

RO Files

To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/48

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications,
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

J. T. Carroll, Jr. 9/26/74
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

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PDR ADOCK 05000219
S PDR

RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE *9/26/74 12:00*

*50-219
incident*

Initial Telephone

Report Date: 9/25/74

Date of

Occurrence: 9/25/74

Initial Written

Report Date: 9/26/74

Time of

Occurrence: 1010

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/48IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Isolation of the A and B isolation condensers due to a false high flow indication on the condensate line break sensors.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	<input type="checkbox"/> Post Scram Stabilization
	<input type="checkbox"/> Operations

Conditions prior to the scram were:

Power:	Reactor, 1902 MWt
	Electric, 665 MWe
Flow:	Recirc., 60.2×10^6 lb/hr
	Feed., 7.11×10^6 lb/hr
Reactor Pressure:	1020 psig
Stack Gas:	1260 μ Ci/sec

DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 25, 1974, a generator load rejection scram occurred which resulted in closure of the MSIV's approximately 45 seconds later due to low main steam line pressure. In order to remove the reactor decay heat and control reactor pressure, an attempt was made to initiate the B isolation condenser. Approximately one half minute after initiation,

the B isolation condenser rupture alarm sounded and the condenser

isolated. The operator on duty immediately pushed the isolation condenser isolation reset button and reinitiated the condenser which again isolated after the appropriate time interval. The operator then initiated the A isolation condenser which also isolated approximately one half minute after initiation. Since the condensers were operable for half minute periods apiece due to the action of an isolation bypass time delay relay which is started when the isolation signal occurs, the operator was able to alternately initiate and reset the condenser isolations, thereby providing a heat sink for the reactor decay heat.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/> Installation/	<input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental
<input type="checkbox"/> Construction	<input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure
<input type="checkbox"/> Operator	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____

The cause of this occurrence is under investigation.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

Had a bonafied isolation condenser initiation condition existed both condensers would have isolated, thus eliminating them as a heat sink for the reactor vessel. It should be noted that they could have been initiated manually using the previously discussed techniques.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

Surveillance testing was performed on all isolation condenser condensate line break sensors. "As found" setpoints for the sensors were found to be below the Technical Specification limit

of 27 inches H₂O. During this testing, the line break sensors were adjusted to trip at 27 inches H₂O.

Additional items of corrective action will be determined during the review of this occurrence by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

FAILURE DATA: Not applicable.

Prepared by:

J. P. Manning for
A. H. Rone

Date:

9/25/74