ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14604

FRANCIS E. DRAPER, JR.
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

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September 8, 1969



Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject: Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Unit #1
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Dr. Morris:

The results of our investigation of the lower internals have shown no significant damage resulted from the lowering incident. Operations leading to fuel loading are being resumed. The following summarizes this investigation.

On July 18, the reactor vessel lower internals were being transferred from the reactor vessel to their support stand. During this transfer, a crane malfunction occurred which allowed the internals to abnormally descend about 6 feet and strike the support stand.

The internals, which had come to rest out-of-position on the stand, were securely fastened to prevent further incidents. A cursory visual inspection showed damage to two bolt heads in the lower core support plate, several scratch marks, and damage to the support stand.

Later, after the internals were properly positioned on a support stand, a very detailed, complete inspection program was carried out. This program involved visual inspection, dimensional checking, and non-destructive testing. The results show that no damage or changes occurred to the lower internals as a result of the incident, with the exception of the two bolts which were replaced and the scratch marks which were stoned or ground out.

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Dr. Peter A. Morris

Several approaches were used to approximate the forces that were exerted during the incident. One approach used the extent of damage inflicted on the support stand and the forces that would be necessary to accomplish such damage. The other approach involved the lack of damage to an instrument thimble guide tube and the forces that the tube could satisfactorily withstand without any damage. Both approaches agreed reasonably well and indicated that as a maximum, forces no greater than 2.5$_g$'s could have been exerted. (2.5$_g$'s is in the range of forces which are tolerated during shipping.) Examination reveals that all joints in the internals have the ability to satisfactorily resist at least 20$_g$'s. Thus, there is a factor of safety of 8 over the 2.5$_g$'s possibly exerted during the incident.

The crane design has been reviewed in detail and certain modifications have been made to obtain an improved installation.

A formal detailed incident report will be submitted to you at a later date.

Very truly yours,

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

Francis E. Drake, Jr.
Chairman of the Board