

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 360A (17))

Description of the Event:

On March 21, 1984, with Unit 2 operating at 95% power, automatic actuation of the standby gas treatment system occurred as a result of a partial Group III isolation in the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) at 1:30 a.m. The partial isolation was caused by a burned-out relay in the PCIS logic (Relay No. 16A-K24).

With no main steam tunnel ventilation, the temperature in the tunnel increased to slightly less than the trip level setting of 200 degrees F. As allowed in Table 3.2.A of the Technical Specifications, the trip level setting was increased to 250 degrees F at 4:05 a.m. This increase is allowed for a period not to exceed 30 minutes to permit restoration of ventilation flow.

Relay 16A-K24 was replaced with its auxiliary relay 16A-K24A from the PCIS logic. Ventilation was restored at 4:10 a.m., and the steam tunnel high temperature trip setting was reset to 200 degrees F at 4:28 a.m.

Consequences of the Event:

The PCIS is designed as a fail safe system. The failure of the relay in the PCIS logic caused the standby gas treatment system to automatically actuate as designed.

Temperature detection, radiation monitoring and steam line high flow instrumentation are provided to detect main steam line breaks. During this period, the tunnel radiation monitors were operable and the steam line high flow instrumentation was operable.

Operators also monitored control room indication of the duct temperatures to detect a rapid increase in tunnel temperatures indicative of a steam line break.

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

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Therefore, there was adequate protection in the unlikely event of a main steam line break. The temporary increase of the high temperature trip level setting is permitted to restore main steam tunnel ventilation. Ventilation was restored and the high temperature trip point was reset prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit permitted by the Technical Specifications.

Because of a wiring error which occurred during replacement of the 16A-K24A relay, the CAD system was inoperable in that the PCIS logic for four normally closed, outboard post-LOCA containment atmospheric dilution valves was affected. However, these valves remained closed, and there was no breach of primary containment integrity.

Cause of the Event:

The cause of the partial Group III isolation signal was a burned-out coil in relay 16A-K24 (General Electric Company Type CR120A) within the PCIS logic.

Corrective Actions:

Upon receipt of the partial Group III isolation signal, an investigation determined that the coil on relay 16A-K24 had burned-out. This relay was replaced with its auxiliary relay and 16A-K24A was replaced with a new relay. A Plant Operations Review Committee approved checkout procedure was used to verify proper relay operation. This procedure identified a wiring error on the 16A-K24A which occurred during relay replacement. This error was corrected and the test was re-performed satisfactorily. The affected portion of the PCIS logic was restored to operable condition at 5:25 p.m. on March 21, 1984.

The Engineering & Research Department is evaluating all relays in safety-related systems (including the Primary Containment Isolation System) in response to I.E. Bulletin No. 84-02, "Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays in Use in Class IE Safety Systems" and will be paying particular attention to the service life for GE Type CR120A relays.

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April 19, 1984

Docket No. 50-277

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
SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report

This LER concerns the automatic starting of the Standby Gas Treatment System due to relay failure.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277
Report Number:	2-84-02
Revision Number:	00
Event Date:	March 21, 1984
Report Date:	April 19, 1984
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(iv)

Very truly yours,



W. T. Uflrich
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation Division

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
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Site Inspector

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