




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WPW Ltr.#417-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
June 1, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19 & 25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2&3
SECTION 6.6.B.3 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit in which on May 24, 1973, the Unit #3 and Unit #2/3 emergency diesel generators tripped on high temperature. This occurrence was telephoned to Mr. Hugh Dance of Region III of Regulatory Operations at 1340 hrs. on May 25, 1973 and followed up by telegram one hour later.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

On May 23, 1973 the Units 3 and 2/3 emergency diesel generator cooling water flow was reversed as required by procedure 6600-S-I which is conducted during each maintenance outage. On May 24, 1973, surveillance testing was conducted on both diesel generators in preparation for going to the "Refuel" mode from the "Shutdown" mode for control rod scram testing. The units #3 and #2/3 diesel generators tripped on high temperature at approximately 1900 hours. This violated section 3.9.D of the Unit #3 Technical Specifications and section 3.9.A.2 of the Unit #2 Technical Specifications. Investigation revealed that the cooling water flow valve lineup was incorrect. The resulting low flow of cooling water caused the diesel generators to trip on high temperature. This incorrect valve lineup was the result of an unclear procedure. The diesel generators were inoperable for approximately 25 minutes while the lineup was corrected. The diesel generators were subsequently tested and run for one hour to verify proper operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The surveillance procedure is only used during maintenance outages and thus is used at infrequent intervals. The short coming of this procedure had not been apparent until this incident. The procedure will be revised so

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that the correct valve lineup will be explicitly stated. This revision will be completed during the next 60 days. This occurrence does not pose any problems other than to revise the procedure. No plant equipment malfunction was involved.

There were no effects on the safety of plant personnel or the public during this situation because Unit #3 was in the shutdown mode, no work was in progress that had the potential for draining the vessel, and a core or containment cooling system was not required. Secondary containment power requirements could have been met by the Unit #2 diesel generator. The operation of Unit #2 was such that sufficient power was available from other sources. Since power was available to the 345 KV switchyard, and from the 138 KV system through a 4160 volt bus tie, and the fact that one diesel (the Unit #2 diesel) carries sufficient engineered safeguards equipment to cover all breaks, there was no compromise of public safety.

Sincerely,

W. P. Worden

W. P. Worden
Superintendent

WPW:do

cc: WPW Ltr. File