

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Preliminary Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 73-25

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications, para-
graph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 10/1/73
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

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S PDR

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50-219

SUBJECT: Failure of Isolation Condenser initiation relay 6K12 to function when deenergized while performing routine surveillance.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, by telephone on Saturday, September 29, 1973, at 1:35 p. m., and by telecopier on Monday, October 1, 1973, at 12:00 p. m.

SITUATION: While performing a routine surveillance test on the Reactor High Pressure - Isolation Condenser initiation switches, contacts on relay 6K12 failed to open within the preset time delay of 15 seconds after tripping the pressure switch and deenergizing the relay.

CAUSE: Unknown. The relay has since been removed from the circuit and bench tested and appears to function properly.

REMEDIAL ACTION:

Relay 6K12 was replaced with one from spares. A satisfactory surveillance test was conducted and the Isolation Condenser System then considered to be operable.

September 28, 1973

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

As detailed in Amendment 67 to the PDSAR, at least one of the Isolation Condensers is required to act as a means for heat removal during a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident. Actuation of relay 6K12 can be by means of High Reactor Pressure or Low Low Reactor Water Level. It is wired into the logic circuit such that tripping of the relay provides one-half of the initiation logic for both condensers, the other one-half being its redundant counterpart on the same instrument penetration. A second redundant instrument penetration also includes two pressure switches, contacts from which also will initiate both isolation condensers. The significance of this event then is the loss of redundancy provided to initiate one-half of the signal for placing the Isolation Condenser System in service.

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| TO (Name and unit) M. D. Thornburg, Chief, FS&EB | INITIALS DATE | REMARKS Licensee: Jersey Central Power & Light Co. Docket No.: 50-219 Abnormal Occurrence: AO 73-25 |
| TO (Name and unit) RO:HQ (5) DR Central Files (1) Regulatory Standards (3) Dir. of Licensing (13) | INITIALS DATE | REMARKS The attached report from the subject licensee is forwarded in accordance with RO Manual Chapter 1000. |
| TO (Name and unit) RO Files | INITIALS DATE | REMARKS The action taken by the licensee is considered appropriate. Followup will be performed during the next inspection as appropriate. Copies of |
| FROM (Name and unit) B. L. Capton, Senior Reactor Inspector, BWR Section | REMARKS | the report have been forwarded to the PDR, Local PDR, NSIC, DTIE and State representatives. The licensee will submit a 10 day written report to |
| PHONE NO. | DATE 10/2/73 | Licensing. |

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GPO : 1971 O - 445-452

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