NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	01 OF 03

TITLE (4) Partial Invalid Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	05000
04	25	95	95	009	00			95	FACILITY NAME N/A	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Mr. Richard Plasse, Senior Licensing Engineer	(315) 349-6622

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

The plant was operating at full power on 4/25/95 when the 'A' Reactor Building ventilation exhaust radiation monitor was being removed from service to support preventive maintenance on the monitor sample pump. To prepare the radiation monitor for removal from service, I&C planned to install a jumper to maintain the circuit function intact and to avoid an invalid Engineered Safety Function (ESF) actuation. The jumper slid off the terminal and struck a nearby cable connector, causing a ground which blew fuse 17A-F14A. This resulted in isolation of the Reactor Building Ventilation System and the 'A' side primary containment atmosphere sampling system and the start of the 'A' standby gas treatment system at 2157 hours. The operating crew replaced the blown fuse and returned the systems to standby service at 2225 hours. Corrective action planned as a result of this event will be to continue with an existing modification intended to improve the attachment of jumpers. On 5/22/95 at 2145 hours, the plant was operating at full power when I&C technicians were in the process of completing the corrective actions for the 4/25/95 event (installing test connection lugs per Modification D1-93-058) when a ground blew fuse 17A-F14A. This resulted in the same ESF actuation discussed above. The operating crew returned the systems to standby service at 2206 hours.

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

EIIS Codes are in []

Event Description

On April 25, 1995, the plant was operating at full power when the 'A' Reactor Building (secondary containment) [NG] ventilation exhaust [VA] radiation Monitor A [IL] was being removed from service to support preventive maintenance on the monitor sample pump. Removal of the sample pump from service stops the air flow through the monitor. To maintain the isolation logic for the Reactor Building Ventilation System in an operable condition, an electrical jumper is applied.

The Instrument and Control (I&C) Department was requested to remove the 'A' Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (17RM-452A) from service, to support preventive maintenance on the associated sample pump 17P-36A. The I&C technician took conservative actions to securely install the electrical jumper to the prescribed test terminal strip. At 2157 hours, as the technician stepped back out of the panel, one side of the electrical jumper slid off of the terminal and struck a nearby cable connector causing a ground which blew fuse 17A-F14A and isolated the 'A' side Reactor Building Ventilation System, the 'A' side primary containment sampling system [BB] and initiated the 'A' side Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) [BH]. All equipment functioned as designed and the systems were restored to normal at 2225 hours.

On May 22, 1995, the plant was operating at full power when I&C technicians were in the process of completing the corrective actions for the April 25, 1995 event (installing test connection lugs per Modification D1-93-058). At 2145 hours, while installing a test connection lug, with the terminal strip screw loosened, the existing circuit lead slipped out of a pair of pliers, resulting in contact with the adjacent ground chassis, causing a ground which blew fuse 17A-F14A. This resulted in the same ESF actuation discussed above. All equipment functioned as designed and the systems were restored to normal at 2206 hours.

Event Cause

The cause of the initial isolation was the loss of contact with the electrical jumper resulting in a ground which blew fuse 17A-F14A. The I&C technician recognized the high potential for a loss of contact with the electrical jumper and provided adequate self-checking to assure the "alligator clips" were securely fastened. An inspection of the jumper clips showed both were in good condition and not worn.

The cause of the second event during corrective action activities, was a loose lead that made inadvertent contact in the circuit, resulting in a ground which blew fuse 17A-F14A.

Event Analysis

In both situations, isolation of the 'A' Reactor Building Ventilation System and 'A' side Primary Containment Sampling Systems, and initiation of the 'A' SBGT System, is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an invalid ESF actuation not specifically exempted by 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(3) due to the fact that the 'A' side Primary Containment Sampling System valves are components of the containment isolation system. There were no system or equipment failures. In both events the blown fuse was replaced and the systems were returned to normal.

Corrective Actions

1. A Modification (MOD D1-93-058) had been previously initiated to install test connection lugs in those places where jumpers are required for surveillance testing or abnormal procedures. This modification involves the installation of test connection lugs intended to improve jumper clip connection points. This modification had not been completed on the panel where the jumper slipped off during this event. Work on this modification will continue.

2. When performing Modification D1-93-058, attempts will be made to deenergize the circuits to avoid any unexpected automatic initiations/ isolations. In cases where deenergizing circuits is undesirable, appropriate precautions will be defined with potential plant impact of the work activity fully understood prior to conducting the work activity.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LERs: 89-013, 92-039, 92-040, and 92-046 described similar unplanned engineered safety feature actuations during jumpering or lifted lead activities.

Attachment 1

LER-95-009

Commitment Status

Number	Commitment	Due Date
LER-95-009-01	A Modification (MOD D1-93-058) had been previously initiated to install test connection lugs in those places where jumpers are required for surveillance testing or abnormal procedures. This modification involves the installation of test connection lugs intended to improve jumper clip connection points. This modification had not been completed on the panel where the jumper slipped off during this event. Work on this modification will continue.	
LER-95-009-02	When performing Modification D1-93-058, attempts will be made to deenergize the circuits to avoid any unexpected automatic initiations/isolations. In cases where deenergizing circuits is undesirable, appropriate precautions will be defined with potential plant impact of the work activity fully understood prior to conducting the work activity.	