

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

October 9, 1972

Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for Operating Reactors
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. Skovholt:

SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
DOCKET 50-219
FLOODING OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENT

In accordance with your letter of August 3, 1972, the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has been reviewed to determine (1) whether failure of any equipment which does not meet the criteria of Class I seismic construction, particularly the circulating water system, could cause flooding sufficient to adversely affect the performance of engineered safety systems, and (2) whether failure of any equipment could cause flooding such that common mode failure of redundant safety related equipment would result. The purpose of this letter is to report the results of that review.

Rupture of and subsequent flooding from the circulating water system would be annunciated and alarmed in the control room and the circulating water pumps could be secured and the condenser isolation valves could be shut. These valves do isolate the system expansion joints from both the inlet and discharge canal water sources. Even if a rupture were non-isolable (i.e., a pipe rupture not within the confines of the condenser isolation valves) flooding through the inlet piping is impossible once the pumps are secured because of the elevation of the piping. Backflooding through the circulating water discharge piping is possible but only to the level of the discharge canal. Normal high water level in the canal is 1'6" MSL which is two feet below the lowest elevation in the turbine building (3'6" level) where engineered safeguards equipment is located. Therefore, performance of engineered safeguards systems would not be adversely affected by any rupture of the circulating water system.

All other fluid systems in the plant which do not meet seismic Class I requirements have been reviewed to determine the potential for flooding and subsequent deterioration of engineered safeguard system performance. The Fire Protection System is the only system with sufficient flow rate to cause flooding near engineered safeguards systems (in this case, vital power supplies) but the

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Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for Operating Projects


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room in which this switchgear and piping are located has sufficient drainage through pipe chases to preclude flooding that could affect more than one of the redundant vital supplies.

Therefore, the review of fluid systems at the Oyster Creek Station did not uncover any situation in which a rupture would cause flooding which would adversely affect the performance of engineered safeguards systems to a point at which they would be unable to perform their intended function.

We are enclosing forty copies of this letter.

Very truly yours,


Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President

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cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1