank through the RCIC pump and back to the RCIC storage tank were not in their normally closed position. Therefore, the RCIC system was not in an operable configuration. The line assistant shift supervisor (LASS) authorized plant operators to increase reactor pressure above 150 psig even though the RCIC system was not operable. Once operators recognized that the test return line isolation valves were open, they immediately reduced reactor pressure from about 165 psig to less than 150 psig. The cause of the event is attributed to a lack of attention to detail by the LASS. Corrective actions for this event include the shift supervisor discussing the event with the LASS and emphasizing attention to detail, and providing Operations personnel an opportunity to review information about this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Clinton Power Station	05000461	95	004	00	2 OF 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On April 27, 1995, the plant was in Mode 2 (STARTUP) and plant startup from the fifth refueling outage (RF-5) was in progress. At 2040 hours reactor [RCT] pressure was about 135 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and reactor coolant temperature was about 361 degrees Fahrenheit. The operations line assistant shift supervisor (LASS) gave operators permission to perform surveillance CPS No. 9054.05, "RCIC Pump Flow Operability (Low Steam Flow)" which tests the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system [BN] pump [P] by recirculating water from the RCIC storage tank [TK] through the pump and back to the RCIC storage tank through a test return line. At about 2118 hours the RCIC pump was started as required by surveillance CPS No. 9054.05. The RCIC pump was shutdown as part of surveillance CPS No. 9054.05 at about 2215 hours.

At about 2240 hours the LASS authorized operators to increase reactor pressure above 150 psig.

At about 2255 hours, with reactor pressure at 165 psig, a review of plant conditions by the Operations shift supervisor (SS) identified that the RCIC system was not operable because the test return line isolation valves [ISV] to the RCIC storage tank were open. The valves were opened for the performance of surveillance CPS No. 9054.05. The restoration steps of CPS No. 9054.05, which requires that the test return line isolation valves be closed, had not yet been completed. CPS No. 9054.06, "RCIC Filled Discharge Piping, Flow Path and Flow Controller Checks," which verifies that the test return line isolation valves are closed, also had not been completed. With the test return isolation valves open, the RCIC system is not in an operable status. CPS Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires that the RCIC system be operable prior to increasing reactor pressure above 150 psig.

At about 2300 hours, the SS directed operators to reduce reactor pressure to less than 150 psig until the RCIC system could be restored to operable status. Operators closed the test return line isolation valves in accordance with the restoration steps of surveillance CPS No. 9054.05 and the RCIC system was filled and vented in response to a RCIC water leg pump low discharge pressure alarm in accordance with surveillance CPS No. 9054.06.

By 2359 hours, the operators had closed the test return valves and completed CPS No. 9054.05, CPS No. 9054.06 and declared the RCIC system operable.

Condition Report 1-95-04-098 was initiated to track a root cause and corrective action determination for this event.

No automatic or manually initiated safety system responses were necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition. No other equipment or components were inoperable at the start of this event to the extent that their inoperable condition contributed to this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	OF
Clinton Power Station	05000461	95	004	00	3 of 4

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is attributed to a lack of attention to detail by the LASS. The LASS, a licensed senior reactor operator, failed to verify that the test return line isolation valves for the RCIC system were shut and that RCIC system operability had been established prior to authorizing an increase in reactor pressure above 150 psig. In addition, main control room operators, licensed reactor operators, failed to question the authorization to increase reactor pressure above 150 psig without first verifying RCIC system operability.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Once operators identified that the RCIC system was not operable, the SS immediately ordered a reduction in reactor pressure from approximately 165 psig to less than 150 psig. The test return line isolation valves were then closed, the system filled and vented and declared operable before authorization was given to increase reactor pressure above 150 psig.

The SS discussed this event with the LASS and emphasized that greater attention to detail to the restoration of plant systems following testing, and prior to authorizing a change in plant conditions would have prevented this event.

A copy of condition report 1-95-04-098, which describes this event, including its root cause and corrective action, has been attached to the Operations Night Orders to provide for Operations personnel, including reactor operators, an opportunity to review this event and the corrective actions in response to it.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because the RCIC system was not operable as required by the Technical Specifications prior to increasing reactor pressure above 150 psig.

Assessment of the safety consequences and implications of this event concluded that this event was not nuclear safety significant. The High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) [BG] was operable at the time of this event and it performs a function similar to the RCIC system. That is, both systems provide high pressure coolant makeup to the reactor vessel in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The Technical Specifications allow the RCIC system to be inoperable for up to 14 days provided the HPCS system is operable. Also, all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) [BM], [BO], were operable at the time of this event. This event would not be safety significant in any other mode or power level since all ECCS were operable during the event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	OF
Clinton Power Station	05000461	95	004	00	4 of 4

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No equipment or components failed as a result of this event.

Clinton Power Station has not reported similar events in recent history.

For further information regarding this event, contact H. E. Bouska, Operations Shift Supervisor at (217) 935-8881, extension 3369.