

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2										
TITLE (4) INADVERTENT AUTO-START OF DIESEL GENERATOR 1-3																									
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
0	3	3	0	8	4	8	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	4	3	0	8	4	0	5	0	0	0		
OPERATING MODE (9) 3		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)											
		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(a)											
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A)											
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																									
NAME JACQUELINE R. HINDS, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1															
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR									
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO													

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), Diesel Generator No. 1-3 automatically started when the 4KV bus 'F' potential transformer fuse drawer was pulled out during a wire trace by an electrical maintenance engineer. The engineer was unaware that opening the drawer would disconnect the bus potential fuses. In order to prevent recurrence, labels will be mounted on the potential transformer fuse drawers to caution personnel.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 1 1	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 30, 1984, at 1000 PST, while in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), the 4KV bus 'F' potential transformer fuse drawer (EB) was opened, resulting in the actuation of Diesel Generator 1-3 (ENG) (EK).

While performing a wire trace, an electrical maintenance engineer opened the 4KV bus 'F' potential transformer fuse drawer while the bus was energized. The engineer was not aware that opening the drawer would disconnect the bus potential fuses and cause a simulated undervoltage condition on bus 'F'. The engineer realized he had opened a protection circuit, and immediately reclosed the drawer.

The undervoltage signal started Diesel Generator 1-3 and shed the following 4KV bus 'F' loads: component cooling water pump 1-1 (CC), auxiliary feedwater pump 1-3 (BA), and auxiliary saltwater pump 1-1 (BI). Diesel Generator 1-3 did not connect to the 4KV bus F since the bus remained energized throughout the event. Auxiliary saltwater pump 1-2 started automatically. The system performed as expected. The components shed from bus F were restored, and Diesel Generator 1-3 was secured. The Control Room staff completed notification of the significant event per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) within four hours.

The potential transformer drawer was not labeled to caution personnel on the consequences of opening the drawer. To provide adequate guidelines and prevent recurrence, caution labels will be installed on the potential transformer fuse drawers to inform personnel not to open them without first consulting with the Shift Foreman.

The vital 4KV loads are arranged such that the loss of any one vital bus will not reduce the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Since this event involved only a brief loss of some vital 4KV loads, the public's health and safety would not have been affected even if this event had occurred in any other operational mode.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E



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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

April 30, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-167

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-011-00
Inadvertent Auto-Start of Diesel Generator 1-3

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the inadvertent auto-start of Diesel Generator No. 1-3.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

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