



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 E. ST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14604

KEITH W. AMISH
VICE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

April 29, 1971



Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject: Failure of Valves 826 A, 826 B, 826 C, and 826 D to open
Ginna Station Unit #1
Docket #50-244

Dear Dr. Morris:

Thursday evening, April 22, 1971, Rochester Gas and Electric men were doing the Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test. The scope of the test was to prove that the Emergency Diesel Generators will automatically start, automatically tie into the safeguard busses, and automatically assume their required load upon the simulation of station blackout and concurrent safety injection signal. The unit was in a cold shutdown condition, as it had been out since February 26, 1971 for its annual refueling.

When the simulated station blackout and safety injection signal was initiated, it was found that the valves 826 A, B, C, and D between the Concentrated Boric Acid Tanks and the Safety Injection Pumps failed to open.

Investigation showed that when the station blackout condition occurs, the voltage is momentarily lost on all 480 volt safeguard busses (#s 14, 16, 17, and 18). The loss of bus 14 also results in the loss of Instrument Bus 1 B. Instrument Bus 1 B, in turn, feeds the "A" Concentrated Boric Acid Tank level channels LC 102 and LC 172. Therefore, when the 1 B Bus voltage was lost a downscale indication was shown on LC 102 and LC 172. Low level indication from these two channels actuates an interlock which prevents the Concentrated Boric Acid Tank outlet valves 826 A, B, C, and D from opening.

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TO Dr. Peter A. Morris

During hot functional testing prior to initial criticality, the fact that the momentary loss of bus 14 would cause this problem was not discovered due to the fact that two different tests were involved. The two tests were RGE - SU - 4.30 Diesel Generator Test and RGE - SU - 4.5.1 Safety Injection Pre-operational Test. Each test thoroughly covered the proper equipment, but due to the fact that the tests were not run concurrently, the above problem was not discovered.

The Plant Operating Review Committee met on April 23, 1971 and reviewed the problem. It was recommended that the Power supply for the "A" Concentrated Boric Acid Tank level channels be transferred to the 1 A Instrument Bus. This Bus is fed from the "A" battery bank through an Inverter; therefore, it will always be active even if station blackout conditions occur. We will still be maintaining separateness for the Concentrated Boric Acid Tank level instruments because the "B" Concentrated Boric Acid Tank level channels are being fed from Instrument Bus 1 C which is being fed from the "B" battery bank through another Inverter.

The power supply was changed from the 1 B Instrument Bus to the 1 A Instrument Bus and a retesting showed that the valves 826 A, B, C, and D did open properly.

Very truly yours,

Keith W. Amish
Keith W. Amish
Vice President
Electric and Steam