


Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003
Telephone (212) 460-5181

May 25, 1973

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. O'Leary:

5/30/73
FD
JRH
OW
JK
FN
JS
GUR
LB

The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-5 is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1 of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On Friday, May 18, 1973, the Reactor Coolant System was in the process of being heated up in order to conduct a hydrostatic test. At the time, four reactor coolant pumps were in service with Reactor Coolant System conditions of approximately 440 psig, 130°F, 1980 ppm boron and all control rods inserted. The reactor had not yet been brought to initial criticality.

At 0552 hours, a pressure transient within the Reactor Coolant System was experienced due to the closure of certain air operated valves in the reactor coolant letdown system. The reactor coolant pumps and charging pump were shutdown to prevent any further pressure increases. Closure of the valves resulted in Reactor Coolant System pressure increasing to approximately 575 psig. An investigation revealed that moisture in an air supply line at the refrigerant dryer of the Instrument Air system had frozen. The alternate dryer was placed in service with subsequent re-establishment of the proper pressure within the Instrument Air System. Reactor Coolant System pressure was then returned to normal.

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S PDR

50-247
Inquiry 3520

May 25, 1973

Investigation as to the cause of the freeze-up disclosed that the suction service valve to the refrigerant compressor had been backseated to eliminate gland leakage. Backseating of this valve, however, also resulted in isolation of the low suction pressure shutoff controller for the compressor and this caused it to remain in service allowing moisture in the air line to freeze, and eventually interrupt the air supply.

To prevent recurrence, a relocation of the suction pressure controller tap to a point directly on the suction of the compressor is to be accomplished. This will allow backseating of the valve to prevent freon leakage along the valve stem, without affecting the control system. In the interim, signs have been installed at the dryers prohibiting full-backseating of the subject valves while the compressor is in service.

The safety implications of this occurrence are not considered significant. There was no damage incurred to any system or component nor was there any reason to expect any as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude. The pressure limitation of 500 psig, at coolant temperatures less than 220°F, is imposed only as a means for providing additional conservatism in the application of fracture toughness concepts. The limit also includes the effects of fast neutron exposure which would occur over a two year period of operation. In light of the above, it is considered that the safety of the facility was not comprised by this occurrence.

Very truly yours,

William C. Caldwell

CC - Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regulatory Operations

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ICS IPMDONA NYK

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PMS JAMES P OREILLY DIRECTOR

REGULATORY OPERATIONS REGION I

US ATOMIC ENERGY COMM

970 BORAD ST

NEWARK NJ 07102

DEAR MR OREILLY-

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

6.6.1B FOR FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO

DPR-26 WE WISH TO INFORM YOU OF AN ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE WHICH WAS

IDENTIFIED ON MAY 18, 1973 AT 0552 HOURS-

IN THE COURSE OF HEATING UP THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PREPARATORY TO THE CONDUCT OF A HYDROSTATIC

TEST, A PRESSURE TRANSIENT TO ABOUT 575 PSIG

BP-1201 (RS-68)

WAS EXPERIENCED DU TO CLOSURE OF CERTAIN AIR OPERATED VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CHARGING AND LETDOWN SYSTEM UPON LOSS OF CONTROL AIR.

OUR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INDICATES THT THE LOSS OF CONTROL AIR WAS THE RESULT OF A FREEZE UP OF THE AIR SUPPLY LINE AT THE REFRIGERANT DYER. AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSIENT, THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WAS A APPROXIMATELY 440 PSIG.

AND 130 DEGREES F WITH FOUR REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS IN SERVICE AND ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED.

THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENT NOR WAS

THERE ANY REASON TO EXPECT ANY AS A RESULT OF THE PRESSURE TRANSIENT. MR A FASANO OF YOUR OFFICE WAS INFORMED OF THE OCCURRENCE BY MR JOHN MAKEPEACE BY TELEPHONE ON MAY 18 1973.

BP-1201 (RS-68)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.2 NOTIFICATION OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY COMMITTEE HAS BEEN MADE.

WE ARE CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE AND WILL ADVISE YOU OF OUR FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN IN A WRITTEN REPORT WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED WITHIN THE REQUIRED TEN (10) DAYS
YOURS TRULY

WILLIAM E CALDWELL

Dupe 8110240535

RO files

MEMO ROUTE SLIP		See me about this. Note and return	For concurrence. For signature	For action. For information
TO: (Name and unit) H. D. Thornburg, Chief, FS&EB		INITIALS DATE	REMARKS Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company Docket No.: 50-247 Abnormal Occurrence: Telegram dtd 5/21/73	
TO: (Name and unit) RO:HQ (5) DR Central Files (1) Regulatory Standards Dir. of Licensing (13)		INITIALS DATE	REMARKS The attached report from the subject licensee is forwarded in accordance with RO Manual Chapter 1000.	
TO: (Name and unit)		INITIALS DATE	REMARKS The action taken by the licensee is considered appropriate. Followup will be performed during the next inspection as appropriate. Copies of	
FROM: (Name and unit) RO:I		REMARKS the report have been forwarded to the PDR, Local PDR, NSIC, DTIE and State representatives. The licensee will submit a 10 day written report to Licensing.		
PHONE NO.	DATE			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GPO: 1971 O - 445-469

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM.
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE

1973 MAY 29 PM 1 53

RECEIVED

Handwritten signature/initials