



Northeast
Nuclear Energy

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The Northeast Utilities System

Donald B. Miller Jr.,
Senior Vice President - Millstone

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)

May 26, 1995
MP-95-172

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49
Docket No. 50-423
Licensee Event Report 95-010-00

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 95-010-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Donald B. Miller, Jr.
Senior Vice President - Millstone Station

DBM/RLM:lfg

Attachment: LER 95-010-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3
V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000423

PAGE (3)

1 OF 2

TITLE (4)

Inadvertent Loss of Power Signal During Refueling Outage due to Procedural Weakness

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	30	95	95	010	00	05	26	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)										
OPERATING MODE (9)		0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		0%		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)		
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Robert L. McGuinness, Senior Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(203) 447-1791 Ext. 6855

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 1913 hours on April 30, 1995, while operating in Mode 0 at 0% power, 81 degrees Fahrenheit and atmospheric pressure a Train B Loss of Power (LOP) signal was generated when control power fuses were reinstalled in the degraded voltage circuitry following replacement of a degraded voltage relay. The associated emergency bus, 34D, was deenergized for scheduled maintenance and the associated emergency diesel sequencer was aligned for normal operations. Upon receipt of the LOP signal, the sequencer processed the signal and actuated several components. Since the B Train AC power was deenergized, very few loads responded to the LOP signal. Some ventilation systems and DC powered air operated valves responded to the signal.

Since the plant was in Mode 0 and the bus was deenergized and tagged out, this event had no safety significance.

The event was caused by procedural weakness. The sequencer should have been disabled in this plant configuration.

To prevent recurrence, the procedure for deenergizing an emergency 4160 Volt bus was revised to require tagging the sequencer bypass switch in "test" prior to deenergizing the bus and leaving it tagged until the bus is restored.

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7-14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT, 3150-0104, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000423	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3) 02 OF 02
		YEAR 95	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER — 010 —	REVISION NUMBER 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

At 1913 hours on April 30, 1995, while operating in Mode 0 at 0% power, 81 degrees Fahrenheit and atmospheric pressure a Train B Loss of Power (LOP) signal was generated when control power fuses were reinstalled in the degraded voltage circuitry following replacement of a degraded voltage relay. Procedurally, the associated diesel sequencer is placed in "test 2" prior to deenergizing the 4160 Volt bus to prevent processing the LOP signal generated as the bus is deenergized. This was performed correctly. However, while the bus was down, surveillances and other work were performed on the sequencer which required removing it from "test 2." Since the LOP sensing circuit blocks itself after a short initiation period, plant personnel determined that it was acceptable to leave the sequencer on-line for the remainder of the bus outage. Later, fuses were pulled in the degraded voltage circuit to allow the replacement of a degraded voltage relay. This action reset the degraded voltage logic such that when the fuses were reinstalled, a new LOP signal was generated. Since the sequencer had been left on-line, it processed the signal and sent out the normal LOP signals. Some ventilation systems shut down and the non-safety portion of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water was isolated. There were no loads on the non-safety related header at the time of the event. Most of the normal LOP loads did not respond since the associated AC power supplies were all deenergized and the emergency diesel generator was tagged out.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of the event was a procedural deficiency which allowed the sequencer to be placed on-line while the 4160 Volt bus was still deenergized.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is reported as an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). An immediate notification was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). There was no safety significance since the emergency bus was tagged out and the opposite train was capable of handling any actual emergency conditions.

IV. Corrective Action

Immediate actions taken during the event were to realign the equipment which had actuated and to reset the sequencer. Discussions were held with I&C and Generation Test Services personnel to prevent recurrence during the subsequent A Train outage. Lastly, the procedure for deenergizing an emergency 4160 Volt bus was revised to require tagging the sequencer bypass switch in "test" throughout the bus outage.

V. Additional Information

Licensee Event Report 95-007-00 reported a partial Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA) signal, due to personnel error during the current refueling outage. That event is unrelated to the current event. The causes of the CDA initiation were personnel error and programmatic weaknesses, which were unrelated to the current LOP event. The corrective actions associated with the CDA would not have prevented the LOP event.

ELIS CodesSystem

JE—Engineered Safety Features Actuation System

Component

None