

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 9 1 7 1 OF 0 1 2

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

## Unscheduled Reactor Protection System Actuation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
03	28	84	84	02	8	00	04	25	84	0 5 0 0 0								
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																		
OPERATING MODE (9)			20.402(b)								20.406(a)		X 60.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)			0 0 1 0								20.406(a)(1)(i)		60.36(a)(1)		60.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(a)	
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)								60.36(a)(2)		60.73(a)(2)(vi)		X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)			
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)								60.73(a)(2)(i)		60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)								60.73(a)(2)(ii)		60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)		50.72(b)(2)(ii)			
			20.406(a)(1)(v)								60.73(a)(2)(iii)		60.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

L. D. Kassakatis, Plant Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

5 0 9 3 7 7 1 - 2 5 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) Ext. 2201

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
A	J	C		N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		X NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
		X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 words, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3/28/84, a Reactor Protection System (RPS) unscheduled actuation occurred due to Scram Discharge Volume High Level. Maintenance activities in progress on three Control Rod Drive (CRD) Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) required valve lineups which set up a flow path from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the Scram Discharge Volume via the CRD withdraw lines. Another maintenance activity, adding a vacuum breaker to the Scram Discharge Volume, was in progress and this activity required a valve lineup that included danger tagging shut the Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves. Leakage from the RPV to the Isolated Discharge Volume filled the Discharge Volume until the level sensing instruments actuated, causing an unscheduled RPS actuation.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/95

FACILITY NAME (1):  Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2):  0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	LER NUMBER (6):			PAGE (3):		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 2 8	— 0	0 0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Reactor Mode - 4  
Power Level - Zero

On 3/28/84 at approximately 1630 hours, a Reactor Protection System unscheduled actuation occurred due to a Scram Discharge Volume High Level trip. Investigation revealed the following: The Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves were danger tagged closed to allow Plant Maintenance personnel to install a vacuum breaker on Scram Discharge Volume piping.

At the same time, a Maintenance effort was under way to correct problems with three separate Hydraulic Control Units in the Control Rod Drive System. A valve lineup for this work included the instrument air header supplying scram air to the three HCU's (CRD-V-116) and the charging water isolation valve (CRD-V-113). However, a flow path from the Reactor vessel to the Discharge Volume still existed through the drive water line of each HCU via the drive water isolation valve (CRD-V-102). Vessel water flowed through the open withdraw isolation valve, into the Discharge Volume (which was isolated for maintenance) and actuated the Scram Discharge Volume High Level trip instrumentation yielding the unscheduled Reactor Protection System actuation.

The Reactor Protection System logics were reset per Plant procedures and the valve lineup for the HCU maintenance activity was altered to preclude any further drainage from the vessel. Maintenance activities were then completed and all systems restored to normal lineups. Plant tagging procedure was reviewed and no inadequacies were found.

The personnel involved have been cautioned to be aware of specific precautions prior to working in or on equipment capable of actuating ESF systems. This is a unique event and requires no corrective action other than the continued cautioning of personnel.

## Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397  
April 25, 1984

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Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: **NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2**  
**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-028**

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-028 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of noncompliance, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1929 hours on March 28, 1984.

Very truly yours,

  
J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:de

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-028

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator  
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
1450 Maria Lane  
Walnut Creek, California 94596  
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)

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