

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1):	DOCKET NUMBER (2):	PAGE (3):
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4) Scram Signal During Transfer of Power

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)																
									N/A					0 5 0 0 0																
0	3	1	6	8	4	8	4	—	0	0	1	—	0	0	0	4	1	2	8	4	N/A					0 5 0 0 0				

OPERATING MODE (8)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 C.F.R. § 1.124 (Check one or more of the following) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (10)	01010		20.402(b)	20.406(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
			20.406(a)(1)(i)	60.38(a)(1)		60.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)	60.38(a)(2)		60.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)	60.73(a)(2)(i)		60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)	60.73(a)(2)(ii)		60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.406(a)(1)(v)	60.73(a)(2)(iii)		60.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSER CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER				
Paul J. Hamilton - Plant Engineer	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>AREA CODE</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>6 1 7</td> <td>7 4 6 - 7 9 0 0</td> </tr> </table>	AREA CODE		6 1 7	7 4 6 - 7 9 0 0
AREA CODE					
6 1 7	7 4 6 - 7 9 0 0				

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

[illegible]

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		-	-	-

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (10)

On 3/16/84 and again on 3/27/84, while shut down for refueling, a full scram signal was generated. No fuel was in the vessel, and all control rods were valved out at the time of the events. Operations initiated an investigation which concluded that the scrams occurred when the power supply for "A" RPS was temporarily interrupted. Cause of the unplanned scram was due to operator error combined with an off-normal configuration of the RPS. During both scrams, the operator failed to realize that a full scram will occur when the scram discharge high level signal is bypassed and a loss of power to either RPS occurs.

There were no system or component failures during this event.

To preclude recurrence, Operations personnel were counselled on the cause of the event. In addition, a copy of this report will be forwarded to all licensed operators and the Training Department.

B405010486 B40412
PDR ADCK 05000293
S PDR

2231

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station	0500029384	—	001	—	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 3/16/84 and again on 3/27/84, while shut down for refueling, a full scram signal was generated. No fuel was in the vessel, and all control rods were valved out at the time of the event. The event occurred when transferring the power supply for the "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS). During the transfer, power to "A" RPS was momentarily interrupted as planned. In both cases, the operator expected a half scram from loss of power to "A" RPS, but received a full scram.

In both cases, the operator initiated an investigation into the cause of the scram. The investigation was completed on 3/28/84 and revealed that when the scram discharge volume high level circuitry is bypassed, Relays 5AK18A and 5AK18C are common to both RPS channels. Thus, loss of power to either RPS channel will cause a full RPS scram. The scram discharge volume high level scram had been bypassed via key lock switch approximately two weeks prior to the first event in support of a modification to the CRD scram discharge volume system.

Root cause of the events is attributed to cognitive operator error. Specifically, the operators failed to realize that a full scram would occur when in the above-mentioned configuration and power to either channel of the RPS was interrupted. We believe procedures are adequate in that if the operators had realized that a full scram would occur, they would have expected the scram and planned accordingly.

To reduce the probability of a similar event, Operations personnel were immediately counselled on the cause of the scrams upon completion of the investigation. In addition, a copy of this report will be sent to all licensed operators and the Training Department.

This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

A search of failure records indicates no previous occurrences of a similar nature.

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
800 BOYLSTON STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02199

WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

April 12, 1984

BECO Ltr. #84-053

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Docket Number 50-293
License DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report 84-001-00, "Scram Signal During Power Transfer," is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

If there are any questions on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully submitted,



W. D. Harrington

PH:caw

Enclosure: LER 84-001-00

cc: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Standard BECO LER Distribution