

50-237

# Commonwealth Edison Company

72 WEST ADAMS STREET \* CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply To:

POST OFFICE BOX 767 \* CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450

WPW Ltr. #178-73

March 13, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545



SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT #2,  
SECTION 6.6.C.1 of THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit in which, on February 19, 1973, three control rod drives (CRD) gave indication of an apparent uncoupled condition when they were withdrawn during a startup.

During the startup, CRD B-6 was withdrawn to position 48 and an overtravel check performed. The CRD overtravel alarm annunciated and a loss of position indication and red back lighting was observed, giving an indication of an apparent uncoupling condition. The drive was successfully recoupled on the first attempt and tested for coupling. The results were satisfactory; no uncoupling resulted. Further along in the control rod withdrawal sequence, the same condition existed with CRD K-8. The rod was recoupled and tested satisfactorily. At this time, CRD's B-6 and K-8 were scrambled and a recoupling check performed. No abnormalities were found.

As the startup continued, the overtravel alarm was received on the third CRD, L-11. This drive also recoupled and tested satisfactorily.

It should be noted that all CRD's withdrawn to position 48 were checked for coupling, and CRD's at partial positions were checked for nuclear instrumentation response. This is normal procedure whenever a CRD is withdrawn to position 48.

No conclusion was reached as to whether or not the drives had actually uncoupled, although all indications were there. It was concluded that, following the recoupling operation, drives were coupled and no safety issue existed. The startup was continued without any further incidents.

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S PDR

A review of the problem with General Electric resulted in essentially the same conclusions that were reached by the station. It was suggested that the three CRD's be tested a number of times to confirm that the drives were coupled.

On February 20, 1973, CRD's B-6, K-8, and L-11 were inserted from position 48 to position 44 and then given a continuous withdraw signal to position 48 to verify coupling. This was performed twenty-five times on each drive without indication of uncoupling.

A surveillance program was initiated to perform the uncoupling check once per day on each of the three drives for a period of one week and once per week thereafter until the next outage. During the outage, beginning on March 25, 1973, CRD's B-6, K-8, and L-11 will be removed and inspected in an effort to determine the cause of the anomaly. Additionally, all CRD's will be timed and checked for overtravel indications.

It is planned to submit a report by approximately April 30, 1973, describing the findings made during disassembly and inspection of these drives. Investigation on Unit #3 will proceed as indicated by the results of the inspection.


Sincerely,

*W. P. Worden*

W. P. Worden  
Superintendent

WPN:TPS:jw

cc: WPN Ltr. File



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