



**Commonwealth Edison**  
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EBS Ltr. #394-75

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
June 25, 1975



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operation-Region III  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
FAILURE OF VALVE MO-2-1301-2 TO OPERATE

- References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A
- 2) Notification of Region III of U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Telephone: Phil Johnson, 1355 hours on June 15, 1975  
Telegram: J. Keppler, 1102 hours on June 16, 1975
- 3) Drawing Number 12E2507A

Report Number: 50-237/75-38

Report Date: June 25, 1975

Occurrence Date: June 15, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

At 0800 hours on June 15, 1975, isolation condensor outboard steam supply valve MO-2-1301-2 was found to have a bent stem.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Unit-2 was in the shutdown mode during a weekend maintenance outage. The instrument mechanics were performing the high flow isolation valve surveillance test which causes valve 1301-2 to close.

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June 25, 1975

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

Following a work request for a tripped circuit breaker, the electrical maintenance department made an inspection of valve 1301-2. During testing of the breaker and Limitorque operator, the valve was found to have a bent stem.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Equipment Failure)

No definite cause has been determined at this time; however, two problems apparently contributed to the occurrence:

- 1) Excessive cycling of valve 1301-2 during maintenance and surveillance testing of the high flow isolation  $\Delta P$  switches caused the breaker to trip thermally. The control room operator inadvertently placed the control switch in the "auto" position instead of the closed position specified in the surveillance procedure. The "auto" position allowed the valve to cycle each time the  $\Delta P$  switches were tripped.
- 2) A possible maladjustment of the limit switches for valve travel may have allowed the valve's torque switch to be bypassed, causing the valve to close with excessive force and bending the stem.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

Since Unit-2 was in the shutdown mode with pressure under 90 psig, the isolation condensor was not required to be operable. The outboard valve 1301-2 was in the closed position (isolated) and was capable of isolating the inboard valve 1301-1 if isolation had been required. Plant personnel and the public were not jeopardized by this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to submit a work request for inspection of the valve and breaker. The electrical maintenance department had the valve taken out of service for disassembly and replacement of the stem. The Limitorque drive nut and the valve stem threads were worn significantly; consequently, a valve stem and Limitorque operator from the Unit-3 1301-2 valve were installed.

The limit and torque switches were inspected for damage and found to be in good condition; however, the initial limit switch settings were not checked before disassembly.

After assembly, the valve was successfully cycled three times, both locally and from the control room. All aspects of the control circuitry performed as designed. The valve was also successfully leak-rate tested before being placed back in service.

The control room operators have been cautioned to place valves in the closed position, as specified in the surveillance procedure, to avoid valve cycling during testing.

Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region III  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Telecopied Date 6-16-75  
CE 11:02 a.  
DC 10:55 a.  
BY aw

cc:

J. F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

50-237

SUBJECT: DPE-19, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2

This will confirm a conversation with Mr. Phil Johnson of  
your office at 1<sup>55</sup> P hrs this date concerning a failure of the  
evolution condenser down stream steam  
supply valve - 2-1301-2. This valve closed  
but failed to open while performing the  
evolution condenser hi. flow surveillance.

The reactor was in a shut down  
condition because of maintenance work  
on the A.P.S. sys.

50-237  
inquiry

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To Call:

CE - 5-858-2660x16 (auto)  
DC - 9-1-381-492-7617 (auto) - on 6  
WF - 815-942-4449/4321

Station Dist: Originator (copy)  
Incident File (copy)  
Telegram File (original)

B. B. Stephenson, Superintendent  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
Commonwealth Edison Company  
E.E. #1  
Morris, IL 60459

Telephone: 815-942-2920/2921x212  
(telecopy x262)