

September 7, 1973

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region I  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1  
RO Bulletin 73-2  
Docket No. 50-244


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This letter is in response to your Regulatory Operations Bulletin 73-2, dated July 18, 1973, which requested us to review the design of the control circuit for the containment ventilation system isolation valves to determine whether the failure of a single control switch could result in the simultaneous failure of the redundant supply valves or redundant exhaust valves and provide your office with our findings within 45 days of the receipt of your letter.

A review of our electrical prints indicates that each valve may be individually operated by a separate main control board switch; consequently, a single control switch failure could not render the associated redundant valve inoperable.

The containment ventilation isolation trip relay contacts are series connected with the individual switch contacts supplying D. C. power to the respective isolation valves actuating solenoids. This configuration ensures that all of the concerned containment ventilation isolation valves will close upon receipt of a containment ventilation isolation signal regardless of any postulated switch being inoperable.

Very truly yours,

  
Keith W. Amish

xc: Mr. J. F. O'Leary

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