

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----|----------------------|----|--------------------------------|----|---------------------------|----|-------------------------------|----|---------------------------|----|-----------------------------------|----|--------------------|----|--------------------|--|
| 0 9 | | SYSTEM CODE A B | | CAUSE CODE B | | CAUSE SUBCODE B | | COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z | | | | | | COMP. SUBCODE Z | | VALVE SUBCODE Z | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | | |
| 17 | | EVENT YEAR 8 3 | | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 6 9 | | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 | | REPORT TYPE X | | REVISION NO. 1 | | ACTION TAKEN X | | FUTURE ACTION X | | | |
| 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | | |
| EFFECT ON PLANT 2 | | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z | | HOURS 0 0 0 0 | | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y | | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N | | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z | | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9 | | | | | |
| 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | | | | |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

| FACILITY STATUS | | | % POWER | | | OTHER STATUS | | | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | |
|-----------------|---|---|---------|----|----|--------------|----|----|---------------------|----|--------------------------|--|
| 1 | 5 | E | 28 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | A | 31 | Identified in NCR 83-118 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | | 45 | 46 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | | | | | | DESCRIPTION | |
|---------------------|---|------|----|------|----|-------------|----|
| NUMBER | | TYPE | | | | | |
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | (37) | Z | (38) | NA |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 12 | 13 | | |

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
[1] [Z] (42) NA
PDR ADOCK 05000345
S PDR

| PUBLICATION | | ISSUED | | DESCRIPTION | | NRC USE ONLY | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---|--------|------|-------------|--|--------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 7 | 8 | 9 | | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 3 | N | (44) | NA | | | | | | | | | | | |

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-96

DATE OF EVENT: November 30, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

1 | IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Fire Barrier Doors 320, 321, 322, 323, 332, 427, 428, 215, 601, 603, and 605 contain non-UL listed hardware attachments

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWt) = 2761 and Load (Gross MWe) = 915.

Description of Occurrence: On November 30, 1983, Nuclear Facility Engineering Department received Non-Conformance Report (NCR) 83-118, which identified the subject fire barrier doors as having non-UL listed hardware attachments affixed to these fire doors. These attachments compromise the affixed UL labels and places the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 for possibly nonfunctional fire barrier doors. This NCR resulted from a letter, BT-14227, from Bechtel Corporation (Toledo Edison's architect/engineer) responding to Facility Engineering's request to review door attachments made during security modifications at Davis-Besse.

1 | Subsequent to the above occurrence, a review was performed on security drawing E-445, "Security System Door Details". Two additional doors were found to be nonfunctional (332 and 605) based upon the same criteria as specified above.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was a design/fabrication error. Modifications that were required to upgrade security requirements to internal doors at Davis-Besse downgraded the fire protection rating of the same doors.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Immediate fire watches were posted within the hour as required. The doors were only possibly nonfunctional as fire barriers, not security. In addition, fire detection and suppression systems are located throughout the plant.

Corrective Action: Facility Engineering will review the options available in either replacing these doors with new UL listed doors and associated UL listed hardware, modify existing doors so as to obtain compliance with UL and NFPA requirements, or prepare an exemption request to the requirements of having these doors contain UL listed hardware.

Failure Data: A similar occurrence was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-82-76 (82-061), which identified doors 509 and 519 as possibly nonfunctional due to improperly affixed fire rating labels.

LER #83-069



April 26, 1984

Log No. K84-469
File: RR 2 (NP-33-83-96)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is a copy of Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 83-069. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please replace your previous copy of the subject report with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

JCS/001