

June 30, 1972

Mr. Edward J. Bloch, Acting Director  
Division of Reactor Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
7920 Norfolk Avenue  
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Subject: Loss of power to control rods  
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1  
Docket 50-244



Dear Mr. Bloch:

The Ginna unit was being returned to service following its refueling outage. At approximately 2219 hours on June 23, 1972, with the reactor at five percent thermal power the control board received alarms of Rod Bottom Rod Stop and Rod Control Urgent Failure Rod Stop.

The Head Control Operator immediately manually tripped the full length control rods. The part length rods were out of the core. When the operator received the alarms he noted that the indicating rod bottom lights for the "B" Bank Control Group 2 Control Rods G 5 and G 9 were on and also that the position indicators for these two control rods were at zero.

Immediate investigation in the rod control cabinet area disclosed that water was dropping on top of these cabinets from the intermediate floor above. The source of water was found to be coming from a Swagelok fitting on the tubing which transmits the main steam generator feedwater flow indication to the control room. The isolation valves to the transmitter were then closed.

The escaping water, which is condensate from the secondary system, had dropped through the floor above and followed in some cable trays to a position above Power Cabinet 2 BD. It then entered through penetrations on the top of the cabinet and grounded out the control power to the stationary gripper coils for Control Rods G 5 and G 9 which dropped these rods into the core.

The power to the cabinet was turned off, the water wiped out and the cabinet thoroughly dried. Examination was made of the other full length rod control cabinets, both internally and above and these were found unaffected.

Control Rods G 5 and G 9 were then each pulled 24" and manually tripped twice. All of Control Bank "B" control rods were pulled out ten steps and returned to zero.

The Plant Operations Review Committee agreed that the control rods were

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
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TO Mr. Edward J. Bloch

operating properly and that the reactor could be returned to criticality. The time for this return was at 0635 hours on June 24, 1972.

The feedwater flow transmission lines had been relocated during the refueling outage to accommodate the modification of the main steam safety valve support system. The Swagelok fitting was found to have been made up incorrectly and the complete fitting was replaced.

The committee has recommended that any holes in the floor above these rod drive cabinets be plugged, that deflection hoods over these cabinets be considered, and further that the maintenance force be reinstructed in the proper procedure of the installation of these compression fittings.

Very truly yours,



Keith W. Amish

xc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly