NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Approved OMB No. 3150-0104
Expires: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 3	1 OF 2

TITLE (4)
Drift of RCS Pressure Transmitter input to ESAS

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 3	2 8	8 4	8 4	-- 0	0 3 -- 0	0 4	2 0	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)	X	50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)	X	50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	Telephone Number (Area Code)
Donald B. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor	5 0 1 9 6 4 3 2 1 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NPRDS	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NPRDS
X	J E	P T	F 1 8 0	Y					

SUPPLEMENT REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	Month	Day	Year
_ Yes (If yes, complete Expected Submission Date) X No				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) calibration while shutdown for a planned mid-cycle outage, three Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure transmitters were found out of tolerance in the non-conservative direction. Each pressure transmitter provides input to one of the three ESAS channels. The high drift of the Foxboro manufactured transmitters, model E11GH, would have resulted in ESAS actuation on low primary pressure by as much as 22.75 psig below the Technical Specification required actuation setpoint of $\geq$ 1500 psig. All three instruments were calibrated to within acceptable tolerances.

Form 1062.01B

NRC Form 366A
(9-83)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 3	8 4	-- 0 0 3	-- 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

While shutdown for a planned mid-cycle outage, Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians were performing Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) calibrations. On March 27, 1984, at 1530, PT-1040 which provides Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure signal to ESAS channel 3, was found out-of-tolerance such that the channel 3 low primary system pressure actuation would have occurred at 1489 psig rather than $\geq$ 1500 psig as required by Technical Specifications. On March 28, 1984, at 1430, PT-1022 which provides RCS pressure signal to ESAS channel 2, was found out-of-tolerance such that channel 2 actuation would have occurred at 1478.25 psig. On March 28, 1984, at 1500, PT-1020 which provides RCS pressure signal to ESAS channel 1, was found out-of-tolerance such that the channel 1 actuation would have occurred at 1492.5 psig. The cause of these occurrences was a non-conservative high drift of all three pressure transmitters. The three pressure transmitters were manufactured by Foxboro, model E11GH, Bourdon type range 0-2500 psi. Each transmitter was recalibrated to within acceptable tolerances.

ESAS actuation on low primary system pressure intiates High Pressure Injection and Low Pressure Injection and starts Reactor Building Cooling and Reactor Building Isolation in the event of a breach of RCS integrity. The pressure transmitter drift is potentially significant in that ESAS actuation would not have occurred at the analyzed primary system pressure setpoint had the plant been operating and a breach of the RCS had occurred. ESAS functional integrity was not impaired in that all systems actuation would have occurred on low primary pressure 22.75 psig below the Technical Specification setpoint.

This event is reportable per 50.73(a)(2)(v) and 50.73(a)(2)(vii) in that, had the plant been operating, and a breach of the RCS occurred, ESAS actuation would have been initiated at a primary pressure below the analyzed setpoint. A similar occurrence was reported in LER-83-004.

Changes to ESAS settings for actuation on low primary pressure have been made and incorporated into surveillance procedures to provide confidence that there is adequate allowance for setpoint drift in the future.

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April 20, 1984

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One -Unit 1
Docket No. 50-313
License No. NPF-6
Licensee Event Report
No. 84-003-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) and 50.73(a)(2)(vii), attached is the subject report concerning drift of RCS pressure transmitter input to ESAS.

Very truly yours,

James M. Levine

James M. Levine
General Manager

JRM:mab

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard P. Denise, Director
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