NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - 480 V MCC Telemand Swap

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									Turkey Point - Unit 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1
0 3	2 9	8 4	8 4	- 0 1 2	- 0 0	0 4	3 0	8 4	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
	N		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)				
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Paul A. Roach, Regulation and Compliance Engineer	3 0 5 2 4 5 - 2 9 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 29, 1984, an automatic transfer of a 480 volt power supply occurred. The root cause was determined to be due to the accidental jarring of an electrical auxiliary relay by a member of the plant construction work force. The jarred relay, which senses loss of voltage, momentarily completed circuits that function to automatically transfer the affected 480 volt bus to its alternate power supply. All equipment functioned as designed. Immediate corrective actions included functional checks of associated electrical circuits and a manual reset of the auto-transfer (telemand swap) relay. The health and safety of the public were not affected. Similar occurrences: None.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	8 4	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 29, 1984, at 8:30 a.m., the D 480 volt motor control center (MCC, B08) underwent an automatic transfer from its normal to alternate power supply. The root cause was determined to be due to the accidental bumping of an electrical auxiliary relay (2X4/4A) by a member of the plant construction work force. The action of jarring relay 2X4/4A, which senses loss of D MCC bus voltage, completed a circuit that functions to perform the automatic transfer between the power supplies and resulted in the transfer occurring.

The performance of modifications in the sequencer cabinet for the D MCC were in progress when the accidental jarring of relay 2X4/4A located in the cabinet occurred. This resulted in spurious actuation of relay 2X4/4A and closure of contacts number 2 and 8 which completed a circuit, energizing the telemand swap relay (TCR 3B). The coincident logic pre-existent to the transfer requires the normal 480 volt feeder breaker (30406) to be closed and the B emergency diesel generator to not be at rated speed (VSR relay). The transfer between power supplies onto the 480 volt alternate feeder breaker (0802) occurred as designed and without problem upon actuation of the TCR 3B relay.

Immediate corrective actions included functional checks of associated electrical circuits and a manual reset of the telemand swap relay without problem. Additionally, the plant construction work procedure which provides guidance regarding potential problem areas that can be encountered during plant construction activities was re-emphasized in terms of its importance in providing control of plant activities, in identifying potential problem areas, and in preventing a recurrence of this type.

The resetting of the telemand swap relay and transfer back to the normal power supply was completed without problem. All equipment functioned as designed. The unit continued at full power operation unaffected by the power supply transfer.

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

April 30, 1984
PNS-LI-84-152

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 84-12
Turkey Point Unit 3
Date of Event: March 29, 1984
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

H. M. Paduano
for J. W. Williams, Jr.
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

JWW/PLP/js

Attachment

cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Region II, USNRC
Harold F. Reis, Esquire
File 933.1

IE22
1/1

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